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Hours of Service Impact Assessment 
Phase 1 : Baseline Risk Estimates and Carrier Experience 
Introduction 
The objective of this project is to provide baseline information to assess the impact of the 
proposed hours of service (HOS) options, including safety and economic impacts. The 
analysis is organized around driverloperation groups developed by Federal Motor Carrier 
Safety Administration (FMCSA) for the hours of service (HOS) options. The objective of 
Phase 1 is to provide preliminary information for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. 
One objective of this work is to develop baseline estimates of the risk of fatigue accidents by 
the driverloperation subsets identified in the HOS options under consideration. Baseline 
estimates of the number of vehicles, vehicle miles of travel and fatigue accidents will be 
refined to characterize the populations affected by hours of service regulations. The FHWA 
Office of Motor Carriers (now FMCSA) prepared preliminary assessments of the crash 
problem size and driver population. The primary objective of this work is to separate the 
estimates of fatigue accidents by the driverloperation subsets identified in the HOS options 
under consideration. The accident data will be developed in Section 1.1. The incidence of 
fatigue accidents will be combined with the population data, developed in Section 1.2, to 
estimate the overall risk of fatigue accidents for each driverloperation option. These: risk 
estimates are the necessary starting point for subsequent estimates of the safety impact of 
each HOS option, 
The impact on drivers and motor carriers is addressed in Section 1.3. This Section is divided 
into three activities. Section 1.3.1 will provide baseline information on driver sched.ules from 
the University of Michigan Trucking Industry Program (UMTIP) driver survey. A 
preliminary assessment of the driver impact is addressed in Section 1.3.2, while the industry 
impact is addressed in Section 1.3.3 
1.1: Accident Data 
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) prepared a brief "Accident 
Problem Size Assessment: Large Truck Accidents Related Primarily to Fatigue" in 
September 1998. This task adopts the same definition of fatigue as coded on police accident 
reports (and in FARS). The objective of this task is to expand on the FMCSA analysis by 
distinguishing driverloperation subsets identified in the HOS options. This will be 
accomplished by using the UMTRI Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents (TIFA) data that 
supplements the FARS (Fatality Analysis Reporting System) data. The TIFA file offers 
several advantages for this analysis. In addition to the FARS variables, TIFA has more 
complete and accurate truck type codes, area of operation (interstate, intrastate), carrier type 
(private, for-hire), and the trip type variable based on one-way intended trip distance (local 
delivery, 51-100 miles, 101-200 miles, 201-500 miles, over 500 miles) used in the 1992 
Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS). These variables will be used to identify 
driverloperation subsets that correspond to those identified in the HOS options. 
The levels for coding trip distance have changed over the period of the TIFA file. From 1980 
to 1990, a two level coding (local, over the road) taken from the MCS 50-T form was used. 
From 1991 to 1993, three levels corresponding to the 1987 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
(local, 50-200, and greater than 200 miles) were used in TIFA. Starting in 1994, the five 
level coding (local, 50-100, 100-200,200-500, >500) from the 1992 Truck Inventory and Use 
Survey was adopted in TIFA. Distances are the intended one-way trip distance. 
Consequently, the 5 level trip distance variable is only available in the 1994 to 1996 TIFA 
files. The three level trip distance is available in the 1991 to 1996 files by combining the five 
level classification. Additional variables in the preliminary analysis are time of day and 
hours driving at the time of the accident. 
1.1.1 Coding of Fatigue in Fatal Accidents 
The measures of interest, or dependent variables, for this analysis are prevalence and risk. 
Prevalence measures the size of the problem. Prevalence is most important because it 
identifies the target population. Risk is of secondary importance, but may provide insight to 
the role of explanatory factors. Risk estimates are also necessary to estimate potential 
benefits when the countermeasures may change the underlying exposure amount or 
distribution. 
Prevalence is the annual frequency of, in this case, truck driver fatigue in fatal accidents (and 
non-fatal later). For the six years, 1991 to 1996, fatigue is coded as a contributing factor for 
5 11 trucks drivers out of a total of 27,463 medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal 
accidents over the six year period. The 5 11 cases of truck driver fatigue coded correspond to 
an annual average of 85 per year, or 1.9 percent of all medium and heavy trucks involved in 
fatal accidents in the U.S. 
Fatigue is shown by year in Figure 1. There is a clear downward trend over the 17 years 
shown. A quick review of the coding of fatigue by State shows some large variations. These 
results are based on a 6-year TIFA file, 1991-1996. The coding on fatigue is taken from the 
"driver related factors" variables in FARS. Up to 3 factors can be selected from a list of 
nearly 100 choices covering the broad categories of physicaUmenta1 condition, vision 
obscured, avoiding or swerving, and miscellaneous. "Drowsy, sleepy, asleep, fatigued" is the 
first factor listed (01). For this analysis, the truck driver is classified as fatigued if 01 is 
coded for any of the three contributing factors for the truck driver. For most cases, no driver 
related factor is coded. "None" is coded about 60 percent of the time for the first driver 
related factor, 80 percent for the second factor, and 95 percent for the third. When fatigue is 
coded, it is indicated as the first driver related factor in about 75 percent of the cases ( and is 
coded as the second or third factor for the rest). FARS analysts must rely on the original 
police accident report. To the extent that the reporting of fatigue varies from state to state, it 
is probably a reflection of the availability of coding or information on the original police 
report. In general, the FARS data are very accurate and complete. Fatigue, of course, is 
particularly difficult to assess, even with in-depth investigations, since there is no physical 
evidence of fatigue. The assessment is usually based on statements of the involved parties or 
witnesses, or inferred from the sequence of events. 
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Figure 1: Fatigue by Year, TIFA 1980-1996 
States have been sorted in order of increasing fatigue and are shown in Figure 2. Note 
several states with no fatigue reported in six years. The TIFA file is a sample of the FARS 
census file. Comparison of the TIFA data with the FARS census file for the years 1993 to 
1995 show only minor differences. North Carolina and Wisconsin each report one fatigue 
case over that period, as compared to none in the TIFA file. Aggregate totals for the year 
differ by only a case or two. Since fatigue occurs primarily on rural roads, difference in 
urbanization from state to state may influence the state wide proportion of fatigue. The 
ranking of states in Figure 2 is repeated for rural accidents only in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Fatigue by State for Rural Accidents Only, TIFA 1991-1996 
A few changes are evident. Delaware and Connecticut drop to zero when only rural areas are 
included. Otherwise, the ordering of the two figures is similar. Of most concern, are 5 large 
states, shown in Table 1, with a total of only 9 fatigue cases in 6 years, or 0.2 percent of the 
truck drivers involved in fatal accidents in the 5 states (based on all accidents). This 
percentage is below the average (1.86 percent) by nearly a factor of 10. One might conclude 
that fatigue is underreported in these states. These states represent 20 percent of the national 
total, suggesting that the national average is also significantly underreported. 
Table 1 
States Reporting less than 0.5% Fatigue 
TIFA 1991-1996 
State Fatigue Total Percent 
Florida 5 1648 0.3% 
Michigan 3 879 0.3% 
North Carolina 0 1115 0.0% 
Ohio 1 1167 0.1% 
Wisconsin 0 573 0.0% 
Total 9 5382 0.2% 
A second group of states is shown in Table 2. This group also has a relatively low 
percentage of fatigue. However, this group includes some small states such as District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, and New Hampshire, and as a group represent only 10 percent of the 
national total. Consequently, they are of less concern. 
Table 2 
States Reporting 0.5% to 0.7% Fatigue 
TIFA 1991-1996 
State Fatigue Total Percent 
Arkansas 4 567 0.7% 
Dist of Columbia 0 18 0.0% 
Hawaii 0 25 0.0% 
Maryland 2 377 0.5% 
Massachusetts 1 208 0.5% 
Minnesota 3 423 0.7% 
Mississippi 5 559 0.9% 
Nevada 1 1 73 0.6% 
New Hampshire 0 6 1 0.0% 
New Jersey 3 498 0.6% 
Total 19 2909 0.7% 
The remaining states, shown in Table 3, all report at least 1 percent fatigue among truck 
drivers involved in fatal accidents. As a group, these states account for 70 percent of the 
national total for fatal truck accidents. The average level of truck driver fatigue reported in 
these states is 2.5 percent, or about 35 percent higher than the overall figure for all states 
during the years 1991 to 1996. 
Table 3 


















































































































































Wyoming 1 88 1.1% 
Total 483 19172 2.5% 
It may also be of interest to note the other extreme, states reporting the highest percentage of 
fatigue among truck drivers. Four states are substantially higher than the rest and these are 
listed separately in Table 4. Texas and Arizona share the boarder with Mexico, and Maine is 
the home of Parents Against Tired Truckers (PATT). Texas also has a very complete 
accident report that includes fatigue in a long list of "factor or conditions that may have 
contributed" to the collision that is printed on the report form.. The report states that this 
information is based on the officer's opinion. The Texas police-reported accident data may 
be a good source to look at fatigue in non-fatal collisions. Neither Arizona or Maine include 
fatigue as an explicit category on the accident report form. 
Table 4 
States Reporting the Most Fatigue 
TIFA 1991-1996 
As part of this look at fatigue by state, states were aggregated into four geographic regions. 
This result is shown in Table 5. As one may have expected, the percentage of fatigue among 
truck dnvers is higher in the western states. However, this result is influenced by the state to 
state variations already discussed. 
Table 5 
Fatigue by Geographic Region 
TIFA 1991-1996 
State Fatigue Total Percent 
Northeast 131 9869 1.3% 
Southeast 67 6609 1 .O% 
Northwest 50 2447 2.0% 
Southwest 262 8487 3.1 % 
AL & HI 1 51 2.0% 
Total 511 27463 1.9% 
The reporting of fatigue was also examined for only collisions with one or more fatalities in 
the truck. This result is shown in Figure 4. Overall, 14 percent of all trucks involved in fatal 
accidents had one or more fatalities in the truck. Of the truck occupant fatalities, 9.5 percent 
(361 cases) were coded for truck driver fatigue. These fatigue cases are 70 percent of all 
fatigue coded for truck drivers in the TIFA data for 1991 to 1996. The proportion of fatigue 
in the non-truck fatalities is 0.6 percent. Again, the variation by state is substantial. The 
order of the states is essentially the same as Figure 2. The range of percentages is 
substantially higher, with several states reporting over 20 percent fatigue in truck driver 
fatalities and a few reporting 40 percent. 
Figure 5 looks at the reporting of fatigue by state in the older TIFA files from 1980 to 1990. 
The ranking of states is very similar. Whatever the reasons for state to state differences, they 
seem to be fairly stable over the entire 17 years. The overall percentage of fatigue is 
somewhat higher in the 1980s, as shown by the yearly trend in Figure 1. 
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Figure 4: Fatigue by State for Truck Driver Fatalities, TIFA 1991-1996 
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Figure 5: Fatigue by State, TIFA 1980-1990 
The variations in fatigue reporting provide some insight to the difficulty of identifying the 
role of fatigue in accidents and the difficulty in determining the total incidence of fatigue 
nationwide. It seems clear that the overall proportion in fatal accidents, 1.86 percent from 
FARSITFA, underestimates the true value. The largest proportions of fatigue for individual 
states in the FARS file approach the levels observed from in-depth investigations. For 
example, values of 20 to 40 percent for truck occupant fatalities are in the same range 
reported by NTSB in their truck driver fatality study. Similarly, the range of truck driver 
fatigue in all medium and heavy truck fatal involvements among states (Figure 2) exceeds the 
range estimated from more in-depth examinations reported in the FMCSA Accident ]Problem 
Size Assessment for truck driver fatigue. 
The remaining issue is to determine whether the variation in fatigue reporting from state to 
state should alter the planned safety analysis described here. One might consider limiting the 
states used to a subset with "better" reporting. But this creates the need to extrapolate back to 
national estimates, and introduces the problem as to whether the subset is still representative 
of the whole. As far as we know, the other variables in the analysis are not subject to the 
same kind of state to state variation. Consequently, the current approach will be to continue 
with the complete file. The information on state to state variations in the reporting of fatigue 
illustrates the uncertainty in our overall population estimate. This issue can be addre:ssed by 
simply factoring up the observed proportions by whatever amount is felt to be most 
appropriate, as in the FMCSA analysis. 
1.1.2 Prevalence of Fatigue in Fatal Accidents 
The objective of this analysis of the prevalence of fatigue is to identify subsets that account 
for the greatest proportion of the fatigue cases. Consequently, all prevalence results will be 
presented as a percentage of the total for each table or figure. The sum of all bars or1 every 
figure is 100 percent. This holds when another variable is used to divide the data, such as 
straight trucks versus tractors. Overall percentages are shown so that the sum of all the 
straight truck bars plus the tractors is 100 percent. This approach maintains the relative 
proportions for each category (independent) variable. 
Figures in this section are presented in pairs, two on a page. The top figure shows the 
distribution (prevalence) of all medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal accidents and the 
bottom figure is the distribution of all medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal accidents 
where truck driver fatigue was coded as a contributing factor. The top figure is shown only 
for reference, or perspective, to illustrate the overall pattern of fatal accidents involving 
medium and heavy trucks. For many factors, the distribution of all trucks involved in fatal 
accident reflects the underlying exposure. The overall fatal accident involvement can be 
thought of as the product of the exposure amount multiplied by the risk of involvement in a 
fatal accident per unit exposure. It will be shown in Section 1.2 using exposure estimates 
from TIUS, that the variations in risk were often less than the variation in exposure, so that 
the underlying exposure pattern is visible in the accident experience. Of course, this is not 
always the case and for variables without exposure data, one cannot know for sure. 
The basic approach is illustrated in the following tables. The coding of truck driver fatigue is 
shown by the 5 trip distance categories in Table 6. The greatest portion, 36.6 percent, of the 
fatigue cases are in the trip distance greater than 500 miles category. The prevalence of truck 
driver fatigue will be examined in relation to many variables in order to better characterize 
the factors associated with the greatest proportion of truck driver fatigue. 
Table 6 
Truck Driver Fatigue, TIFA 1994-1996 
Trip Distance 
Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 2500 Unknown Total 
Frequency 21 32 28 62 98 27 268 
Percent 7.8% 11.9% 10.4% 23.1% 36.6% 10.1% 100.0% 
It is also of interest to compare the distribution of the fatigue cases with the distribution of all 
cases, shown in Table 7. For the current example, the question is whether fatigue is over- 
represented in any of the trip distance categories. A finding that fatigue is over- or under- 
represented in specific trip distance categories indicates an association between the factor 
level and fatigue. Comparing these two tables, one sees that 36.6 percent of the fatigue cases 
are coded >500 miles trip distance whereas 15.5 percent of all trucks involved in fatal 
accidents are coded trip distance >500 miles. Thus, fatigue is over-represented in trips >500 
miles by a factor of 2.35, the ratio of these two percentages, as shown in Table 8. 
Table 7 
All Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents, TIFA 1994-1996 
Trip Distance 
Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 >500 Unknown Total 
Frequency 5,685 1,655 1,462 2,041 2,244 1,346 14,433 
Percent 39.4% 11.5% 10.1% 14.1% 15.5% 9.3% 100.0% 
This calculation is convenient to use because it is scaled to always produce an overall figure 
of 1.0 for the aggregate. It is equivalent to the ratio of the percentage of cases coded fatigue 
in an individual category (9812,244 = 4.4% for trips >500 miles) to the overall percent fatigue 
(268114,433 = 1.9%). The ratio of 4.4 to 1.9 is 2.35. These percentages estimate the 
probability of fatigue given the truck is involved in a fatal accident. The ratio takes the form 
of a relative risk where the denominator is based on fatal accident involvement. 
Table 8 
Relative Risk of Fatigue based on Fatal Accident Involvement. TIFA 1994-1996 
Trip Distance 
Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 >500 Unknown Total 
Relative Risk 0.20 1.04 1.03 1.64 2.35 1.08 1 .OO 
Later, fatal accident involvement rates per vehicle miles traveled will be presented as a 
similar relative risk. The calculation is the same. The accident rate (trucks involved per vmt) 
in an individual category is divided by the overall accident rate to produce a relative ~ i s k  
scaled to an overall value of 1.0. 
This initial work focuses on common variables in both the TIFA data and the 1992 Truck 
Inventory and Use Survey so that the relative risk of fatigue based on the registered vehicle 
population and vehicle miles traveled can also be calculated. For these variables, three rates, 
or relative risks, can be formed: 
1. Fatigue in fatal accident involvement per vehicle miles traveled 
2. All fatal accident involvement per vehicle miles traveled 
3. Fatigue fatal accident involvement per all fatal accident involvement 
The three are related as: 
Fatal fatigue involvement/vmt = (all fatal involvement/vmt) x 
(fatal fatigue involvement/(all fatal involvemen~t) 
This is equivalent to: 
Relative risk of fatigue in a fatal accident = (relative risk of fatal accident involvement) x 
(relative risk of fatigue given fatal involvement) 
The relative risk of fatigue per vehicle (driver) or per vehicle miles traveled is probably of 
primary interest. However, the necessary exposure data are available for only a few factors, 
trip distance, power unit type, and privatelfor hire. After that, we have only the accident data 
and can only calculate the last term, the risk of fatigue given fatal accident involvement. The 
exposure-based rates will illustrate the relationship (or lack of relationship) between relative 
risk based only on accident data and risk measures based on exposure. 
Exposure data and rates based on exposure data are covered in the next Section, 1.2. This 
section covers all results based only on accident data. The following results are limited to 
fatal accidents. Information on non-fatal accidents in Texas is presented Section 1.1.3. 
The first group of results is limited to variables that are available in both FARSITFA and the 
1992 TIUS. The three variables are: trip distance, power unit type (straightltractor), and 
carrier type (privatelfor hire). The sequence of figures is as follows: 
Figure 6, Figure 7: Trip distance (5 levels), 1994-1996 
Figure 8, Figure 9: Trip distance (5 levels) by Power Unit Type, 1994-1996 
Figure 10, Figure 11: Trip distance (3 levels), 1991-1996 
Figure 12, Figure 13: Trip distance (3 levels) by Power Unit Type, 1991-1996 
Figure 14, Figure 15: Trip distance and Power Unit type (6 levels) 
by Carrier Type, 1991-1996 
Figure 16, Figure 17: Trip distance and Power Unit type (6 levels) 
by Truck/Nontruck, 1991-1996 
The pairs of figures on the following pages show the prevalence (or percent distribution) of 
all trucks involved in fatal accidents on the top of the page and the subset of those trucks with 
fatigued drivers on the bottom of the page (as in Table 7and Table 6). The bottom figure 
shows the relative contribution of each category to the overall prevalence of fatigue. 
Comparison of the distributions on the top and bottom of each page gives a visual indication 
of the under- or over-involvement of fatigue in each category of the independent variables. 
The ratio of these percentages, the relative risk of fatigue given involvement in a fatal 
accident, is presented later in this section after all the prevalence results. Higher levels of 
relative risk imply an association between factors defining (or associated with) the categories 
of the independent variable and the risk of a fatigue related involvement in a fatal accident. 
Some observations from this first group of results on prevalence follow. 
Trip Distance. The definition of this variable in the TIFA file is taken from the Truck 
Inventory and Use Survey. The categories are based on the trip distance in one direction, and 
not the round-trip distance. For application in TIFA, it is defined as the intended one-way 
trip distance in order for the categories to be compatible with TIUS. Thus, in the TIFA file, 
the accident must have occurred at some distance less than the intended one-way distance. 
Hours of driving since the last 8-hour break are recorded in a separate variable and time of 
day is also available from the FARS record, but no comparable exposure data are available 
on these variables. Results on time of day and hours driving from the accident data will be 
presented after the current group of variables. 
The current 5-level version of the trip distance variable is available since 1994 in TIFA. 
Even though TIUS adopted this version for the 1992 survey, TIFA did not incorporate it until 
1994. The 3-level version used in the earlier TIUS was used in TIFA starting with the 1991 
file. The major observation has already been stated: the greatest portion (prevalence) of the 
fatigue cases, 36.6 percent, are in the trip distance greater than 500 miles category, whereas 
only 15.5 percent of all trucks involved in fatal accidents are on trips of more than 500 miles. 
Thus, fatigue is over-represented in trips over 500 miles by a factor of 2.35, the ratio of these 
two percentages. These relative risk estimates based on fatal accident involvement will be 
presented after the prevalence data. Essentially the same pattern is shown in the 3-level and 
5-level versions of this variable. The 3-level version is more useful because 6 years of TIFA 
data are available as compared to only 3 with the 5-level version. 
Power Unit type and Trip Distance. Truck configuration for this study is based only on the 
power unit. This classification is most accurate in the T F A  and TIUS files. In praci:ice, it is 
essentially the same as a single-unit versus combination vehicle split. Again, the greatest 
prevalence of fatigue is on the longest trips and these trips are overwhelmingly taken by 
tractors. Based on the 1991-1996 TIFA data, only 20 percent of the truck &ivt:r fatigue 
coded is for straight truck drivers. 
Carrier Type. Fatigued drivers work primarily for for-hire carriers. Only 30 percent of the 
fatigued truck drivers involved in fatal accidents work for private carriers. In comparison, 43 
percent of all medium and heavy truck drivers involved in fatal accidents work for private 
carriers. The relative risk of fatigue for private and for-hire carriers will be addressed later. 
Truck and Nontruck Fatalities. This tabulation is somewhat different. Here the split is based 
on whether the fatalities were truck occupants or not. If the only fatalities in the accident 
were truck occupants, then it is categorized as a "truck" fatal involvement. If anyone other 
than a truck occupant received fatal injuries in the accident, then it is categorizecl as a 
"nontruck" fatal involvement. These two figures do not address factors associated with 
fatigue, but simply address the victims of fatigued truck drivers in fatal accidents. First, 
looking at all fatal accidents i~lvolving a medium or heavy truck, nearly 90 percent of the 
fatalities are parties other than the truck occupants. Most of these are occupants of passenger 
cars and other vehicles involved in the accident with the truck. But when the truck driver is 
coded as fatigued, this situation reverses dramatically. Seventy percent of the truclk driver 
fatigue involvements result only in fatalities to truck occupants. Only 30 percent result in 
fatal injury to nontruck occupants. This is largely a reflection of the fact that most fatal 
fatigue accidents are single vehicle accidents. It may be that fatigue frequently prociuces ran 
off the road (single vehicle) accidents, or it may be related to the association of fatigue and 
night travel when traffic volumes are low. 
In any event, the FARSITFA data do not provide any evidence that truck driver fatigue plays 
a significant role in fatalities among occupants of other vehicles involved in collisi~ons with 
medium and heavy trucks. In fact, looking at truckhontruck two-vehicle fatal collisions, 
fatigue is coded for the nontruck driver much more often than for the truck driver, 2.4 percent 
versus 0.9 percent (Blower, 1998). 
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Figure 11: Percent Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 





B 20.0% a 
10.0% 
0.0% 
Local 50-200 >200 Unknown 
Trip Distance 
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Figure 13: Percent Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
and Trip Distance (3 level), Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 
All Medium and Heavy Trucks 
40.0% 
Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Unknown 
Straight Tractor 
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Figure 16: Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities: 
Percent Distribution by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) 
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Figure 17: Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities: 
Percent Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and 
Trip Distance (6 levels) Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 
Time of Day 
This series of figures focuses on one variable: time of day. No exposure data are available 
for time of day, so all results come from the TIFA files. This series maintains the full detail 
of 24 hourly categories. In order to get a maximum sample for this analysis, results from 16 
years of TIFA data, 1981 to 1996, were combined. A few comparisons showed no significant 
differences in results from the earlier years as compared to later years. This was also 
illustrated in the previous material on the coding of fatigue by state. The 16 years of TIFA 
data include 79,352 medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal accidents. Of these, fatigue 
was coded as a contributing factor for 1,653 truck drivers, or 2.1 percent. This percentage is 
a little higher than the 1.9 percent for the years 1991 to 1996. This difference is a result of 
the slight downward trend observed in the plot of fatigue by year in the earlier materials. The 
annual average over the 16 years is 103 truck drivers per year with fatigue coded as a 
contributing factor out of an annual average of 4,959 medium and heavy trucks involved in 
fatal accidents. 
Missing data on time of day reduces the available sample by only 0.1 percent. Missing data 
on other variables examined further reduces the data by usually only a few percent. For 
example, missing data on power unit type (straight truck vs. tractor) is 1.8 percent over the 16 
years. 
Prevalence is presented as a percentage. The sum of all bars on every figure is 100 percent. 
This holds when another variable is used to divide the data, such as straight trucks versus 
tractors. Overall percentages are shown so that the sum of all the straight truck bars plus the 
tractors is 100 percent. This approach maintains the relative proportions of straight trucks 
versus tractors while also illustrating the pattern with time of day. Figures in this section are 
presented in pairs, two on a page. The top figure shows the distribution (prevalence) of all 
medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal accidents and the bottom figure is the distribution 
of all medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal accidents where truck driver fatigue was 
coded as a contributing factor. The top figure is shown only for reference, or perspective, to 
illustrate the overall pattern of fatal accidents involving medium and heavy trucks. For many 
factors, the distribution of all trucks involved in fatal accident reflects the underlying 
exposure. The overall fatal accident involvement can be thought of as the product of the 
exposure amount multiplied by the risk of involvement in a fatal accident per unit exposure. 
One could observe in the earlier material using exposure estimates from TIUS, that the 
variations in risk were often less than the variation in exposure, so that the underlying 
exposure pattern is visible in the accident experience. Of course, this is not always the case, 
and without exposure data, one cannot know for sure. However, the variation in exposure by 
time of day is believed to be sufficiently large to be visible in the overall fatal accident 
experience of medium and heavy trucks. 
While the top figure is intended to provide a reference, or perspective, the bottom figure in 
this series is of more immediate relevance. It shows only truck driver fatigue in fatal 
accidents. This is the accident subset of interest, and these figures show the situations where 
truck driver fatigue occurs most often. The following series illustrates other factors in 
combination with time of day. As a starting point, the first pair of figures shows the 
distribution by time of day for all medium and heavy trucks involved in fatal accidents from 
1981 to 1996. All trucks involved in fatal accidents are shown in the top figure (Figure 18) 
and the subset of those where the truck driver has fatigue coded as a contributing factor are 
shown on the bottom of the page (Figure 19). The difference in these two distributions is 
striking. Whereas exposure is believed to dominate the first, clearly the variations in the risk 
of fatigue dominate the pattern of fatigue-related involvements. Figure 19 follows the 
circadian pattern. 
Looking ahead to the last series of figures on risk, the measure used here is simply a 
comparison of the top and bottom prevalence figures. For example, if the midnight hour 
contains 2.5 percent of all trucks involved in fatal accidents (from Figure 18) and 5 percent of 
the truck fatigue involvements (from Figure 19), then the relative risk of fatigue is 2 (5.012.5) 
for the midnight hour, given involvement in a fatal accident. This calculations is presented in 
the last series on relative risk per involvement starting with Figure 46. 
The following additional factors are illustrated with time of day in the remaining pairs of 
figures in this series: 
Figure 20, Figure 21: Power Unit Type (straight trucks versus tractors), 1981-1996 
Figure 22, Figure 23: Truck Occupant Fatalities versus Nontruck Fatalities, 1981-1996 
Figure 24, Figure 25: Trip Distance (local versus over the road), 1981-1996 
Figure 26, Figure 27: Operating Authority (interstate versus intrastate), 1981-1996 
Figure 28, Figure 29: Carrier Type (private versus for hire), 1981-1996 
Figure 30, Figure 3 1 : Carrier Type For Interstate Carriers Only, 198 1-1996 
Figure 32, Figure 33: Power Unit Type And Trip Distance, 198 1-1 996 
Observations on this series of results follow. 
Power Unit type. As shown before, the majority of fatigue coded in the FARSITFA, data is 
for tractor drivers. Even though the magnitude of fatigue is much smaller for straight truck 
drivers, it still reflects the circadian pattern. Overall, this series of figures illustrates the 
pervasive impact of the circadian pattern on fatigue for truck drivers. To the extent that the 
distribution of all fatal accident involvement by time of day reflects the underlying exposure, 
it is evident that straight trucks operate predominately during the day. Tractor involvements 
drop off at night by only a third or so in comparison to daytime levels, implying more night 
exposure than straight trucks. 
Truck and Nontruck Fatalities. Here the categories separate fatal accident involvement where 
the only fatalities where truck occupants from those resulting in fatalities to other parties in 
the accident. As noted earlier, the majority of fatalities resulting from truck driver fatigue are 
truck occupants. The distribution of all fatal involvement appears to reflect the underlying 
exposure. Truck involvement resulting in nontruck fatalities reflects substantially more 
daytime travel, while the truck fatality subset shows a more uniform pattern by time of day. 
For each subset, fatigue follows the circadian rhythm. 
Trip Distance. The two trip distance categories show the predominant daytime operation for 
local trips (in the top figure) and the more uniform distribution by time of day for the over 
the road (long haul) trips. However, fatigue follows the circadian pattern. Not the prominent 
3pm peak evident for the long-haul truck drivers on the bottom figure. 
Operating Authority. Similar results are shown for truck operated by interstate carriers as 
compared to intrastate. The experience for intrastate carriers is very similar to that for local 
trips in the previous figures. Trucks operated by interstate carriers are involved in 73 percent 
of all fatal accidents and 89 percent of the truck driver fatigue involvement. This result is 
apparently die in part to the greater nighttime operation by interstate carriers. 
Carrier Type. Similar insight on the difference between private and for-hire carriers is 
provided by the time of day distributions. Looking at the top figure, for-hire carriers appear 
to operate much more at night than private carriers. This is true even when the comparison is 
limited to interstate carriers in the next pair of figures. The circadian pattern is always 
evident in the fatigue subset. 
Power Unit type and Trip Distance. The final pair of figures shows four categories formed by 
the combination of straight trucks versus tractors with local versus over the road trips. The 
results are consistent with the trends each factor showed separately. As has been the case in 
every figure in this series, the fatigue follows the circadian rhythm. 
The relation of time of day and fatigue is pervasive. It is clearly reflected in every subset 
examined. 
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Figure 18: Time of Day Distribution for All Medium and Heavy 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents, 1981-1996 
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Figure 20: Time of Day Distribution by Power Unit Type 
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Figure 21: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
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Figure 22: Time of Day Distribution for Truck Occupant and Nontruck Fatalities 
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Truck Driver Fatigue 
M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1011 N 1314151617181920212223 
Time of Day 
Figure 23: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue 
for Truck and Nontruck Fatalities 
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Figure 24: Time of Day Distribution by Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 25: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 26: Time of Day Distribution by Operating Authority 
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Figure 27: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Operating Authority 
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Figure 28: Time of Day Distribution by Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 








Time of Day 
Figure 29: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
4.0% 
I For Hire 
All Medium and Heavy Trucks 
M 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1011 N 13141516171819202122:23 
Time of Day 
Figure 30: Time of Day Distribution by Carrier Type-Interstate Only 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 31: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue--Interstate Carriers 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 32: Time of Day Distribution by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
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Figure 33: Time of Day Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
and Trip Distance, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
Hours Driving 
This series of figures focuses on the number of hours driving at the time of the accident. No 
exposure data are available, so all results come from the TIFA files. Again, 16 years of TIFA 
data are combined, 1981 to 1996. The origin of this variable in the TIFA file is Question 11E 
on the MCS 50-T accident report that was submitted by interstate motor carriers. The 
question asked for the "hours actually driving since the last period of 8 consecutive hours off 
duty." A category was provided for each hour up to 12, and an additional category for "not 
applicable." No space was provided on the form to indicate hours driving greater than 12. 
Since the form was filed by the carrier, it is not likely they would have reported driving over 
12 hours. From 1980 through 1992, about one third of the data in TIFA came from the MCS 
50-T form. The remainder was collected by telephone interview. Since 1993, all the TIFA 
supplementary data is collected by telephone intervizw, including this question. 
The interview source is still often the owner or dnver of the truck, so one would not expect 
complete reporting for hours driving beyond the legal limit. However, the survey form 
provided space for any response and driving times over 12 hours are sometime reported. In 
some cases the information may come from an investigating officer. Sometimes respondents 
refuse to answer this question, Consequently, missing data on this variable is much higher 
than any of the other variables used for this analysis, about 25 percent in the years 19!91 to 
1996. Cases with missing data on hours driving have been excluded for this series of figures. 
This results in some loss of sample size. Cases with missing data on hours driving at the 
time of the accident have about the same proportion of truck driver fatigue, 2 percent, as in 
the overall file. However, one can expect some bias even in the complete data. The results 
are likely to under estimate the effect of driving time since longer driving time, particularly 
over 12 hours are under-reported. The following results are provided in light of this caveat. 
The following additional factors are illustrated with hours driving in the remaining pairs of 
figures in this series: 
Figure 34, Figure 35: Hours Driving, 1981-1996 
Figure 36, Figure 37: Power Unit Type (straight trucks versus tractors), 1981-1996 
Figure 38, Figure 39: Trip Distance (local versus over the road), 1981-1996 
Figure 40, Figure 41: Operating Authority (interstate versus intrastate), 1981-1996 
Figure 42, Figure 43: Carrier Type (private versus for hire), 1981-1996 
Figure 44, Figure 45: Power Unit Type And Trip Distance, 1981-1996 
The results on hours driving at the time of the accident reveal the complexity of fatigue 
issues. Figure 34, the distribution of hours driving for all medium and heavy trucks involved 
in a fatal accident, illustrates an essential fact. The majority of accidents happen after only a 
few hours of driving. More than 25 percent occur in the first hour. Two-thirds occur in the 
first 4 hours. This pattern is driven by exposure, not risk. The most exposure necessarily 
takes place in the first hour because every trip begins with the first hour. One can't drive the 
second hour without having driven the first. We don't have exposure data by hours driven, 
so we don't know how many drivers stop after the first, second, or tenth hour. However, we 
do know that the exposure distribution must be continuously decreasing with hour driving. 
For each successive hour driving, there must be fewer trips than for the previous hour. 
Consequently, accidents in the last hours of a trip will never be a large proportion of the total. 
Only about 4 percent of all medium and heavy truck dnvers involved in a fatal accident 
reported driving more than 8 hours at the time of the accident. While, these numbers are 
believed to underestimate the true total, the nature of the exposure distribution will always 
keep the number of accidents after many hours driving a small proportion of the total, even 
with dramatic increases in risk with hour driving. 
Looking at Figure 35, the majority of reported fatigue also occurs in the first few hours of 
driving. Half of all reported truck driver fatigue occurs in the first four hours of driving. 
Looking at the other end of the distribution, about 15 percent of the reported fatigue occurs 
after 8 hours of driving. While this figure implies a relative risk of fatigue of more than 3 
(1514) after 8 hours of driving, 15 percent is still a relatively small proportion of all accidents. 
While these results confirm the generally accepted fact that fatigue increases with time on 
duty, they also illustrate that time on duty is not the only factor. As illustrated in the previous 
section, the time of day when each hour of driving takes place also influences the risk of 
fatigue. It is likely that there is a strong interaction between time of day and hours driving. 
The risk of fatigue when the eighth hour is driven at 4am is likely to be much higher than 
when the eighth hour is driven at 5pm. And the risk increase may be more than the product 
of the two marginal distributions. However, that issue was not examined in this current effort. 
Furthermore, fatigue is cumulative. The amount of work and rest during the previous day 
and week also affect the level of fatigue during any hour of the current trip. However, no 
information on the previous work schedule is available for this study. Without such 
information, this study cannot quantify the cumulative effect of fatigue. Observations from 
the other factors that could be examined follow. 
The distribution of hours driving for all truck drivers involved in fatal accidents illustrates 
that straight truck drivers generally take much shorter trips than tractor drivers, as would be 
expected. While this same result is evident in the comparison of local versus over the road 
trips, the difference is less. 
The carrier variables show a similar pattern. There is a rather large difference in the 
distribution of hours driven for all truck drivers involved in fatal accidents (Figure 40). 
Intrastate carriers appear to take much shorter trips. However, in the subsequent comparison, 
there is not much difference between private carriers and for-hire carriers. Looking at Figure 
43, for-hire carriers have the most reported fatigue during the fifth hour of driving. This also 
seems like an interesting finding that merits further study. 
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Figure 34: Hours Driving Distribution for all Medium and Heavy Trucks 
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Figure 35: Hours Driving Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue for all Trucks 
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Figure 36: Hours Driving Distribution by Power Unit Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
Truck Driver Fatigue 1 
Hours Driving 
Figure 37: Hours Driving Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
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Figure 38: Hours Driving Distribution by Trip Distance 
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Figure 39: Hours Driving Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Trip Distance 
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Figure 40: Hours Driving Distribution by Operating Authority 
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Figure 41: Hours Driving Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Operating Authority 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 42: Hours Driving Distribution by Carrier Type 
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Figure 43: Hours Driving Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 44: Hours Driving Distribution by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 45: Hours Driving Distribution of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
and Trip Distance, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
1.1.3 Relative Risk Of Fatigue Based On Fatal Accident Involvement. 
The relative risk of truck driver fatigue based on fatal accident involvement assesses whether 
fatigue is over-represented in any of the categories of the independent variables. A finding 
that fatig,ue is over- or under-represented in specific categories indicates an association 
between the factor level and fatigue. In the earlier example, 36.6 percent of the fatigue cases 
were coded over 500 miles trip distance whereas only 15.5 percent of all trucks involved in 
fatal accidents were coded trip distance over 500 miles. Thus, fatigue is over-represented in 
trips over 500 miles by a factor of 2.35, the ratio of these two percentages, as shown in 
Figure 46. The ratio takes the form of a relative risk where the denominator is based on fatal 
accident involvement. This calculation is convenient to use because it is scaled to produce an 
overall value of 1.0 for the aggregate. These percentages estimate the probability of fatigue 
given the truck is involved in a fatal accident. A higher relative risk, or probability of fatigue 
given the truck is involved in a fatal accident, indicate an association between the factors 
defining the subset and the risk of fatigue. Such results are only suggestive. Other factors 
that are associated with the subset and may or may not be in the data file may also be 
responsible for the association with risk that is shown. Care should be used when 
interpreting disaggregate relative risk values. Risk values do not sum to produce a combined 
risk as do counts. The risk of the combined cells must be calculated by first summing the 
numerators and denominators and then dividing these sums. The rate for a combination of 
cells will always fall between the individual cell values, but the result is a weighted average 
where the weighting factor is the denominator. Consequently, one cannot aggregate risk 
values without knowing the corresponding values for the numerators and denominators. 
The results on relative risk based on fatal accident data follow in the same order of 
independent variables that was used in the previous section on prevalence. First the variables 
that are also available in 1992 TIUS (power unit type, trip distance, and carrier type:), truck 
versus nontruck fatalities, time of day and hours driving. Combinations of these variables 
that were presented earlier are also included here. The sequence is listed below. 
Independent Variables in 1992 TIUS 
Figure 46: Trip distance (5 levels), 1994-1996 
Figure 47: Trip distance (5 levels) by Power Unit Type, 1994-1996 
Figure 48: Trip distance (3 levels), 1991-1996 
Figure 49: Trip distance (3 levels) by Power Unit Type, 1991-1996 
Figure 50: Trip distance and Power Unit type (6 levels) 
by Carrier Type, 1991-1996 
Figure 51: Trip distance and Power Unit type (6 levels) 
by Truck versus Nontruck fatality, 1991-1996 
Time of Day sequence 
Figure 52: Time of Day, 1981-1996 
Figure 53: Power Unit Type, 1981-1996 
Figure 54: Trip Distance (local versus over the road), 1981-1996 
Figure 55: Operating Authority (interstate versus intrastate), 1981-1996 
Figure 56: Carrier Type (private versus for hire), 1981-1996 
Figure 57: Carrier Type For Interstate Carriers Only, 1981-1996 
Figure 58: Power Unit Type And Trip Distance, 198 1-1996 
Hours Driving sequence 
Figure 59: Hours Driving, 1981-1996 
Figure 60: Power Unit Type (straight trucks versus tractors), 1981-1996 
Figure 61: Trip Distance (local versus over the road), 1981-1996 
Figure 62: Operating Authority (interstate versus intrastate), 1981-1996 
Figure 63: Carrier Type (private versus for hire), 1981-1996 
Figure 64: Power Unit Type And Trip Distance, 1981-1996 
Variables in 1992 TIUS. The relative risk of truck driver fatigue based on fatal accident 
involvement increases with trip distance. Based on the 5-level classification, local trips are 
lowest, 50-100 miles and 100-200 miles are comparable, and 200-500 miles and over 500 
miles are substantially higher. Given these levels, the 3-level classification maintains the 
most significant variation across levels of trip distance. 
The interaction between trip distance and power unit type is interesting. In local trips, both 
straight trucks and tractors have comparable and low relative risk of fatigue. However, in 
any operation beyond local, straight truck drivers have substantially higher relative risks of 
fatigue than tractor drivers in the same trip distance category. Since straight trucks seldom 
take long trips, this elevated risk does not pose a problem. In fact, it may be a reflection of 
straight truck drivers lack of experience with fatigue on longer trips. Tractor drivers with 
more experience on long trips appear to manage fatigue better based on these results. 
The results on trip distance and power unit type also illustrate an apparent paradox that often 
occurs in disaggregate risk tables. The overall relative risk for straight trucks is 0.55 and for 
tractors is 1.19. Aggregated across all trip distance categories, the relative risk of a fatigue 
involvement is more than double for tractor drivers as compared to straight truck drivers. Yet 
in the disaggregate data, straight trucks have equal or higher risk values in every trip distance 
category. This apparent contradiction is a consequence of exposure differences. The 
aggregate risk is not an average of the individual cell risks; it is a weighted average based on 
the exposure in each cell. In this case, straight trucks are used primarily on local and short 
trips where the risk of a fatigue involvement is lower whereas tractor are used primarily on 
longer trips with higher risks of fatigue. Even though tractors have a lower risk of fatigue in 
every cell, the aggregate risk of fatigue for tractors is more than double that for straight trucks 
because tractors are used more in operations with a higher risk of fatigue. In this situation, 
the higher risk of fatigue for tractors is clearly due to their use. 
In this case, it seems that there is sufficient information to arrive at a correct interpretation of 
the higher fatigue risk for tractors as compared to straight trucks. In other aggregate 
comparisons to follow, there may be additional factors that were not considered in this 
analysis that contribute to the aggregate result. Consequently, the analysis has focused on 
disaggregate risk as much as possible given the scope of the issue and the available data. 
The combination of carrier type with trip distance and power unit type shows relatively 
comparable relative risks of fatigue in most categories. Private carriers operating straight 
trucks on longer trips show somewhat higher relative risk of fatigue than do for-hire carriers 
in the same trip distance categories. And for-hire carriers have a somewhat higher relative 
risk of fatigue on trips over 200 miles by tractor drivers in comparison to private carriers. In 
the aggregate, for-hire carriers the relative risk of fatigue is 1.23 as compared to 0.70 for 
private carriers, an apparent over-involvement by a factor of 1.76. Again, this aggregate 
result appear to be due in part to private carriers more frequent operation on shorter trips and 
during daylight hours as compared to for-hire carriers. 
Figure 51 show the substantial increase in relative risk of truck dnver fatigue based on fatal 
accident involvement when the only fatalities are truck occupants. Conversely, the re:lative 
risk of truck driver fatigue is very low in multiple vehicle collisions resulting in fatality to 
other parties. 
Time of Day. This series of results all show the circadian rhythm. The influence of time of 
day on the relative risk of fatigue is clearly reflected in every subset examined. Apparently 
none of the other factors have examined have a large enough affect on the risk of fatigue to 
overshadow the influence of time of day. However, there are important differences in the 
magnitude of the relative risk of fatigue across some of the factors examined here. Overall, 
the relative risk of fatigue by time of day is comparable for straight truck and tractor drivers. 
Straight truck drivers appear to have a slightly lowei relative risk at every hour of the: day. 
The difference is quite pronounced from 4am to 6am when tractor drivers have about one- 
third higher relative risk of fatigue. The overall difference between straight trucks ar~d 
tractors is apparently the due to their greater use on local or short trips, as discussed earlier in 
this section. The larger difference in the early morning hours may be due to greater 
proportions of tractors on longer trips at that time of day in comparison to straight trucks. 
Figure 58 shows disaggregate risk by time of day for the four combinations of power unit 
type and trip distance. The over the road trips dominate at all times of day and straight trucks 
on over the road trips have particularly high fatigue risk during the night. However, the 
variability of the result reflects small sample sizes in many cells. 
Over the road drivers in general have higher fatigue risks at all time of day. The aggregate 
relative risk of fatigue for drivers on local trips is 0.21 as compared to 1.54 for over the road 
trips, an over-involvement ratio of more than 7. The fatigue risk for drivers on over the road 
trips is particularly elevated from 6am to 9am in comparison to local drivers. This is also the 
case at 3pm, 5pm, lOpm and 1 lpm. The early morning difference may because most local 
drivers are just starting at that time, whereas some over the road drivers are approaching the 
end of a trip. 
This same pattern shows up in the carrier type comparisons. Overall, interstate carriers are 
higher at every time of day, apparently because they are more likely to be on longer trips in 
comparison to intrastate carriers. The same is true for for-hire carriers as compared to private 
for the same reason. Examination of the time of day figures shows that this over- 
involvement is greatest in the early morning hours, the same as over the road trips i n  
comparison to local trips discussed in the previous paragraph. The same explanation would 
appear to apply here. These figures also show some of the same elevations at 3-5pm as well. 
When the carrier type comparison is limited to interstate carriers, a similar pattern results. 
For-hire interstate carriers are over-involved in fatigue-related accidents by a factor of 1.5 in 
comparison to private interstate carriers. This over-involvement holds at nearly all times of 
day, but is particularly large through most of the night and early morning hours. The 
prevalence data imply that interstate private carriers do much less night travel than interstate 
for-hire carriers. This result shows that the fatigue risk of interstate private carriers is also 
lower at night in comparison to interstate for-hire carriers. 
Hours Driving. The relative risk of truck driver fatigue based on fatal accident involvement 
shows a gradual increase with hours driving. During the ninth hour the fatigue risk is nearly 
double and by the 12th hour the risk is higher by a factor of over 6.  A pronounced increase is 
shown in the fifth hour. Fatigue risk drops back below 1.0 during the sixth a hour and 
increases with each additional hour. Aggregate risk for the second four hours is greater than 
the first four hours by a factor of 1.6. This pattern holds in every subset examined. Based on 
the caveats discussed earlier for this variable, the true risk is expected to be higher than the 
values shown. 
The subsequent figures showing hours driving by power unit type and trip distance and 
carrier type all show the same pattern. Tractors, over the road trips, interstate, and for-hire 
carriers have higher fatigue risks in nearly every hour of driving. A closer examination 
reveals that these differences are somewhat larger in the 6th through 10th hours. These 
differences may be due to confounding variables or a cclmulative fatigue effect. However, it 
does not show up after the 10th hour. 
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Figure 46: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 
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Figure 47: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 level) 
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Figure 48: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue Trip Distance (3 level) 
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Figure 49: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 
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Figure 50: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type 
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Figure 51: Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities: 
Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) 
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Figure 52: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Time of Day (TOD) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 53: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by TOD and Power Unit Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 54: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by TOD and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 55: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by TOD and Operating Authority 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 56: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by TOD and Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 57: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by TOD and Carrier Type-Interstate Only 
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Figure 58: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by TOD, Power Unit type and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 59: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Hours Driving 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 60: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Hours Driving and Power Unit Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 61: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Hours Driving and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 62: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Hours Driving and Operating Authority 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 63: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Hours Driving and Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
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Figure 64: Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Hours Driving, Power Unit type 
and Trip Distance, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1981-1996 
1.1.4 Texas Data 
In the FARS data, Texas reported among the highest proportion of fatigue among truck 
drivers. Texas is also one of the largest states, so it appears to be a good candidate to look at 
fatigue in non-fatal truck accidents. Fatigue is available in the Texas police-reported accident 
data as a code level in a driver impairment variable. The code levels available in the variable 
are: 
1. Eyesight defective 
2. Hearing defective 
3, Limbs missing 
4. Other physical impairment 
5, Impaired by illness 
6. Fatigued or asleep 
7. Mentally impaired 
8. Other handicap 
Table 9 shows the proportion of trucks involved in accidents where driver impairment is 
coded "fatigue" by most severe injury in the accident. The column labeled all trucks includes 
all vehicles identified as a truck in the Texas data. This group may include some light trucks. 
There are about 770 trucks involved in fatal accidents among the cases, about 80% more than 
in TIFA for 1997. The column labeled "tractor-semitrailers" includes only trucks identified 
as such in the Texas "specific vehicle type" variable. This may be a pretty good 
representation. There are 294 tractor-semitrailers in fatal accidents in 1997, according to the 
Texas police-reported data file. In FARS, 303 tractor-semitrailers were identified in Texas. 
Table 9 
Percent Fatigue 
1997 Texas Truck File 
Severity All "trucks" Tractor-semitrailer 
All accidents 1.50 2.45 
Fatal 4.96 3.74 
A&B 2.66 4.1 6 
C injuries 0.75 1.25 
PDO 1.48 2.27 
Note the percentage of fatigue. From the TIFA files for 1991-1996, fatigue was 5.4010 for fatal 
involvements in Texas. The 1997 figure from the Texas file for fatal involvements is 3.7%, 
as shown in the table above. This could be a reflection of the general downward trend in 
fatigue by year observed earlier. But it appears that the computerized Texas data may not 
reflect all the data captured on the police report. Checking the Texas police report, for each 
vehicle the officer can code up the 3 factors that in his opinion contributed to the accident 
and an additional 2 factors that may or may not have contributed to the accident. It appears 
that in the released data, some processing is going on and additional fatigue cases are lost. 
But the PARS analyst, looking at the police report, is able to capture more cases of fatigue 
(and any other driver factor). A more thorough review by the FARS analyst is one of the 
advantages of the FARS program 
Figure 65 shows the overall distribution of driver fatigue in police-reported accidents 
involving a tractor-semitrailer in Texas, 1997. It shows the daily circadian rhythm that we 
have come to expect, even down to the slight increase in the early afternoon, though the 
increase may be earlier than in other data. The second series shows the overall distribution of 
police-reported accidents involving tractor-semitrailers. Each series in the figure sums to 100. 
This pattern will be repeated for the figures for fatal, A and B injury accidents, C injury 
accidents, and property damage only (PDO) accidents. 
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Figure 65: Distribution of Fatigue and All Tractor-Semitrailers, Texas 1997 
Figure 66 is limited to only fatal involvements in Texas. Though the sample size is too small, 
the same pattern is evident, including the bump in the early afternoon. Only 11 fatigue cases, 
but the circadian rhythm can still be seen. Note how flat the distribution is of all fatal 
involvements. 
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Figure 66: Distribution of Fatigue in Fatal Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, Texas 1997 
Figure 67 shows tractor-semitrailer involvements where the most severe injury in the 
accident was an A or B injury. This possibly arbitrary cut point was chosen to look at fairly 
serious accidents, not swamped with minor injuries. Again, the same pattern. And not much 
variation in the distribution of all A or B injury invclvements by time of diy. 
Fatigue 1 .Total / 
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Figure 67: Distribution of A and B Injury in Tractor Semitrailer Involvements, Texas 1997 
C-injury involvements shown in Figure 68 have more variation by time of day than the more 
serious involvements illustrated above. Fatigue-impaired involvements still follow the 
circadian rhythm, though with no afternoon bump. Officer may pay less attention to driver 
factors (and other reporting information) in minor accidents. Finally, the distribution of 
fatigue in non-injury (PDO) accidents is shown in Figure 69. Sample size is about the same 
for C injury accidents. The pattern is the same. 
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Figure 68: Distribution of Fatigue in C-Injury-Tractor Semitrailer Involvements, Texas 1997 
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Figure 69: Distribution of Fatigue in PDO Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, Texas 1997 
The following figures show the relative risk based on accident data, for the same series of 
accidents by severity as the above figures: all police-reported, fatal, A&B, C, and PDO. 
Figure 70 is for tractor-semitrailer involvements of all accident severity. The pattern follows 
the circadian rhythm and the level of risk is comparable to that observed for fatal accidents. 
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Figure 70: Relative Risk of Fatigue for All Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, Texas1997 
Fatal data shown in Figure 7lare too sparse for only one year. But the magnitude of the effect 
and the timing are both about right. 
Time of Day 
Figure 71: Relative Risk of Fatigue for Fatal Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, Texas1997 
The distribution of relative risk tractor-semitrailer involvements were the accident included 
either an A or B injury also looks quite reasonable, as shown in Figure 72. 
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Figure 72: Relative Risk of Fatigue for A and B Injury Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, 
Texas1997 
Relative risk of fatigue for C-injury involvements is shown in Figure 73 and for non-injury 
(PDO) in Figure 74. 
Time of Day 
Figure 73: Relative Risk of Fatigue for C-Injury Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, Texas1997 
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Figure 74: Relative Risk of Fatigue for Non-Injury Tractor-Semitrailer Involvements, 
Texas1997 
Additional years of Texas data could be combined to increase sample size. However, it 
appears that the coding of driver factors such as fatigue may be less complete in minor 
accidents. One year of data confirms the circadian rhythm for all police-reported fatigue- 
related accidents. The pattern is evident at all injury levels and in non-injury accidents. Other 
factors studied here such as trip distance and carrier type are not available in the Texas data. 

1.2 Population Data 
The objective of this task is to refine estimates of vehicles and vehicle miles that distinguish 
the driverloperation subsets identified in the HOS options. The 1992 Truck Inventory and 
Use Survey (TIUS) is used to provide these estimates. The vehicle and vehicle miles 
estimates will provide denominators for the incidence of fatigue crashes from Section 1.1 to 
produce overall risk estimates for each hverloperation option. 
UMTRI explored alternative methods of identifying trucks in the TIUS file that produced a 
somewhat different distribution of trucks across operation types from the July 15, 1998 
FMCSA estimate. The results are discussed below. Some of the alternative approach's did 
not significantly change the result. Others appear to offer improvements that FMCSA might 
consider for subsequent estimates. 
Relative risk estimates per vehicle mile traveled and per vehicle are presented in Section 
1.2.3, based on the exposure estimates developed in Section 1.1.2. Variables available in 
both the 1992 TIUS and the 1991-1996 TlFA files are power unit type (straight truck versus 
tractor), trip distance (3 levels and 5 levels), and carrier type (private versus for-hire). The 
variable identifying interstate carriers was not usable in the 1992 TIUS. A discussion of 
results follows in Section 1.2.4. Relative risk of fatigue based on each exposure measure is 
compared to the relative risk based only on accident data and presented in Section 1.1. 
1.2.1 FMCSA Estimates Of Distribution Of Trucks And Travel By Trip Distance 
In the FMCSA paper, Number of truck drivers and the distribution of travel, (July 15, 1998) 
the number of trucks is estimated by trip distance and vehicle type, using the 1992 TIUS file. 
FMCSA subset the target population of medium and heavy trucks by including only vehicles 
reported to operate with an average gross vehicle weight over 10,000 pounds. Vehicles are 
assigned to trip distance categories by looking at variables showing the percentage of travel 
in trips of various distances. TIUS respondents distributed their vehicle's total travel among 
the following trip-distance categories: 1) less than 50 miles, 2) 50 to 100 miles, 3) 100 to 200 
miles, 4) 200 to 500 miles, 5) more than 500 miles. FMCSA aggregated these trip categories 
to travel categories that approximate the categories used in the HOS proposed rulemaking: 1) 
less than 200 miles, or local; 2) 200 to 500 miles, or regional; and 3) over 500 miles, or long- 
haul. Vehicles are assigned to whatever category had the highest percentage of travel. In 
cases of ties, the vehicle was assigned to the shorter trip category. Cases with missing 
mileage data were assumed to have the same distribution as complete cases. 
Using these methods, both the filter to identify medium and heavy trucks described above 
and the procedure for assigning vehicles to trip usage categories, the FMCSA produced the 
distribution shown in Table 10 for single unit and combination trucks: 
Table 10 
Distribution of Vehicles by Most Common Trip Distance, FMCSA method 
regional 200-500 1 6% 28% 
operation type 
long-haul >500 
single unit combination 
1% 19% 
1.2.2 UMTRI Estimates Of The Distribution Of Trucks And Travel By Trip Distance 
local ~ 2 0 0  
Total 
We attempted to improve the FMCSA estimates of the distribution of vehicles and travel by 
two primary differences in procedure: 1) a different filter to identify medium and heavy 
trucks in the TIUS data, and 2) alternative means to estimate the number of vehicles in trip 
categories. 
93 % 53% 
100.0 100.0 
Medium and Heavy Truck Population in TIUS 
The motivation for the different truck filter in the TIUS data is that the TIUS survey and file 
is not really designed to facilitate classifying trucks by gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR). 
The survey itself does not request that information. Using the average gross operating weight, 
as was done for the FMCSA paper discussed in the previous section, is plausible but subject 
to error. Class 3 vehicles (10,001-14,000 GVWR) typically weigh 6,000 to 7,000 pounds 
empty and may never operate near their rated weight, much less average their rated weight. 
Moreover, other variables are available in the TIUS which provide clues to the rated weight, 
including body type, number of axles, and number of tires. 
As part of the post-survey processing of the data, the Bureau of the Census apparently adds a 
variable for GVWR class provided by the R.L. Polk company. The GVWR class is derived 
from decoding the vehicle identification number (VIN). We also used the body type, empty 
weight, axle count and number of tires to exclude vehicles that do not qualify as medium or 
heavy trucks. 
To identify medium and heavy trucks in the TIUS data, we used the following filter: 
Polk VIN-derived GVWR greater than 2. 
Trucks with body type coded pickup, van, minivan, sport utility, and station wagon on a 
truck chassis are excluded. 
Trucks with empty weights less than 6,000 pounds, two axles, and only four tires are 
excluded. 
r Trucks with all reported miles off-road are excluded. 
This filtex produces a somewhat different truck population from the filter used in the FMCSA 
paper. For example, about 13.4% of the vehicles in the UMTRI subset reported average gross 
operating weights of less than 10,000 pounds. But this is quite plausible since a class 3 
vehicle can have an empty weight of 6,000 pounds or less. On the other hand, vehicles with 
empty weights of 6,000 pounds or less and two axles and four tires are excluded, on the 
grounds that such vehicles are very likely pickup trucks or some other light duty vehicle. In 
addition, pickups, light vans, minivans, sport utility vehicles, and station wagons built on a 
truck chassis are all excluded from the UMTRI subset. 
Vehicle Miles Traveled 
The travel estimates from the 1992 TIUS are separated into categories that correspond to the 
HOS options to the extent that can be supported in both the 1992 TIUS and the TIFA data 
files. The common variables of interest are power unit type (straight, tractor), trip distance, 
and carrier type (private, for-hire). Travel estimates by power unit type and trip distance are 
shown in Table 11. The 5-level trip distance variable in the 1992 TIUS is only available in 
the 1994 and later TIFA files. From 1991 to 1993, the TIFA files have the 3 level trip 
distance variable from the 1987 TIUS. Travel estimates are presented for both versions and 
each is used for the rate calculations. Figure 75 shows the distribution of vehicle miles 
traveled by power unit type and 5 trip distance categories. 
Table 11 
100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled 
All Medium and Heavy Trucks by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Trip Distance 
Local 50-1 00 100-200 200-500 >500 Total 
Straight 202 83 3 1 17 7 340 
Tractor 82 103 107 162 236 690 
Total 284 186 138 179 243 1,030 
In the 1992 TIUS file, respondents report an annual mileage for the truck and the percent of 
travel in each of the 5 trip distance categories. These percentages were used to allocate each 
truck's annual travel to the 5 trip distance categories. The resulting figures were aggregated 
in each category separately for straight trucks and tractors. The percentage of total travel 
(straight trucks and tractors combined) are shown in Figure 75. Straight trucks accumulate 
33 percent of the total travel and tractors 67 percent. This information is repeated in Figure 
76 and Figure 77 for private and for-hire carriers respectively. Private carriers accumulate 
somewhat more travel, 53 percent, than for-hire. Most straight trucks are operated by private 
carriers, and straight trucks account for about 54 percent of the travel by private carriers. 
Conversely, straight trucks account for only about 9 percent of the travel by for-hire carriers. 
Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 500+ 
trip distance 
Figure 75 
Distribution of Travel by Power Unit type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Private Carriers 
Local 50-1 00 100-200 200-500 500+ 
trip type 
Figure 76: Private Carriers, 
Distribution of Travel by Power Unit type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
For-Hire Carriers 
Local 50- 1 00 100-200 200-500 500t 
trlp distance 
Figure 77: For Hire Carriers, 
Distribution of Travel by Power Unit type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Similar distributions are repeated in Figure 78 and Figure 79 after combining to 3 trip 
distance categories. Figure 79 combines all three variables and shows overall percentages of 
travel. 
Local 50-200 >200 
trip distance 
Figure 78 
Distribution of Travel by Power Unit type and Trip Distance (3 levels) 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 
straight trucks trlp distance tractors 
Figure 79 
Distribution of Travel by Power Unit type, Trip Distance, and Carrier Type 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Exploration of Methods to Assign Vehicles to Trip Categories 
Table 12 shows the result of using the FMCSA method of assigning vehicles on a file that 
used the truck filter developed by UMTRI. For this table, we developed an algorithm that 
follows the procedure described in the FMCSA paper, but ran it on our own truck subset. 
Trucks reported by respondents to be used primarily as straight trucks only were classified as 
"single unit." Trucks reported by respondents to be used primarily as a straight truck with a 
trailer or a tractor with a trailer were classified as "combination." As reported above, 
respondents distributed the travel of their vehicles across five different trip length categories. 
Trips reported to be within 50 miles of base, 50 to 100 miles, and 100 to 200 miles were 
aggregated as "local." Trips reported in the 200 to 500 miles category were considered to be 
"regional." Trips reported over 500 miles were classed as "long haul." 
As in Table 10, this table shows the distribution of vehicles assigned to the operatior~s 
category with the preponderance of travel. The distribution is quite different from Table 10, 
however, For long-haul, the proportions are comparable, but the regional category is 
significantly less than Table loand the local category is significantly more. For combination 
vehicles, the population produced by the UMTRI filter has about 14.1% in the regional 
category, compared with 28% of the FMCSA subset. And over two-thirds of combination 
vehicles are local, compared with 53% of the FMCSA-subset combination vehicles. 
Table 12 
Distribution of Vehicles by Most Common Trip Distance, 




The FMCSA paper assigned vehicles as local, regional, or long-haul by the trip type reported 
with the greatest proportion of travel. This is a reasonable method of assignment. However, it 
does not take into account the fact that particular trucks (and drivers) may take trips of 
differing lengths over the course of a year. In the extreme, if a respondent filled out a survey 
so that 33% of miles were assigned to the local category, 33% to the regional and 34% to 
long-haul, by the FMCSA method, the truck would be treated as if all its travel were long- 
haul. 
single unit combination 
0.6 18.1 
1 .O 14.1 
local <200 
Total 
Two alternatives were considered. The first was simply to assign vehicles in proporlion to 
the travel in a particular operations category. In other words, if 30% of the single unit travel 
is in the regional category, then assume that 30% of the trucks fall into that operations type. 
In this method, particular trucks are not assigned to an operations category, but instead 









The weakness of this method, however, is apparent: It assumes that the average travel of a 
truck used in each operation type is the same; for example, that a combination truck used 
exclusively for long-haul operations accumulates just as many miles as one used in local 
service. It is equivalent to dividing the total travel for a cell by the average travel for a truck 
type. But this is clearly wrong. Long-haul trucks typically cover many more miles annually 
than local service trucks, even when "local service" is defined to include trips of up to 200 
miles. 





Accordingly, a second alternative was developed. The alternative is essentially a refinement 
of the first. However, instead of using average travel for a truck type (single unit or 
combination) across all operations categories, the mean travel for a truck primarily used in 
each operations category is determined and then the total number of such trucks implied by 
the total travel for the cell is calculated. This is accomplished by dividing the total travel in 
each cell by the mean travel for a typical truck used for each operations type. 
94.2 44.3 
100.0 100.0 
To determine an average travel for a typical vehicle, we looked at distributions of travel by 
truck type across the different operations types. The purpose was to understand the variation 
among trucks in their distribution of travel across operations types. If there was a large group 
of trucks in each operations category that was used exclusively in that category, those trucks 
would be good candidates to calculate a average or mean travel for a truck used in each 
category. In fact, however, the distributions showed that most trucks are used 
overwhelmingly in local operations. To get reasonable estimates for the regional and long- 
haul categories, it was necessary to expand the range of travel to at least 75% of travel. 
About 70% of straight trucks and 44% of combination trucks have all of their travel in the 
local (<200) trip category. For operations of 500+ miles (the long-haul category), 0.13% of 
straight trucks accumulate 100% of their travel in that category, and 8.3% of combinations. 
The regional (200-500) category really falls between two stools. Ninety-four percent of 
straight trucks and 66% of tractors have less than 5% of their travel in that category. One-half 
a percent of straight trucks and 4.9% of tractors have all travel in the regional category. 
Expanding the range to 75-100% of travel in the regional category, the proportions are 0.7% 
for straight trucks and 8.8% for tractors. For the long-distance category, the equivalent 
proportions are 0.4% of straight trucks and about 13% of combination trucks. Almost three- 
fourths of combinations accumulate less than 5% of their travel on trips over 500 miles. Over 
97% of straight trucks accumulate less than 5% of their travel on trips over 500 miles. 
Table 14 shows the calculated mean travel for single unit and combination vehicles by 
operations type. The column head " N  shows the unweighted sample sizes on which mean 
travel estimates are based. Mean travel is weighted. Note the relatively small number of cases 
for the long-haul and regional categories of single unit trucks. The mean annual travel for 
combination trucks appears to be plausible, with combinations operated in the long-haul 
segment averaging over 100,000 miles per year, while local combinations average only about 
35,000 miles. It is also likely that the local single unit estimate is solid, given the large 
number of cases. However, for single unit trucks, mean travel for regional and long-haul 
operations appear to be reversed. 
Table 14 
Mean Travel by Truck Type For Vehicles in Which 75 Percent Or More Of 
Their Total Travel is the Particular Trip Distance Category 
Table 15 shows the resulting distribution of trucks, based on the procedure outlined above. 
The distribution is determined by dividing the total travel in a particular operations category 






Distribution of Vehicles by Typical Average Travel 
For a Unit Primarily Used in Each Operations Type 
Single Unit 
N Mean trrvel 
224 23,079.67 
23 8 37,396.90 
25,486 13,045.80 
Overall, the distribution of trucks produced by this procedure is quite similar to the 
distribution produced by the simpler FMCSA method of assigning each vehicle to the 
operations category with the greatest travel as displayed in table 2. The largest relative 
differences are in the single unit long-haul and regional operations cells, but both are around 
1% for both methods. The distributions of combination vehicles are very close, with 17%- 
18% of combination vehicles in long-haul service and 14%-15% in regional service. 
Combination 









The differences in results between the more elaborate method of assigning vehicles 
developed by UMTRI and the simpler, more straightforward method used in the FMCSA 
paper are likely not significant. Though there might be theoretical reasons for preferring the 
UMTRI method, since the results do not appear to be appreciably different from the FMCSA 





procedure, simplicity favors the latter. The major difference between the estimates of 
vehicles arrived at here and those in the FMCSA paper summarized in Table 10 above are the 
result of the different and more restricted truck population subset from the TIUS file. 
In the FMCSA paper, the ultimate aim of estimating the distribution of trucks across 
operations types is to estimate the number of drivers across operations types. Trucks are used 
as a proxy for drivers. The full range of operations types identified in the HOS proposal 
includes "labor primarily other than driving" (LPOD) and split shift. No estimate of split shift 
drivers is possible from TIUS; in any case, split shift drivers are primarily either school or 
transit bus drivers, who are not covered by the HOS regulations. 
The TIUS file does not directly identify trucks that are used primarily for non-driving 
purposes. However, the file does identify the industry in which the vehicle is used. FMCSA 
developed a rule of assigning homebase vehicles to LPOD operations, based on the type of 
industry in which the vehicle is used. The rule is given in table 2 of the FMCSA paper and 
will not be repeated here. Applying the FMCSA rule to the population of trucks identified by 
the UMTRI produces the distribution of trucks shown in Table 16 below. This distribution is 
very similar to the FMCSA distribution, except UMTRI estimates about 7% more homebase 
trucks and about 7.2% fewer regional vehicles. 
Table 16 
Percent of Trucks by Operations Type 
Finally, we can estimate the number of drivers by the operations types. FMCSA estimated a 
total of 6.43*106truck drivers subject to the HOS regulations. This estimate appears to be 
based on reasonable assumptions and the best available data, so we will adopt that number 
here. Using the distribution of trucks across operations types in Table 16, Table 17 shows the 
resulting distribution of drivers by type of truck operations. Again, we estimate somewhat 
more homebase truck drivers than FMCSA, 4.4 million to about 3 million in the FMCSA 
paper. The difference is almost entirely accounted for by the regional category, where we 
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Number of Vehicles 
The distributions of registered trucks from the 1992 TIUS file are much different than the 
distributions of vehicle miles traveled. The difference arises from the large differences in 
annual travel for straight trucks as compared to tractors. Consequently, the distribution of the 
vehicle population is substantially different from the distribution of travel. The resulting 
estimates of the number of registered medium and heavy trucks is shown in Table 18. 
Table 18 
Medium and Heavy Truck Registrations by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Trip Distance 
Local 50-1 00 100-200 200-500 >500 Total 
Straight 2,215,105 356,653 98,398 40,772 22,768 2,733,696 
Tractor 341,666 206,752 148,517 201,297 243,334 1,141,566 
Total 2,556,771 563,405 246,915 242,069 266,102 3,875,262 
Three figures showing the distribution of registered trucks are given for comparison to the 
earlier distributions of travel. These differences will directly carry over to the accident rates 
presented in the next section. Figure 80 shows the distribution of trucks by power unit type 
and 5 trip distance categories. The comparable travel distribution is shown in Figure 75. 
Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 500+ 
Trip Distance 
Figure 80 
Distribution of Trucks by Power Unit type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
The same distribution collapsed to 3 trip categories is shown in Figure 81, and the combined 
distribution including carrier type is shown in Figure 82. The comparable distributions of 
travel are Figure 78 and Figure 79. In general, the truck distributions are dominated by the 
large number of straight trucks in local service. These trucks far outnumber the tractors in 




Distribution of Trucks by Power Unit type and Trip Distance (3 levels) 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
Local 50-200 2200 Local 50-200 >200 
straight trucks trip distance tractors 
Figure 82 
Distribution of Trucks by Power Unit type, Trip Distance, and Carrier Type 
1992 Truck Inventory and Use Survey 
1.2.3 Relative Risk Based on Vehicle Miles Traveled and Truck Population 
This section combines the counts of trucks involved in fatal accidents from Section 1.1 with 
the truck travel and truck population estimates from the 1992 TIUS file from the previous 
section to calculate fatal accident involvement rates. The 1992 TIUS is based on vehicle 
registrations and does not include government owned vehicles, government owned trucks 
have also been excluded from the accident counts for the rate calculation. Government 
owned trucks were included in Section 1.1. Since only 2.2 percent of all medium and heavy 
trucks in the 1991 to 1996 TIFA files are coded as government owned, their exclusion does 
not change the distributions noticeably. The choice of accident years to combine with the 
1992 TIUS data is dictated by the trip distance categories available in the TIFA file. Only the 
1994 to 1996 TIFA data include the 5 level trip distance classification used in the 1992 TIUS 
file. Consequently, relative risk for the 5 level trip distance classification can only be 
obtained by combining the 1994-1996 TIFA data with the 1992 TIUS. Collapsing to the 3 
level classification (used in the 1987 TIUS) allows use of the 1991-1996 TIFA data, 
providing a larger sample size. Obviously, these accident years are not an ideal match in 
time period to the 1992 TIUS. The absolute value of the rates changes somewhat (see the 
tables at the end). The absolute rates shown in the tables are based on an annual average 
accident count to correspond to the annual travel figures from TIUS. Note that the absolute 
rates are numerically quite similar in the 1994-1996 tables as compared to the 1991-1996. 
Also, the distributions across trip distance categories is quite stable. Thus, the relative risk 
figures are felt to be appropriate for both time periods. 
The accident rates are presented as a relative risk so that the variations from category to 
category are emphasized and are comparable to the information presented in Section 1.1. 
The adjustment is accomplished by dividing each of the cell rates by the aggregate rate for 
the entire table-usually all medium and heavy trucks. The focus of this analysis is the 
variation from category to category, not the absolute value of the accident rates. However, 
the absolute values of the accident rates per 100 million vehicle miles traveled and per 
million registered trucks are given in tabular form at the end of this section. The relative risk 
based on truck travel and truck registrations are presented in pairs. The top figure on each 
page describes the overall risk of involvement in a fatal accident for all medium and heavy 
trucks. The bottom figure is limited to trucks with driver fatigue coded as a contributing 
factor and characterizes the variations in the risk of truck driver fatigue. All relative risk 
figures based on travel are presented first, followed by the same figures based on truck 
population. The counts of trucks involved in fatal accidents are exactly the same for both 
sets. All differences arise from the change in denominator. These differences in the 
exposure method used are all a consequence of differences in the average annual travel across 
the categories shown, These differences are substantial. There is a close association between 
the trip distance categories and average annual travel. Trucks in local service have the lowest 
annual mileage and trucks in long haul service tend to have the highest. Consequently, the 
variation in relative risk of involvement in a fatal accident looks very different depending on 
the choice of exposure measure, travel or truck population. But the variations in the relative 
risk of fatigue are essentially the same, regardless of the exposure method. This result is a 
consequence of the domination of the overall risk of fatigue by the probability of fatigue 
given involvement in a fatal accident (referred to as relative risk based on accident 
involvement in Section 1.1). Variations in the overall risk of fatal accident involvement are 
generally smaller in this analysis. 
Care should be used when interpreting disaggregate accident rates. Cell rates do not sum to 
produce a combined rate as do counts. The rate of the combined cells must be calculated by 
first summing the numerators and denominators and then dividing these sums. The rate for a 
combination of cells will always fall between the individual cell values, but the result is a 
weighted average where the weighting factor is the denominator. Consequently, one cannot 
aggregate in a table of rates without knowing the corresponding values for the numerators 
and denominators. 
The first pair, Figure 83 and Figure 84, show the relative risk based on travel for the 5 level 
trip distance variable using the 1994-1996 TIFA data and the 1992 TIUS. In the top figure, 
the overall risk of fatal accident involvement declines as trip distance increases. However, 
the risk of fatigue increases with increasing trip distance. Notice that the relative risk of 
fatigue based on travel looks similar in pattern to the relative risk of fatigue based on fatal 
accident involvement presented in Section 1.1. This result occurs because the variations in 
the overall risk of fatal accident involvement (shown in Figure 83) are numerically smaller 
than the variations risk based on accident involvement (probability of fatigue given 
involvement in a fatal accident). In this case, the relative risk based on accident involvement 
reveals the correct pattern of fatigue with trip distance, although the value of the relative risk 
figures is modified somewhat by the overall risk variation shown in Figure 83. 
The next pair of figures, Figure 85 and Figure 86, add power unit type to the 5 level trip 
distance variable. The result is similar. Straight trucks operating on longer trips tend to have 
a higher fatigue risk than tractors in the same trip category. 
The 3 level trip distance variable is shown for the 1991-1996 TIFA data in Figure 87 through 
Figure 94. Similar variations in risk with trip distance and power unit type are shown. The 
risk of fatigue increases with trip distance, and straight trucks tend to have a higher risk of 
fatigue than tractors on the longer trips. Carrier type (private1 for-hire) is examined in Figure 
91 and Figure 92. Overall, for-hire carriers have a 50 percent higher overall fatal accident 
involvement rate per mile traveled. Based on Figure 91, the rate for for-hire carriers is higher 
in every category. The risk of fatigue is also higher for for-hire carriers in every category 
except one, as shown in Figure 92. 
The rates per truck are shown in Figure 95 through Figure 106. As discussed earlier, overall 
rates change substantially with registered trucks as the exposure measure due to differences 
in average annual travel, but the patterns of variation in the risk of fatigue are essentially the 
same as those calculated with travel as the exposure measure. The actual rates based on 
travel are shown in Table 19 through Table 26. Per truck rates are in Table 27 through Table 
33. 
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Figure 83 
Relative Risk by Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Truck Driver Fatigue 
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Trip Distance 
Figure 84 
Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 85 
Relative Risk by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Local 50-1 00 100-200 200-500 >500 
Trip Distance 
Figure 86 
Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
All Medium and Heavy Trucks 
Local 50-200 >200 
Trip Distance 
Figure 87 
Relative Risk by Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 88 
Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue and Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
All Medium and Heavy Trucks 
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Figure 89 
Relative Risk by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 90 
Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 91 
Relative Risk by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
versus Carrier Type, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
I Private 
I For Hire 
Truck Driver Fatigue 
Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 
Straight Tractor 
Figure 92 
Relative Risk of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
versus Carrier Type, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
The last 2 figures in this series, Figure 93 and Figure 94 are somewhat different in format. 
Here the accidents are classified as truck occupant fatalities or non-truck fatalities. If the 
only fatalities in the accident were truck occupants, then the case is classified as a truck 
fatality. If anyone not in the truck received fatal injuries, the case is coded non-truck. This 
classification was also presented in Section 1.1. This classification requires a different 
treatment for exposure. Exposure cannot be classified based on an accident outcome like 
this. The appropriate exposure measure for both truck and nontruck fatalities is all truck 
travel in each power unit type and trip distance category. For the trucklnon-truck 
classification, only the numerator changes. A relative risk cannot be calculated in the same 
manner, so the actual rates are shown. In this case, the truck and non-truck rates sum to the 
overall rate within each power unit type and trip distance category. Consequently, the result 
is that same as observed in Sectionl.1. Whereas 87 percent of all fatal truck involvennent 
result in a nontruck fatality, nearly 70 percent of the fatigue involvements result in fatality to 
truck occupants only. The rates per travel and per truck are presented so that the impact of 
HOS options can be calculated separately for truck and non-truck fatalities. The same 
approach is taken in the next series when the rates per truck are classified as truck anti non- 
truck fatalities. 
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Figure 93 
Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 94 
Truck Driver Fatigue in Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities: 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 95 
Relative Risk per Truck by Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 96 
Relative Risk per Truck of Truck Driver Fatigue by Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 97 
Relative Risk per Truck by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 98 
Relative Risk per Truck of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
and Trip Distance (5 level), Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 99 
Relative Risk per Truck by Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 100 
Relative Risk per Truck of Truck Driver Fatigue and Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 101 
Relative Risk per Truck by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 level) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 102 
Relative Risk per Truck of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type 
and Trip Distance (3 level), Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 104 
Relative Risk per Truck of Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip 
Distance versus Carrier Type, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 105 
Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
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Figure 106 
Truck Driver Fatigue in Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Tables Of Accidents Rates per VMT 
Table 19 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 >500 Total 
Straight 5.65 2.13 2.55 3.44 6.26 4.32 
Tractor 9.84 4.03 4.17 4.18 3.25 4.54 
Total 7.00 3.24 3.88 4.20 3.40 4.57 
Table 20 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled, 
Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 >500 Total 
Straight 0.0234 0.061 3 0.1 51 3 0.0654 0.4242 0.0500 
Tractor 0.0354 0.0599 0.051 2 0.1 325 0.1 388 0.1 01 9 
Total 0.0274 0.061 7 0.0753 0.1 287 0.1496 0.0864 
Table 21 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991.1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Straight 6.29 2.40 4.59 4.83 
~racfor 11.17 4.71 4.27 5.25 
Total 7.86 3.98 4.37 5.21 
Table 22 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled, 
Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Straight 0.0262 0.0740 0.2609 0.0571 
~ractor 0.041 2 0.0696 0.1 575 0.1 177 
Total 0.0309 0.071 9 0.1 649 0.0986 
Table 23 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type, 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Private 5.54 2.1 1 3.97 8.15 2.96 2.40 4.04 
For Hire 12.43 3.72 6.51 14.94 6.49 4.80 6,,18 
Total 6.22 2.39 4.55 11.01 4.66 4.23 5,05 
Table 24 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per YO0 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled, 
Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) 
versus Carrier Type, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TYUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Private 0.0244 0.0755 0.2404 0.0310 0.0466 0.0683 0.0544 
For Hire 0.0423 0.0658 0.3327 0.0551 0.0940 0.1 854 0.1465 
Total 0.0262 0.0739 0.2603 0.0411 0.0695 0.1572 0.0975 
Table 25 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled, 
Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type, 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 ~ 2 0 0  Total 
Truck 0.82 0.41 0.80 1.14 0.58 0.59 0.66 
NonTruck 5.61 2.04 3.88 10.26 4.23 3.77 4.55 
Total 6.43 2.46 4.71 11.42 4.82 4.36 5.22 
Table 26 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per 100 Million Vehicle Miles Traveled, 
Truck Driver Fatigue in Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Truck 0.0127 0.0467 0.1908 0.0208 0.0387 0.1177 0.0683 
NonTruck 0.01 38 0.0280 0.0727 0.0208 0.031 6 0.041 4 0.0303 
Total 0.0265 0.0748 0.2634 0.041 6 0.0703 0.1 591 0.0986 
Tables Of Accidents Rates per Truck 
Table 27 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 >SO0 Total 
Straight 51 5 497 81 1 1408 1887 537 
Tractor 2367 201 0 2999 3368 31 51 2747 
Total 777 1073 21 70 3099 31 04 121 4 
Table 28 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks, 
Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (5 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1994-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-100 100-200 200-500 >SO0 Total 
Straight 2.1 14.3 48.1 26.8 127.9 6.2 
Tractor 8.5 29.9 36.8 106.7 134.6 61.6 
Total 3.0 20.4 42.1 95.0 136.6 23.0 
Table 29 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Straight 579 577 1780 600 
Tractor 2845 2605 3867 31 71 
Total 887 1506 3688 1 385 
Table XX: Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks, 
Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (3 levels) 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Trip Distance 
Rate Local 50-200 r200 Total 
Straight 2.4 17.8 101.2 7.1 
~racior  10.5 38.5 142.7 71.1 
Total 3.5 27.2 139.0 26.2 
Table 30 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type, 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Private 482 478 1412 1716 1419 1940 707 
For Hire 2348 1266 3812 5355 4301 4523 4020 
Total 572 573 1766 2805 2580 3829 1341 
Table 31 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks, 
Truck Driver Fatigue by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) 
versus Carrier Type, Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Private 2.1 17.1 85.4 6.5 22.3 55.3 9.5 
For Hire 8.0 22.4 194.7 19.8 62.4 174.6 c35.3 
Total 2.4 17.7 101.0 10.5 38.4 142.4 25.9 
Table 32 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks, 
Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type, 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 2200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Truck 75 99 31 1 291 320 534 176 
NonTruck 51 6 491 1507 2615 2342 3417 1209 -
Total 591 590 1829 2909 2664 3954 1387 
Table 33 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents per Million Registered Trucks, 
Truck Driver Fatigue in Truck versus Nontruck Fatalities 
by Power Unit Type and Trip Distance (6 levels) versus Carrier Type 
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents 1991-1996 and 1992 TIUS 
Straight Tractor 
Rate Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 >200 Total 
Truck 1.2 11.2 74.0 5.3 21.4 106.6 18.2 
NonTruck 1.3 6.7 28.2 5.3 17.5 37.5 8.1 
Total 2.4 18.0 102.2 10.6 38.9 144.1 26.2 
1.2.4 Discussion 
Fatal accident involvement rates per 100 million vehicles miles traveled and per million 
registered trucks were calculated using the 1991-1996 ITFA data and the 1992 TIUS data. 
These rates may be useful to estimate the safety impact of the HOS options. The results also 
illustrate the variation in the risk of truck driver fatigue for the different operating 
environments and industry segments that can be identified in both the TIFA and TIUS files. 
These factors are limited to power unit type (straightltractor), trip distance, and carrier type 
(privatelfor-hire). Missing data on the variable in the 1992 TIUS identifying interstate 
carriers was so large that this information is not usable. Exposure data are not available on 
other important factors such as time of day and hours driving. 
Three measures of risk were explored. The probability of fatigue given involvement in a 
fatal accident was scaled by the overall probability of fatigue and presented as the relative 
risk of fatigue, given involvement in a fatal accident. This calculation requires only accident 
data. This measure is of interest because time of day, hours driving, and other factors are 
available in the TIFA data, but exposure information is not available. For the factors 
available in both TIFA and TIUS, two accident rates were calculated. The first is the overall 
rate (per 100 million miles traveled) for involvement in any fatal accident, and the second is 
the rate for only truck driver fatigue when involved in a fatal accident. As discussed in 
Section 1.1, these three rates are related as follows: 
Relative risk of fatigue in a fatal accident = (relative risk of fatal accident involvement) x 
(relative risk of fatigue given fatal involvement) 
This relationship is illustrated in Table 34. The rates in each row were calculated as 
described. The table illustrates that in each column, the bottom row is equal to the product of 
the first two rows. The relevance of this table is to assess whether the first row, that is based 
only on accident data, provides useful information on the risk of fatigue based on exposure, 
as shown in the last row. For the variables available, it seems that it does. The variation in 
relative risk in the first row is quite similar to the last row. 
Table 34 
Relation of Relative Risk Measures 
Straight Tractor 
Risk Local 50-200 >200 Local 50-200 ~ 2 0 0  Total 
Risk of fatigue 
given fatal accident involvement 0.22 1.61 2.97 0.19 0.77 1.93 1.00 
Risk of fatal accident 
involvement per vmt 1.23 0.47 0.90 2.19 0.92 0.84 1 .OO 
Risk of fatigue per vmt 0.27 0.76 2.67 0.42 0.71 1.61 1 .OO 
This result occurs because the variation in risk in the first row is larger than in the second, a 
range of about 15: 1 as compared to about 4: 1. There are only two columns, straight trucks in 
the 50-100 category and local tractors where the second row significantly modifies the risk 
values from the first row. However, the overall pattern remains the same. This result 
suggests that the relative risk of fatigue given involvement in a fatal accident can provide 
useful information about the overall risk of fatigue for factors not available in existing 
exposure data. 
The combination of the TEA and TIUS data allowed rates per 100 million vehicle miles 
traveled and per million trucks for truck driver fatigue involvement in fatal accidents to be 
calculated for each combination of 3 important factors: power unit type (straightltractor), trip 
distance, and carrier type (privatelfor-hire), Similar patterns in the relationship of these 
factors to the risk of fatigue were found in both the rates per travel and per truck. Trip 
distance, as might be expected, shows a substantial affect. Looking at the 5 level 
classification, trips with one way distances of 200-500 miles and trips over 500 miles one 
way both show substantial over involvement, 1.49 and 1.73 respectively. Underlying factors 
that are associated with trip distance are more likely to be responsible to the increased risk of 
fatigue on longer trips. Two such factors examined in Section 1.1 are time of day and hours 
driving. Local trips occur primarily during the daylight (and presumably with more sleep at 
night) whereas long haul trips involve more night travel. Local travel also seldom requires 
more than 8 hours of driving while long haul trips are more likely to involve more than 8 
ho~irs driving. 
In addition to trip distance, power unit type is also associated with the risk of truck driver 
fatigue per mile traveled or per truck. Straight trucks and tractors both have relatively low 
risks of fatigue involvement in local and short trips. However, straight trucks on long trips 
have a substantially higher risk of fatigue than tractors. The results are somewhat mixed in 
the 5 level trip distance classification, but the fatigue risk for straight trucks is 66 percent 
higher than tractors in trips over 200 miles (one way). While tractors are better designed for 
long haul service, a more likely explanation is that straight truck drivers are less experienced 
in long haul trips and the associated fatigue than tractor drivers. Recall from Section 1.1 that 
straight trucks on trips greater than 200 miles account for less than 5 percent of all truck 
driver fatigue in fatal accidents. As can be seen in the earlier part of this section, the 
exposure of straight trucks in long haul service is very low. 
Carrier type is the last factor that could be examined with exposure based rates. This factor 
shows the strongest association with fatigue. Overall the truck driver fatigue rate per mile 
traveled for for-hire carrier is nearly 3 time that of private carriers. This difference rs in part 
due to the large number of straight trucks in local service operated by private carriers. 
However, for-hire tractors in long haul service (trips over 200 miles one way) also have a risk 
of fatigue that is 2.7 time that of private carriers on a per mile basis. Results from Section 
1.1 show that for-hire carriers in interstate service are involved in about 3 time as many fatal 
accidents at night as private carriers, and the relative risk of fatigue given involvement in a 
fatal accident from midnight to 6am is 3 to 5 time higher for interstate for-hire carriers than 
interstate private carrier. There may be other factors associated with for-hire carriers such as 
irregular shifts or longer work weeks that may contribute to fatigue, but cannot be addressed 
in the T F A  or TIUS data. 
Separate sets of rates were calculated using both travel (100 million vehicle miles traveled) 
and truck population (million registered trucks) as exposure measures. These two measures 
differ substantially because there is wide variation in annual mileage ranging from straight 
trucks in local service to long haul tractors. Consequently, the overall rates for involvement 
in any fatal accident look quite different depending on the exposure measure used. The 
interesting finding is that the risk of fatigue when involved in a fatal accident follows 
essentially the same pattern regardless of the exposure measure used. Again, this result is a 
consequence of the strength of the relationship of fatigue to the factors examined. This 
finding underscores the importance of the link between the various operating environments 
and fatigue. 
1.3: Effects on Drivers and Motor Carriers 
Task 1.3 was produced by a team of economists associated with the University of Michigan 
Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations (ILIR). The team worked individually and in 
small groups and collaborated together in several teleconferences. An important and unique 
contribution has been provided by data collected by the University of Michigan Trucldng 
Industry Program (UMTIP) Driver Survey. These data were collected by Dr. Dale Belman of 
the University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee and Dr. Kristin Monaco of the University of 
Wisconsin - Eau Claire, with funding and suppori from UMTIP. Data manipulation for this 
report based on the UMTIP Driver Survey was provided by Dr. Monaco. Dr. Belzer did the 
final writing, along with integrative work. Some sections, as originally provided by 
contributors, were modified in significant respects by Dr. Belzer, so he is responsible for 
errors. Research assistance was provided by Michael Dover of ILIR. 
Section 1.3.1 was written primarily by Dr. Belzer, based on data from the Driver Survey. 
These data provide an important baseline on truck driver wages, hours, and working 
conditions. They show that on average drivers do not comply with current hours of service 
regulations, suggesting a major cost for the implementation of regulatory option A, the 
current system. The data were collected at truck stops in five Midwest states, randomly 
selected and weighted for size by truck stop traffic. Drivers were selected at random in each 
truck stop in such as a proportion to create an even sampling frame. Survey assistance for the 
Driver Survey was provided by the University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, a 
premier survey agency. 
Section 1.3.2 was written in two sections, The first section was produced by Dr. Donald 
Grimes and Dr. George Fulton of the University of Michigan ILIR. This analysis uses 
several sources, including the Current Population Survey (CPS), the UMTP Driver Survey, 
the Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS), and Form M of interstate motor carrier 
operations, currently collected by the US DOT Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Help in 
estimating the number of owner operators was received from the Owner Operator 
Independent Driver Association (OOIDA). This section estimates the cost of achieving 
compliance with current law. While we do not estimate enforcement costs themselves (far 
beyond our mandate in this study) we do estimate what would happen if drivers actually 
complied with the law. The cost of bringing drivers into compliance with the existing regime 
most likely far outweighs the cost of changing regulatory regimes. 
The second section of 1.3.2 was written primarily by Dr. Stephen Burks of ILIR. Dr. Burks 
received data analysis assistance and modeling collaboration from Dr. Monaco, as well as 
econometric assistance and advice from Dr. Daniel Lass and Dr. Dale Ballou of the 
University of Massachusetts. The regression models in this section allow us to provide some 
estimates of the social opportunity cost of the proposed policy changes. We find that the 
social cost of proposed changes in driver schedule regularity and night dnving are modest. 
Section 1.3.3 was written by Dr. Belzer. In this section we make some qualitative 
judgements about the kinds of changes that might result for the industry as a result of the 
proposed regulatory change. 
1.3.1: Current Driver Experience Baseline. 
The University of Michigan Trucking Industry Program (UMTIP) conducted a survey of 
drivers in 1997. UMTIP also is conducting a survey from the summer of 1998 through the 
end of spring in 1999. Both of these surveys collect information on driver hours of work, 
safety, sleep experience, and other factors. This task will be to evaluate that data to 
determine current practices of drivers: hours driven and worked, including characteristics of 
non-driving labor; number of miles driven; time of day; adherence to regulations; sleep 
experience; self-reported drowsy driving; and others. The survey shows, for example, that 
the median driver works 62 hours in a seven day week. The median local driver works 56.8 
hours and the median over-the-road driver works 65. At the 90" percentile the figure is 95 
hours, with local drivers at 91 hours and over-the-road drivers at 95 hours. The dnver survey 
also includes detailed information on pay: whether time is paid or not, whether paid time is 
hourly or contingent on labor or a flat rate, and the level of pay for each driver category. 
The underlying theory used for this study looks to the competitive marketplace to understand 
the economic pressures that determine the truck driver's work environment, so it is important 
to incorporate those market pressures in any evaluation of governmental regulatory efforts. 
The UMTIP driver survey provides a unique look at the current work environment of the 
over-the-road truck driver. The dnver survey suggests to us that the truck drivers indeed 
work long hours, and the problem of long hours and irregular schedules correlate strongly 
with the extent to which drivers compete with each other to drive down wages and 
conditions. 
The driver survey used a two-stage randomized design in five Midwest states. We selected 
truck stops at random from the population of truck stops in these states, stratified based on 
the number of parking spaces for trucks as a proxy for truck traffic. Subjects were chosen at 
random (every n" individual who walked through the door). The survey took approximately 
45 minutes and we paid drivers $20 for their time. We experienced a response rate of 60% 
(including conversions for those who had insufficient time at the truck stop but whom we 
interviewed at home). An additional 6% response was achieved using a five minute 
questionnaire. We also conducted a fuel line survey to confirm sample validity, and achieved 
an 96% response rate on the fuel line. We currently are conducting a follow up to the 
original driver survey. Though we have had to reduse the number of survey administrations 
due to lack of funds, we believe we will continue to have a valid sampling frame. This 
second wave of surveys will cover a one-year period extending from summer 1998 through 
spring of 1999. 
Miles 
Table 35: Annual Miles 







The average driver covers 112,765 miles annually, and long-haul drivers drive 124,475 miles. 
Averages exceed medians, demonstrating the extent to which high mileage figures dominate. 
Indeed, the top 25 percent of all drivers exceed 150,000 miles and ten percent exceed 
170,000 miles, a quite extraordinary figure. The survey shows that owner operators drive 
substantially fewer miles than do company drivers, suggesting that the pressure on company 
drivers is greater than that on the owner-operators who need to pay off their equipment. The 
following table compares over-the-road drivers who work as employees with over-the-road 
drivers who own their trucks ("owner-operators"). Employee drivers drive 5.8 percent more 
miles than do owner-operators. Incidentally, since more than 17 percent of the drivers in our 
sample work for private carriers, and since few owner-operators (00s) haul for private 
carriers, we suspect the over-the-road (OTR) employee drivers in the for-hire sector average a 
greater number of miles, increasing the gap between themselves and the owner-operators. 
Full Survey Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
Local Drivers Regional Drivers Long Haul Drivers 
112,765 82,065 103,617 124,475 
60,000 25,000 50,000 78,000 
90,352 50,000 80,000 100,000 
110,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 
130,000 125,000 125,000 150,000 
160,000 130,000 145,600 170,000 
n=45 1 n=49 n=113 n=28 1 
' For all mileage calculations the highest and lowest 1 percent have been trimmed to remove inappropriate 
outliers. For all wage calculations, the highest and lowest 5% have been trimmed both to remove outliers and to 
ensure that only those working a full year are included. We believe this trimming is necessary to get an accurate 
picture of driver effort level. In all cases the n for the "full survey" includes all of the drivers for whom valid 
data existed on all variables studied in this analysis. This is a different purpose than one might have when 
merely establishing a census. If we are awarded a contract for the definitive cost-benefit analysis, we revise the 
data set as appropriate. 
Table 36: Annual Miles 







In our regression sample, which for modeling purposes includes only those employee drivers 
paid by the mile, the average mileage is greater yet. 
OTR drivers OTR 0 0 s  
119,392 112,521 
Table 37: Annual Miles 
As we will see throughout, unionization is associated with lower mileage output. Across all 







Table 38: Annual Miles 
Regression Sample, 

































How does this translate into weekly hours of work? The driver survey shows that on average 
drivers worked 64.3 hours in the past seven days, including driving and on-duty-not-driving. 
The survey also shows, somewhat surprisingly, that local drivers work as many hours as do 
long-haul drivers. Since we collected our data at truck stops that generally were not in major 
metropolitan areas, and since drivers identified themselves in these categories, we suspect our 
local drivers are more like the "home base" drivers as suggested by the FHWA. With these 
data it is not possible (at least under these severe time constraints) to distinguish definitively 
between these two categories. Regardless, the data suggest a broad pattern of violation, with 
the top 10 percent of all drivers averaging 94 hours, including a 97 hour average for local 
drivers. At the median, only the local drivers stay below the 60 hour limit and regional 
drivers hit that limit exactly. 
An important note on methodology is in order, however. We carefully asked drivers what 
work they performed by asking them how many hours they drove and how many hours they 
worked loading or unloading, waiting for freight (for a dispatch, to load, or to unload), and 
performing miscellaneous tasks such as mechanical repairs (or waiting for mechanical 
repairs) or waiting for bills to be cut. We did not want drivers to tell us what hours they 
logged and otherwise to make judgements on what constituted "work" because we believe 
drivers will tend to report only those hours claimed for purposes of pay. If they report only 
the latter, but in fact put in more hours unpaid, then the results will be biased downward. As 
indicated below, we found that drivers work a significant number of unpaid hours, 
contributing to potential underreporting problems. 







Full Survey Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
Local Regional Long Haul 
64.3 65 .O 62.6 65.0 
36.0 44.0 38.0 33.0 
50.0 45.0 50.0 50.0 
62.0 58.0 60.0 65.0 
75.0 72.0 70.0 80.0 
94.0 97.0 80.0 96.0 
n=45 1 n=49 n=113 n=28 1 
While this pattern of violation extends across all groups, as expected non-union drivers work 
an average of 11 percent more hours than do union drivers. The median union driver works 
60 hours, while the non-union driver works 65 hours. The biggest problem comes at the 
highest level, as 10 percent of all union drivers exceed the legal limit by 20 hours while the 
top 10 percent of all non-union drivers exceed that limit by 40 hours - a full normal work 
week. 







Full Survey, Full Survey, 








We see the same pattern in the relationship between company drivers and owner-operators. 
Owner-operators stay closer to the legal limit while company drivers work substantially more 
than the allowable hours. Again, the sample we use for the regression models that appear 
later in this analysis includes only mileage-paid drivers, and their work hours exceed the 
legal limit substantially, both at the mean and at the median. 
Table 41: Hours in Last 7 Days 







Table 42: Hours in Last 7 days 
OTR Ees OTR 0 0 s  
67.2 56.5 
I Regression Sample, 
I Mileage Paid Ees 
-- - - -- - - - 






We also have looked at the number of hours worked in the last 24 hours and in the last trip. 
We find that there is a direct, if modest, relationship between the number of hours worked per 
day and the length of trip taken by the driver. Long-haul drivers work the greatest number of 
hours; at the mean, long haul drivers work 12 percent more hours during any single day than 
do regional drivers, and 15 percent more hours on any single day than do local drivers. Not 
surprisingly, they also drive more of those hours and spend less of their time in any given day 
performing non-driving labor. At the mean, long-haul dnvers perform non-driving work 23 
percent of their time, while regional drivers work 25 percent of their time and local drivers 
perform non-driving work 37 percent of their time. Perhaps the most surprising figure is the 
percentage of non-driving labor for long-haul drivers. We think labor time is "lumpy" and 
long-haul drivers may spend a great deal of time loading or unloading, and fractionally their 
non-driving labor is high because this time tends to be lengthy and unpaid. 
Perhaps most startling is the extent to which drivers are exceeding the daily hours-of-service 
rules. At the 75' percentile, long-haul drivers are working 15.5 hours, which scarcely allows 
the minimum 8 hour break along with a very limited half hour of break time within the 15 
hour limit. At the 90" percentile long haul drivers work 19 hours, leaving only 5 in the last 
25 for non-work activity. These figures lead us to believe that more than 25% of all long- 
haul drivers are in daily violation of HOS limits. In addition, figures of 12 hours of driving 
per day (75" percentile) along with 15 hours per day at the 90' percentile strongly suggests 
the pervasiveness of driving  violation^.^ 








All Local Regional Long Haul 
436 45 107 278 
11.35 10.38 10.63 11.93 
5.5 7 6 5 
8 8.25 8 8 
11 10.25 10.5 11.5 
14 12 12.5 15.5 
18 16 16 19 
While averages sum up across all groups, each of these tables represents different distributions (total time, 
driving time, and non-driving work time. These distributions are nct normal - the right tails are much thicker 
than the left tails - and they vary. For example, a driver who drives the mean number of hours (8.33) may 
have zero non-driving labor time or he may have five hours of non-driving labor time. The driver with 8.33 
hours of driving and zero hours of non-driving labor would show up just above the median on the distribution of 
driving time but three hours below the median on total work time and below the 10' percentile on the 
distribution of non-driving labor time. Conversely, the driver with the mean number of driving hours but with 
five hours of labor would show up above the median on driving, between the 75' and 90' percentile on non- 
driving labor hours, and below the 75' percentile on total hours. 








All Local Regional Long Haul 
436 45 107 278 








All Local Regional Long Haul 
436 45 107 27 8 
3.02 3.78 2.76 2.98 
0.25 1 0.5 0 
1 1.5 1 0.75 
2 3 2.25 2 
4 5 4 4 
7 8 6 8 








All Local Regional Long Haul 
436 45 107 27 8 
26% 37% 25 % 23 % 
3% 9% 6% 0% 
10% 20% 13% 8% 
21% 33% 23 % 17% 
35% 50% 33% 32% 
55% 67% 50% 56% 
A great deal of efficiency is lost when drivers spend their labor time waiting. While arguably 
drivers are creating value when they are working (even though they may not be paid), loading 
or unloading a truck for example, they are not creating any value when they are waiting, as 
for a dispatch, to load, to unload, or for some other purpose. This inefficient use of their time 
is the source of a great deal of slack in the system. Since most drivers are not paid for this 
time, or earn a very small piece-work rate for activities, this waste of time is relatively 
costless to the economy (both to the shipper and the consignee, and generally to the trucking 
company) but represents an opportunity cost to the driver. The economic cost can more 
likely be measured in turnover and low human capital investment, as well as a tendency for 
drivers to pack in working (mainly driving) hours in addition to this wait time to make up for 
their lost earnings. The cost also likely can be found in a higher rate of fatigue-induced 
accidents, injuries, and occupational health disorders. 
We see from our data that long-haul drivers put in the most work time per trip, though their 
trips are considerably longer than those of their local or regional counterparts. When we look 
at waiting time, however, we see a disproportionate waste of time on the part of long-haul 
drivers. The average driver waits more than twice as many hours as he works (non-driving 
labor), but the distribution is skewed. Local drivers wait somewhat less than they work 
(which makes sense since they usually are paid by the hour) but long haul drivers wait almost 
three times as long as they work; for long-haul drivers work time generally goes unpaid and 
waiting time almost always is unpaid. 
Looking ahead to the section that calculates the cost of compliance with the current HOS 
rules, we can see that if less of these drivers' time was wasted, carriers would make more 
efficient use of skilled labor, and the cost to shippers, consignees, and the economy would be 
dramatically lower. Shippers and receivers do not consider the opportunity cost this wasted 
time imposes on drivers, much less the cost imposed on the economy. On the contrary, the 
current system imposes perverse incentives on those with the power to conserve this wasted 
resource: if it is more convenient to them to waste the resource (and if they do not pay for it), 
then they will do so. After all, the average long-haul driver wastes more than 6 hours per trip 
waiting around, and spends well over 8 hours in combined non-driving work time 
(technically line 4 on the driver's log). Realistically, the driver probably logs much of this 
wasted time as "off duty" and this explains his long average weekly hours. 
Table 47: Total Hours Worked in the Last Trip 
mean 
Table 48: Waiting Time in the Last Trip (in minutes) 
All Local Regional Long Haul 






5.67 2.25 5 7.5 
9.33 5.58 7 13.5 
14.5 7.67 10.25 20.5 
24 10.55 14 30.5 







All Local Regional Long Haul 
282.94 73.71 196.68 37 1.97 
0 0 0 0 
15 0 0 30 
90 30 60 120 
240 120 135 300 
600 173 360 900 







A11 Local Regional Long Haul 
117.8 94.62 109.28 126.62 
0 15 0 0 
15 30 15 15 
60 60 45 60 
150 120 120 180 
270 200 210 290 







All Local Regional Long Haul 
71% 44% 64% 75% 
0% 
50% 0% 0% 67% 
60% 33% 57% 67% 
62% 50% 53% 63 % 
69% 46% 63 % 76% 
The tables above show the extent to which drivers' time is spent doing tasks other than 
driving. We believe that when this time is unpaid, it probably contributes to excessive hours, 
as drivers log unpaid time off duty. To what extent is this a problem? The following tables 
show paid time as a percent of all non-driving time. We see that at the mean, 29 percent of 
all non-driving time is paid, but at the median the percentage of paid time is zero. This 
means that more than half of all drivers earn nothing for this labor. Looking further it 
becomes clear that most union drivers are paid for their time, as 72.7 percent of the union 
driver's time is paid at the median, while for non-union drivers, at the median their ratio of 
paid time to total non-driving time is zero percent. We see that at the 75' percentile 70.6 
percent of the non-union driver's total non-driving time is paid, while the corresponding 
figure for union drivers is 100 percent. Note also that owner-operators have an even worse 
problem than do ordinary non-union drivers, as at the 90' percentile only 66.7 percent of 
their total non-driving time is paid. 







Full Survey Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
Local Regional Long Haul 
29.0% 50.4% 35.0% 22.1 % 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
70.0% 100.0% 98.0% 42.1 % 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
n=3 12 n=29 n=78 n=20 1 







Full Survey, Full Survey, 
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Full Survey, Full Survey, 







n=3 1 n=20 1 
Table 54: Paid Time as Percent of Total Non-Driving Time 










We believe the wage and earning picture can tell us a great deal about why drivers work as 
hard as they do. While driver mean earnings looks pretty good for a somewhat skilled but 
generally not highly educated worker, one must recall the number of hours worked to achieve 
such earnings levels. While the mean driver earns more than $36,500 annually, he also 
works an average of about 3,300 hours per year to do it. This is more than half again as 
many hours as the full time standard year in the United States and considerably more than 50 
percent more hours than the average employee actually works. With these earnings targets, it 
may not be surprising that we find excessive weekly labor. 
The following table shows that long haul drivers make less than regional drivers. This is 
consistent with previous research that showed that the lowest paid drivers worked for long- 
haul TL carriers. That research showed that rates for drivers working for regional carriers 
averaged 31.0$ per mile while those working for national carriers averaged 25.1$ per mile. 
While the highest pay rate went to national LTL carriers (at 40.1$ they could afford to abide 
by the law), at 22.7$ the mileage rate for national TL drivers was 43% less and they were not 
paid for their non-driving labor (see Belzer, Michael H. 1995. "Collective Bargaining After 
Deregulation: Do the Teamsters Still Count?'Zndustrial and Labor Relations Review 48:636- 
655). 







Full Survey Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
Local Regional Long Haul 
$ 36,572 $ 37,237 $ 37,907 $ 35,945 
$ 19,000 $ 20,000 $ 22,000 $ 18,000 
$ 27,000 $ 26,000 $ 30,000 $ 25,235 
$ 36,000 $ 40,000 $ 36,000 $ 35,000 
$ 46,000 $ 46,000 $ 48,000 $ 45,000 
$ 53,000 $ 53,000 $ 53,000 $ 53,000 
n=45 1 n=49 n=113 n=28 1 
Owner-operators earn somewhat less than do company drivers, suggesting profits may be 
quite low (owner-operators often commingle these concepts). While median earnings are the 
same, mean earnings of owner-operators are about 5 percent lower than those of company 
drivers. Recall, of course, that owner operators drive fewer miles and work fewer hours, but 







~ l e  56: Annual Wage 
Full Survey, Full Survey, 
OTR Ees OTR 00 
$ 37,103 $ 35,244 
$ 22,000 $ 11,000 
$ 30,000 $ 23,000 
$ 35,000 $ 35,000 
$ 45,000 $ 50,000 
$ 53,000 $ 59,000 
n=287 n=114 
As previous research has shown, the most striking difference in driver wages comes from the 
influence of the union. Collective bargaining clearly provides union drivers with great 
advantages in comparison with their non-union counterparts. Articles by Belzer (Belzer, 
Michael H. 1995. "Collective Bargaining After Deregulation: Do the Teamsters Still Count?" 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 48:636-655) and Hirsch (Hirsch, Barry T. 1993. 
"Trucking Deregulation and Labor Earnings: Is the Union Premium a Compensating 
Differential?' Journal of Labor Economics 11:279-301) show the union bargaining effect but 
also suggest that this union premium is also due to industry segment and human capital 
effects. Regardless of the cause, collective bargaining does appear to provide a "high road" 
with a nearly 26 percent earnings advantage over the non-union employees. Since non-union 
employees also work 8.3 percent more hours, the real advantage may be closer to 34.3 
percent, not including the value of benefits (which also is considerably higher for unionized 
employees). 
Table 57: Annual Wage 







Ee Drivers: Union Ee Drivers: Non-Union 
Finally, we present the regression sample here because it looks similar to that of the full 
sample, though somewhat higher. This excludes percentage-paid and hourly employees as 
well as owner-operators. 

















What activities are drivers paid for? From the discussion above, it appears that drivers put in 
a lot of unpaid time. Indeed, the following table shows that fewer than a majority of all 
drivers are paid for non-driving labor. While most union drivers are paid for their time, at 
best most non-union drivers (mainly in the truckload sector) put in a quite a number of 
unpaid hours. While the data show that a relatively high proportion of drivers may get some 
compensation for long waits, most are not paid for routine delays, and many not ever1 for 
routine labor. 
One source of unpaid time was waiting for dispatch. Drivers often experience the transition 
from a delivery to a pickup as "frictional time;" a regular period of uncertainty during which 
they wait for an assignment. Many drivers, in the irregular long-haul TL industry, have to 
wait between loads while their company decides where to send them to make their next pick 
up. Owner-operators often spend many hours waiting for or locating a load. These frictional 
periods often are quite long and ordinarily neither owner operators nor company drivers are 
paid. 
Table 59: Drivers Paid for Non-Driving Work 
Waiting Tasks 
Dispatch 
Loading / Unloading 
Other 
Working Tasks 
Loading / Unloading 
Dropping / Hooking 
Other 
All Local Regional Long Haul 
The above chart shows loading and unloading as both waiting and working because 
sometimes drivers wait while others load or unload their trucks. Other times they physically 
load or unload the trucks. In either case the drivers are on duty not driving because they must 
be responsible for loading operations or for their truck during this period. For example, if a 
driver stands on a dock and supervises the loading process as a warehouse worker loads 
pallets on his trailer, he is working. Likewise, if a driver stacks 40,000 pounds of freight in 
his trailer he is working, though much harder. The above data show that most drivers earn 
nothing for either form of labor. 
How are drivers paid? Clearly most over-the-road drivers are paid on a contingent basis, that 
is, by the mile or by a percentage of the load revenue. The latter method is most common 
among owner-operators, who usually act as subcontractors for motor carriers. It also is 
common among non-union drivers, but is relatively uncommon for union drivers. In this 
early stage of analysis we also have developed a rather crude indicator of whether drivers are 
paid for non-driving time. We believe that to the extent they are not paid for non-driving 
time, they have an incentive to log this time as off duty to conserve their hours. We were 
surprised, however, to find so many "local" drivers paid by the mile. We suspect that many 
of these are the "home base" drivers described in the proposed HOS revision. 
Table 60: Pay Structure 
1 Full Survey Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
Table 61: Pay Structure 
Paid for Any Non-Driving Time 
Paid By Mile for Driving 
Paid Percent of Revenue for 
Driving 
Local Regional Long Haul 
60.2% 60.2% 67.1% 57.0% 
58.4% 27.0% 5 1.4% 69.5% 
35.5% 32.1% 43.9% 31.4% 
Table 62: Pay Structure 
Paid for Any Non-Driving Time 
Paid By Mile for Driving 
Paid Percent of Revenue for Driving 
Full Survey, OTR Ees Full Survey, OTR 00 
66.1% 45.4% 
7 1 .O% 42.5% 
23.8% 66.6% 
Paid for Any Non-Driving Time 
Paid By Mile for Driving 
Paid Percent of Revenue for Driving 
Full Survey, Full Survey, 




Recall that in the regression models below, we have separated out mileage paid drivers for 
analysis, since those are the only ones for whom we have an accurate measure of the wage. 
We have tried to construct a generalized model of the wage, but have been unable to build 
such a construct in which we have confidence in the time allotted for this study. If we 
continue to do further analysis, we will try to build a useful wage model that works far all 
drivers. 
Table 63: Pay Structure 
l ~ u l l  Survey Regression Sample, 
Paid By Mile for Driving 
Paid Percent of Revenue for Driving I 
Paid for Any Non-Driving Time 
Night Driving 
Mileage Pay - 
60.2% 74.3910 
Our survey provided an interesting look at the extent of night driving among truck drivers. The 
survey asks drivers how many hours they worked between the hours of 11 PM and 7 AM, the shift 
known as the "graveyard shift." We were surprised to find that drivers reported a relatively small 
amount of night driving. At the mean drivers drove 29.0 percent of their time between those hours 
(Table 67), with local and long haul drivers putting in a somewhat smaller proportion of their time in 
night driving and regional drivers doing the most. For this quick research project we will not have 
time to analyze this data in depth, but it appears that drivers put in less night work than we thought. 
The proposed HOS restriction involves cutting drivers' night driving (defined as between 
12:OO AM and 6:00 AM) to 18 hours per week. First, we recall that the average driver works 
64.3 hours weekly (Table 39), of which 26 percent (Table 46) is non-driving. Multiplying 
64.3 by .74 we calculate that the average driver drives 47.6 hours per week. Based on the 
"last full, trip" information, the average driver in our sample spends 29% of his or her driving 
time between the hours of 11:OO p.m. and 7:00 a.m. (the hours our survey asked about). If 
we assume a uniform distribution of reported night dnving over this period, then we can 
estimate that the average driver would have 75 percent of his overall night driving hours in 
the policy-relevant six hours between midnight and 6 AM). We calculate that the average 
driver would be driving 21.75 percent of his time during the proscribed hours of the day 
(.75*.29). Using the sample mean driving total of 47.6 hours, this suggests the average driver 
currently drives 10.4 hours during the 12:OO AM to 6:00 AM period each week, well within 
the proscribed limits. From our data we have no way to tell which hours in the 11:OO p.m. to 
7:00 a.m. period our respondent drivers used for the night driving they reported to us, but we 
believe if the uniform distribution assumption is false, it is because drivers were more likely 
to have been rolling between 11 PM and midnight and between 6:00 and 7:00 AM than 
between the midnight to 6:00 period. In fact, we ended up juggling our interview schedule 
eventually because we were unable to get enough drivers during the early morning hours to 
justify maintaining a shift of interviewers. The estimate of 10.4 hours, therefore, is 
conservative. 
These calculations are based on the mean, however, so depending on the characteristics of 
those drivers exceeding the mean either in hours worked or percent of night driving, these 
characteristics might be different at the extremes. For example, in the LTL sector most of the 
regional carriers' drivers operate through the night, five days a week, but do so within the 60 
hour weekly limit (by inference, much of the union work force in our sample). In the 
national LTL and in the package delivery sector, tractor trailers run throughout the night as 
well as during the day. The safety record of these carriers, however, generally is the best in 
the nation so it is not clear to us that we would see a safety benefit and the carriers would 
experience a major business dislocation if night time hours were cut dramatically. 







Table 65: Night Percentage Last Trip 
Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
.ocal Regional Long Haul 
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Table 66: Night Percentage Last Trip 







Full Survey, Full Survey, 








The percent driven at night is defined as those hours 
driven between 11 PM and 7 AM. If we assume these 
are distributed uniformly, then the percent driven 
between midnight and 6am should comprise 75 percent 
of the reported number, which would result in the 







Table 68: Estimated Night Percent 





25 % 24% 
47% 47% 
71% 67% 
n=45 1 n=20 1 
Full Survey, Full Survey, Full Survey, 
Local 
median 
Table 69: Estimated Night Percent 
Full Survey, Full Survey, 
OTR Ees OTR 00 
median 
Table 70: Estimated Night Percent 
Table 71: Estimated Night Percent 
mean 
median 
IFull Survey Regression Sample, 
Full Survey, EE Drivers: Full Survey, EE Drivers: 
Union Non-Union 
24% 2 1 % 
23 % 17% 
median I 
mean 
The impact on the industry would be uneven, however, as we suggest in Section 1.3.3. The 
regional LTL industry depends almost entirely on these hours of driving, as overnight- 
delivery carriers' drivers operate their vehicles in regular schedules that typically span the 
entire policy-relevant night-time driving period. The national LTL industry depends 
significantly on these hours as well, though less so than does the regional LTL industry. 
Both of these industries are relatively heavily union (perhaps 50%) so that the higher 
percentage of night driving reflected in Table 68 probably reflects the industry effect. The 
long-haul and truckload industries depend the least on these hows, as drivers use their 
personal schedules more frequently. Other industries, such as those specializing in Just-In- 
Time deliveries, also use these night-time driving hours heavily. 
Mileage Pay 
21% 21% 
Irregularity of Schedule: The extent and impact of backward rotation 
The current proposed HOS revisions would limit backward rotation of schedules while 
putting no constraint on forward rotation. We have used two proxies for irregularity in this 
analysis to try to model this phenomenon. We did not collect the data originally with this 
specific analysis in mind, so these represent our best effort in a brief analysis to proxy 
irregularity. 
The first irregularity variable is designed to capture whether a driver drives more than ten 
hours in twenty four, thus suggesting that he rotates his schedule backward as hours become 
available. Again, this assumes the driver is obeying the HOS rules currently (which most 
drivers do not). We would need more research to study the question in any greater depth. 
The definition of irregularity follows. 
Irregl is computed as a binary variable based on a ratio. The ratio is: in the denominator, 
the sum of elapsed trip time and time off immediately previous to the trip, and in the 
numerator, trip driving time. The variable is coded " 1" if this ratio is greater than 
10/24=.42. 
k e g 2  is computed as a binary variable based on a ratio. The ratio is: in the denominator, 
the sum of elapsed trip time and time off immediately previous to the trip, and in the 
numerator, trip working time ("working" includes waiting as well as direct labor). The 
variable is coded "1" if this ratio is greater than 12/24=.5. 
Here's the intuition behind these two proxies. The seven-day-sixty-hour or eight-day- 
seventy-hour limit in the present regulations for total on-duty time (whether driving cur not) 
gives dnvers an incentive to log no more than ten hours work time per twenty-four hour day. 
This is because if you use more than this in a given day, and don't have a day later in the 
sliding seven or eight day period with little work to do, you will hit the total hours limit 
before the seventh or eighth day arrives. This means you will be stuck for a day while you sit 
and wait to pick up some hours dropping off the earlier end of the sliding period, raising the 
number of hours you can work today without violating the overall total limit. 
Now drivers can legally log up to sixteen hours driving in a twenty-four hour period under 
the current regulations, if they aren't bumping up against the seven or eight day total hours 
limit by doing so. When they do, it represents "accelerating their tour-of-duty cycle"'. This 
enables them to get in more h v i n g  miles immediately, at the cost of knowing they will have 
to sit sometime later (if they are in fact complying with the regulations). The irregl variable 
is a binary variable that is one for those drivers who report having driven more than ten hours 
in the past twenty-four, and zero otherwise. So it. represents a qualitative proxy for 
accelerating one's tour of duty cycle, which in turn is likely to involve starting at different 
times on succeeding days. 
The irreg2 variable is a bit less useful. It is a binary variable that is one if a driver reports 
more than twelve total work hours in the last twenty-four, and zero otherwise. So if we 
assume that all work time is being logged, it represents a qualitative proxy for starting one's 
work at a later time on successive days. If this assumption is false (as we think likely), then 
it picks out those drivers who would be negatively impacted by a twelve hour work limit in a 
twenty-four hour period, assuming that they fully comply with a new regulation imposing 
this limit. 
We find that irregularity is somewhat negatively related to the driving time, as we find that at 
both the mean and the median, drivers whose schedules are regular use a greater proportion 
of their time driving. 
















Most striking, we find a strong relationship between irregularity (however proxied) and the 
percent of waiting time on the last trip. This suggests that drivers who have a lot of down 
time are more likely to engage in risky behaviors like turning their biological clock back to 
deliver the freight or get more hours. We might infer from this that waiting time wastes the 
driver's time, and forces or encourages him to adopt a more irregular schedule. 








irregl=l irregl=O irreg2=l irreg2=0 
19.5% 16.9% 26.3% 12.6% 
Table 75: Percent Waiting Time on Last Trip 
We observe mixed results looking at the relationship between annual miles driven and 
irregularity. For our whole survey, the differences between those who have regular and 
irregular schedules are modest, with very nearly the same miles reported on average by both 
groups. We observe, however, that at the median drivers with irregular schedules drive 
modestly more miles than do regular drivers, though the averages are very nearly identical, 
For mileage paid drivers, however, the relationship is stronger and in the opposite direction. 
That is, at the mean regular drivers (irregl) cover about 8% more miles, which mainly can be 
seen at high mileage levels. For those fitting the irreg2 definition, the averages are extremely 
close and irregular drivers at higher mileage get rnore miles than their more regular 
counterparts. The variable "irregl" is used in the regression equations in Section 1.3.2, and is 








Table 76: Annual Miles and Irregular Schedule 
irregl=l irregl=O irreg2=l irreg2=0 
18.8% 13.8% 23.6% 11.7% 
0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
3.6% 1.5% 7.1% 1.5% 
14.8% 8.6% 16.3% 7.1% 
22.1% 20.0% 32.1% 16.7% 
53.1% 33.3% 53.1% 31.7% 









irregl=l irregl=O irreg2=l irreg2=0 
112 339 164 287 
113,840 112,430 112,673 112,816 
50,000 6Q,000 50,000 60,008 
100,000 90,000 80,000 100,000 
120,000 1 10,000 113,000 1 10,000 
137,000 130,000 137,000 130,000 









irregl=l irregl=O irreg2=l irreg2=0 
3 5 166 5 3 148 
114,598 123,007 121,827 121,4.'72 
50,000 80,000 50,000 80,000 
100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
120,000 120,000 125,000 120,000 
145,000 140,000 150,000 140,000 
160,000 175,000 175,000 165,000 
Observed as a product of weekly hours, however, we get a very different and more consistent 
story. Irregular drivers put in substantially more hours at the mean, at the median, and in 
most of the quintiles. The relationship is even stronger for mileage drivers, the regression 
sample. For this reason, regression will reveal a strong relationship to hours worked, 
controlling for other factors. Table 76 shows that irregularity is associated with dramatically 
higher mean and median hours and 90 percent of all irregular drivers (definition 1) work at 
least 126 hours or more. 









Table 79: Irregularity and Weekly Hours 
Do these excessive hours affect safety? Our survey had a limited number of questions that 
reflect safety (though our 1998-1999 survey has more), but for the questions we do have the 
effect is overwhelming. Irregularity generally is associated with a 50 percent higher 
likelihood that the driver will admit to violating the HOS regulations during the past 30 days 
(a question designed to repeat that of the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety in their 
survey reported in (Braver, Elisa R., Carol W. Preusser, David F. Preusser, Herbert M. Baum, 
Richard Beilock, and Robert Ulmer. 1992. "Who Violates Work Hour Rules? A Survey of 
Tractor-Trailer Drivers." . Arlington, VA: Insurance Institute for Highway Safety). We also 
asked drivers whether they had either one or more accidents or violations on their record over 
the past 12 months, and we likewise get a strong positive correlation between these safety 
proxies and irregularity. We do not find a particularly consistent relationship between 
admitted drowsy driving or falling asleep at the wheel, but there does seem to be a 









irregl=l irregl=O irreg2=l irreg2=0 
3 5 166 5 3 148 
78.33 63.83 73.27 64.02 
48 42 45 42 
57.5 50 5 5 50.5 
75 62 66 62 
80 70 80 70 
126 90 110 90 
who are paid for their non-driving time are significantly less likely to have irregular 
schedules. 
Table 80: Irregularity and Safety 
Table 81: Irregularity and Safety 
All Drivers 
paid for any non-driving time 
asleep or drowsy at wheel 
unclean driving record 
violate HOS in last 30 days 
irregl=l irregl=O irreg2=l irreg2=0 
47.02% 64.25% 48.35% 66.71% 
20.32% 24.74% 26.69% 22.03% 
52.73% 36.49% 43.64% 38.51% 
70.75% 52.94% 66.56% 51.74% 
Finally, it appears that irregular driving is most associated with long-haul drivers and owner- 
operators. Note that while 13.1 percent of our sample were union members they were 
disproportionately distributed among local and regional drivers and less likely in long haul, 
with very few union owner operators. Irregular driving schedules were disproportionately 
concentrated among long haul drivers and especially owner-operators. 
Mileage Drivers 
paid for any non-driving time 
asleep or drowsy at wheel 
unclean driving record 
violate HOS in last 30 days 
In Table 83 below note the relatively strong correlaticn between hours per week and irregularity, 
along with the correlation between drowsy driving and hours, miles, unclean driving record, and 
likelihood of working more hours than reported. Correlation among many of the variables are 
entirely consistent with over work. In Table 84 below note the extremely strong correlation between 
hours per week and irregularity, along with consistently strong correlation's between reported log 
violation and almost all safety-related variables of interest. 
irregl=l irregl=O irreg%=l irreg2=0 
66.58% 75.88% 66.83% 76.751710 
25.93% 26.6% 29.72% 25.41% 
44.91% 33.58% 36.44% 35.23% 
74.90% 50.75% 72.75% 48.79% 
Table 82: Irregularity and Union Status 
union member 
irregular driving 
Full Regression Full Full Full Full Full Full Full 
Survey Sample, Survey, Survey, Survey, Survey, Survey, Survey, Survey, Ee 
Mileage Local Regional Long OTR Ees OTR Ee Drivers: 
pay Haul 00 Drivers: Non-Union 
Union 
13.1% 14.2% 18.0% 19.2% 9.5% 16.1% 2.5% 
23.7% 17.2% 15.8% 19.9% 27.6% 16.6% 47.7% 18.0% 15.3% 
Table 83: Irregularity Correlation for All Drivers 










irregl irreg2 drowsy hrsweek miles unclean report bymile percent 
1 
0.6573 1 
-0.0224 0.0534 1 
0.0806 0.106 0.0769 1 
0.0183 0.0076 0.1 121 0.1073 1 
0.1405 0.01 0.0997 0.0249 0.0681 1 
0.1366 0.122 0.2404 0.2735 0.2487 0.1212 1 
-0.0188 -0.1249 -0.0292 0.0647 0.1655 -0.1 13 -0.0314 1 








irregl irreg2 drowsy hrsweek miles unclean report 
1 
0.7049 1 
0.0533 0.1005 1 
0.2497 0.1658 0.0796 1 
-0.0369 0.0698 0.0988 0.075 1 1 
0.0161 -0.0715 0.0494 0.0213 -0.1562 1 
0.1412 0.1651 0.2258 0.375 0.3486 0.07 1 
Indicators 
miles: annual miles 
hrsweek: hours worked in the last 7 days 
actmrate: actual mileage rate for this trip (only reported for drivers paid by the mile). 
penvork: percent of total time on last trip spent on non-driving working activities. 
penvait: percent of total time on last trip spent on waiting activities. 
nightper: percent of time driven at night on last trip. 
pdwork: whether the driver is paid in any way for any non-driving work. 
pdwait: whether the driver is paid in any way for any waiting time. 
drowsy: whether the driver reported drowsiness or falling asleep at the wheel at all in the 
last 30 days. 
unclean: whether the driver reported an accident or moving violation in the last year. 
report: whether the driver worked more than logged in the last 30 days. 
1.3.2: Driver Impact. 
Analysis will proceed from two baselines. We will look at proposed changes assuming 
perfect enforcement, and we will look at the changes and compare them with the actual status 
quo. With more than half of all drivers in violation of current regulations, not only do we 
need to calculate the impact of a change, but we need to calculate the potential impact of 
enforcing current rules. The driver survey, along with public employment data, will help us 
to estimate the cost of regulatory enforcement, or regulatory change, and the potential impact 
on employment. Using public and UMTIP driver survey data we will estimate the impact on 
driver earnings. We will attempt to analyze the potential benefit in terms of driver health, 
although data sources are uncertain. 
First, we will analyze the nature of proposed changes and the likely affects on driver 
practices, assuming the regulations were obeyed. For this part of the analysis we will need to 
assume enforcement is efficient and cost-effective. We will perform a thought exercise, 
using our institutional knowledge of industry operations, to work out possible scenarios for 
drivers hours under various conditions. Second, we will look at proposed changes in light of 
current practice, as revealed by the driver survey. Will driver hours be reduced as a result? If 
so, what impact will that have on driver earnings? How are drivers likely to respond to this 
change? 
Part I: Estimating the Number and Cost of Additional Truck Drivers Needed If the 
Existing Hours of Service Regulations Were Enforced 
As part of the analysis of the impact of changing the Hours of Service (HOS) regulations, we 
have estimated the number of additional truck drivers that would be needed if all present 
drivers were required to limit their work time to 60 hours a week. We have also estimated 
the additional cost to the trucking industry of enforcing this restriction. 
We have focused on regional and long-distance drivers because we believe that the primary 
focus of the HOS regulations is on regional and long-haul drivers, and because data on local 
drivers is scanty. With a longer lead time we could extend this analysis to local drivers, but 
we believe our analysis is applicable to this group. The UMTIP Driver Survey data suggest 
local drivers also exceed HOS regulations, though we suspect we have under-sampled local 
drivers due to our sampling frame of truck stops. Local drivers are less likely to stop at truck 
stops, and those who do may differ systematically with those who do not. Consequently, this 
analysis of the impact of enforcing HOS regulations would fall predominantly on regional 
and long-distance truckers. In deriving our estimates, we have made a few additional 
simplifying assumptions: (1) that there is perfect compliance of the new regulations, (2) that 
none of the present drivers quit the profession as a result of the new regulations, and (3) that 
the drivers are paid for 52 weeks per year. We are not including cost of enforcement itself in 
this analysis. 
In order to estimate the number of additional truck drivers that would be required if the HOS 
60-hours-a-week regulation were enforced, we need estimates of the number of regional and 
long-distance drivers. Unfortunately, the Trucking Industry Use Survey (TIUS) collects 
information only on distance traveled by vehicle, not by driver. Using information from the 
1992 TIUS, the FHWA Office of Motor Carriers estimates that there were 482,442 trucks 
used in long-distance driving and 416,499 trucks used for regional driving. We estimate that 
there are about 300,000 owner-operators. If we assume that each owner-operator has only 
one truck and that all drivers are either regional or long-distance drivers, then there are 
598,941 (482,442 + 416,499 - 300,000) regional and long-distance for-hire trucks in the 
United States. According to the ATA/ICC/BTS Form M data set, regional and long-distance 
trucking companies employ 9.45 percent more drivers than trucks. Therefore, we estimate 
that the total number of regional and long-distance drivers in the United States is 955,541 
(300,000 + (1.0945 x 598,941)). If we assume that drivers are distributed in the same 
proportion as trucks, then there are 442,723 regional and 512,818 long-distance drivers in the 
United States. 
According to the University of Michigan's 1997 survey of truck drivers (UMTIP Driver 
Survey), 54 percent of regional drivers and 53 percent of long-distance drivers work over 60 
hours a week. Multiplying these values by the estimated number of regional and long- 
distance drivers produces estimates that 239,070 (0.54 x 442,723) regional and 271,794 (0.53 
x 512,818) long-distance drivers typically work over 60 hours a week. According to the 
UMTIP Driver Survey, the typical regional driver working over 60 hours a week works 70 
hours a week, or 10 hours a week more than the HOS regulations allow. The typical long- 
distance driver working over 60 hours a week actually works 80 hours a week, or 20 hours a 
week more than the HOS regulations allow. Consequently, regional drivers, in aggregate, 
currently exceed the HOS regulations by 2,390,700 (239,070 x 10) hours a week, and long- 
distance drivers exceed the HOS regulations by 5,435,880 (271,794 x 20) hours a week 
(totaling 7,826,580 hours). 
If drivers were prohibited from working the nearly 8,000,000 extra hours a week, the trucking 
industry would need to do one of the following: (1) increase the hours of drivers currently 
working fewer than 60 hours a week, (2) hire new drivers, or (3) significantly increase truck 
driver productivity by substantially reducing non-driving labor time. These alternative 
strategies will be examined in turn. 
Forty-six percent of regional drivers (203,653), and 47 percent of long-distance drivers 
(241,024) work fewer than 60 hours a week. For these drivers (both regional and long- 
distance), the median number of hours worked per week is 50. If all of the dnvers working at 
less than the maximum number of hours were to increase their work time to 60 hours a week, 
the industry could gain 4,446,770 hours per week ((60 - 50) x (203,653 + 24 1,024)). The 
industry would still need to hire new workers to make up the 3,379,810 hours (7,826,580 - 
4,446,770) that would be taken away if all the present drivers were to work 60 hours a week, 
If all of the newly hired drivers worked 60 hours a week, the industry would still need 56,330 
new regional and long-distance drivers (3,379,810 hours + 60 hours per driver), or 5.9 
percent (56,330 + 955,541 total present drivers). 
At the other extreme, if all present drivers working fewer than 60 hours a week were unable 
or unwilling to increase their hours, then the industry would need 130,443 (7,826,580 + 60) 
new drivers working 60 hours a week. This would represent a 13.7 percent increase in the 
present workforce of regional and long-distance drivers (130,443 + 955,541 total present 
drivers). How much would this change cost the industry? The answer depends on two 
factors: (1) how much the earnings of present workers change as they vary their hours, and 
(2) how much the wage needs to change to attract a sufficient number of new workers into 
the industry. 
The earnings profile of drivers in the trucking industry clearly shows that average annual (or 
weekly) earnings increase, but at a decreasing rate, as the average weekly hours increase. 
Truck drivers are not covered by the 40-hour limit provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 
which mandates time-and-a-half pay for hours over 40 hours a week, so earnings by drivers 
for hours beyond 40 hours a week depend on how that time is spent. If drivers spend that 
time driving, the primary method of compensation in the industry is by the mile driven, in 
which case earnings should increase proportionately to hours worked. If the additional hours 
result from non-driving labor time, which is frequently uncompensated or compensated at a 
relatively low rate, then earnings would increase by a smaller percentage than hours worked. 
According to the regression results shown in Table 85, average annual earnings for drivers in 
the trucking industry increase by $364 ($7.01 an hour) for every additional hour worked 
between 35 and 59 hours a week, and by $322 ($6.20 an hour) for every additional hour 
worked over 59 hours a week. We suspect the observed declining hourly wage in trucking is 
due to the increased prevalence of bad jobs among drivers working more than the legal limit; 
they earn lower wages at all levels of hourly output. The results were estimated from an 
ordinary least squares regression of data on earnings and hours in 1997 from the March 1998 
Current Population Survey. The sample consisted of all those who reported that truck driving 
was their "longest" occupation, that the trucking industry was their "longest" industry, and 
that they worked at least 35 hours a week for 50-52 weeks in 1997. Seven observations were 
dropped from the sample because the respondents reported that they had either negative or 
unbelievably high earnings (over $75 an hour). Also, one observation was dropped because 
the respondent was coded as a government employee working in the trucking industry. 
Dropping these observations did not significantly change the coefficients on the hours 
variables. 
The estimates from the regression equation indicate that the typical driver in the trucking 
industry working 40 hours a week would earn $30,976 per year, a 60-hour-a-week driver 
would earn $35,737, and a 70-hour-a-week driver $38,959 per year.3 These earnings levels 
calculated with the CPS compare favorably with those collected directly from drivers with 
the UMTIP Driver Survey, providing cross-validation between sets. The UMTIP Driver 
Survey shows that the average driver earns $36,752 and the average work week is 64.3 hours. 
The mean earnings for all drivers in the sample were $33,824, and the median earnings were 
$3 1,000. 
The predicted earnings values were calculated by assuming that all of the dummy variables in the equation 
assumed their mean values. 
The interpretation of the coefficient on the variable measuring weekly hours for those 
working more than 60 hours a week is that for every hour worked over 60, the aggregate 
earnings of drivers, and correspondingly the aggregate cost to trucking companies, would be 
reduced by $6.20 an hour. As mentioned earlier, aggregate hours of drivers working over 60 
hours a week would be reduced by 7,826,580 hours per week if the HOS regulations were 
enforced. Consequently, the trucking industry would save $48,524,796 per week (7,126,580 
x $6.20) in pay to truckers currently working over 60 hours a week. On the other hand, 
trucking industry payments to present workers who increased their hours to 60 a week, along 
with payments to the newly hired workers, would increase the costs to the trucking industry. 
All of the calculations of the costs to the trucking industry of enforcing 60-hour-a-week HOS 
regulations, for each of the scenarios considered here, are shown in Table 86. 
The least expensive solution for the trucking industry would be for the present drivers 
working fewer than 60 hours a week to increase their effort to 60 hours a week. The 
coefficient on the variable measuring weekly hours for those working 60 or fewer hours a 
week means that for every hour under 61, the aggregate earnings of drivers, and 
correspondingly the aggregate cost to trucking companies, would be increased by $7.01 an 
hour. These additional hours (4,446,770) woulcl cost the trucking industry $31,171,858 
($7.01 x 4,446,770) per week, but the trucking industry would still need to hire 56,330 new 
workers. If the present truckers working fewer than 60 hours a week were unable or 
unwilling to increase their hours, the industry would need to hire 130,443 new workers. The 
cost of hiring these new workers depends on the elasticity of labor supply to the trucking 
industry. 
Since there are no observable data on potential new entrants, their elasticity of labor supply 
cannot be estimated directly. Two considerations suggest that the responsiveness of labor 
supply to wages for this group is relatively elastic: (1) the barriers to entry for working in the 
industry are fairly low, and (2) historical data suggest that employment growth in the industry 
has not been significantly impeded by wage movements. Since a point estimate is not 
possible, we consider two boundary conditions for our calculations, which bracket the range 
of relatively elastic responses of labor supply to wages: (1) perfectly elastic labor supply, 
and (2) unitary elasticity of labor supply. Explanations of these two scenarios follow, with 
accompanying calculations summarized in Table 86. 
If we assume that the regional and long-distance trucking industry can find the desired 
number of workers at the current wage rate (that is, assuming a perfectly elastic labor supply 
curve), then the cost of hiring the new workers (at 60 hours a week) would be $38,712,793 
(($35,737 + 52) x 56,330) per week if the present workers increased their hours, and 
$89,646,952 ($35,737 + 52) x 130,443) per week if they were either unable or unwilling to 
increase their hours. Consequently, the net labor cost to the trucking industry, even if we 
assume a perfectly elastic labor supply curve, would be between $21,359,855 per week 
($1,110,'712,460 annually) and $41,122,156 per week ($2,138,352,112 annually), depending 
on the ability and willingness of present workers to increase their hours. 
If we assume that the labor supply elasticity is equal to 1.0 (unitary elasticity), so that any 
given percentage increase in the labor supply of new workers requires an equal percentage 
increase in the wage rate, the cost to the trucking industry of enforcing the HOS regulations 
increases dramatically. If present truckers were able and willing to increase their hours, then 
the average annual wage for a 60-hour-a-week driver would need to increase by 5.9 percent, 
or from $35,737 to $37,845. The higher wage paid to both present and new workers would 
cost the trucking industry an additional $2,133,024,068 per year ((955,541 + 56,330) x 
($37,845 - $35,737)). If present workers were unable or unwilling to increase their hours, 
then the wage rate would need to increase by 13.7 percent, or from $35,737 to $40,633. This 
higher wage rate would cost the trucking industry an additional $5,316,977,664 per year 
((955,541 + 130,443) x ($40,633 - $35,737)). Combined with the base cost described 
earlier, this means that the trucking industry's labor costs would increase by between $3.2 
billion ($1,110,712,460 + 2,133,024,068) and $7.5 billion ($2,138,352,112 + 
$5,316,977,664) per year if the labor supply elasticity were 1.0. 
The wages indicated in the preceding calculation use the dnver census numbers from the CPS 
along with the driver earnings and wage figures developed in the UMTIP driver survey. We 
use the UMTIP driver survey rather than CPS in this analysis because it more closely 
approximates the wages earned by drivers holding the CDL and operating in interstate 
commerce. Overall driver wages are not calculated using the CPS and the marginal effect on 
driver wages ($7.01 between 35 and 59 hours, inclusive, and $6.20 greater than 59 hours) 
controls for firm size only (note that drivers for very small firms earn significantly less wages 
than the mean and drivers for very large firms earn significantly greater wages than the mean. 
Clearly, labor cost increases of this magnitude would threaten the viability of many firms in 
the trucking industry (even the best-case scenario would result in an increase in total labor 
costs of $1.1 billion per year). Faced with such a change in its labor cost structure, the 
trucking industry would be forced to seek additional labor productivity improvements. One 
possibility would be to reduce non-driving labor time and correspondingly increase driving 
time. 
According to the UMTIP Driver Survey, about three-quarters of total labor time is spent 
driving and the other quarter is non-driving labor time. Applying this ratio to the scenario 
where all present dnvers work 60 hours a week, about 45 hours a week would be spent 
driving and 15 hours would be devoted to non-driving labor time. In this scenario, if non- 
driving labor time were cut by 25 percent with driving time increased correspondingly, we 
estimate that the trucking industry could meet the HOS 60-hour-a-week regulation without 
hiring any new drivers. Given the method of compensation in the industry, this would 
increase labor costs, but by a smaller amount than the alternatives outlined in Table 86. 
Table 85: Estimating the Relationship between Annual Earnings and Weekly Hours for Truck 
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Table 86: Calculating the Cost to the Trucking Industry 
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Part 11: Driver Survey-Based Econometric Modeling Results 
Introduction. Our task is to estimate first, the social costs, and second, the effects on trucking 
industry participants, of potential changes in the HOS regulations for commercial motor 
vehicle operators. In this first attack on the problem we have attempted to construct a 
prototype methodology for generating such estimates. The prototype we have developed 
makes use of the unique survey data on truck drivers collected by the University of Michigan 
Trucking Industry Program, and while it is relatively primitive and ad hoe in its present form, 
it is potentially capable of validation, extension, and refinement in several ways (see Section 
VI). 
In developing our prototype methodology we have considered only two specific versions of 
the potential HOS changes. These give us a reasonable initial idea of the magnitudes of the 
effects involved in the proposals being reviewed. Specifically, we consider (1) the effect of 
limiting night driving between the hours of 12:OO midnight and 6:00 a.m. to eighteen hours 
per work week, versus the current system of no limits. And, we consider (2) a simple version 
of imposing more schedule regularity on all drivers, in particular, the prohibition of more 
than one ten hour driving shift per twenty four hour period, versus the current system which 
permits more than one tour of duty per twenty four hour day (due to the fact that a new tour 
can begin after only an eight hour break, permitting starting times to "rotate backward"). 
Note that our method compares the current status quo (which involves considerable 
violations of the present rules) to perfect compliance with the new policy, and does not 
estimate any increase in enforcement costs that might be required to achieve this state. Nor 
does it adjust the social costs in any way to attempt to reflect potential levels of 
noncompliance. 
In order to consider these potential changes using the UMTIP driver survey data, we take the 
information collected about the last complete trip cycle that each respondent driver 
completed, and construct variables for the percent of diving time performed at night (used 
for (I)), and whether or not the drivers is putting in more than ten hours of driving per 
twenty-four hour period (used for (2)). We take these variables as proxies for the relevant 
measures over all of a driver's work, thus implicitly assuming that the last trip cycle was 
representative of all the driver's work. 
Our technique involves estimating a recursive econometric equation system on a subset of the 
first wave of the UMTIP Driver Survey data to provide two results, one for each equation. 
The first equation, in which the reported wage rate is the dependent variable, provides a 
direct estimate of the marginal social costs of imposing the two policy change versions 
mentioned above. Utilizing some simplifying assumptions spelled out below, we measure 
these costs directly, by using our estimated regression coefficients on the relevant proxy 
variables to simulate changes in the equilibrium pay rates of truck drivers due to (1) or (2). 
These changes are in turn assumed to affect the cost structure of the providers of trucking 
services, the rates they charge, and the ultimate costs for those services that are passed on to 
consumers. Under some further simplifying assumptions, we use these estimates of the 
marginal social cost to compute estimates of the total social costs of policy changes (1) and 
(2). A limitation to the present version of these estimates is that while the interpretation we 
give our econometric results are theoretically reasonably well supported, given our 
assumptions, the estimated coefficients are statistically somewhat imprecise, especially for 
policy change (1). 
The second equation, in which the hours of work time reported to have been supplied in the 
last week is the dependent variable, and the predicted wage from the first equation is an 
explanatory variable, provides a result that is theoretically less well supported, and on which 
we place less reliance at present. It is an estimate of the increase in the number of hours of 
work per week effectively supplied by incumbent drivers who currently have irregular 
schedules. Using this estimated coefficient to simulate the change (reduction) in hours 
supplied per currently irregular driver due to policy change (I), and under further simplifying 
assumptions and using information on the marginal cost to firms of an hour of labor 
computed from CPS data in another part of the present study, we compute a second estimate 
of the total social cost of (I), the elimination of "schedule irregularity". This estimate is 
approximately twice that obtained through the first method, and we report it primarily for 
comparison, as we have less confidence in it. (The results of the second equation do not 
provide a usable estimate of changes in hours associated with the other potential policy 
change (2), limits on night driving.) 
Measuring Marginal Social Cost. For a subset of the driver survey respondents consisting of 
the mileage paid employee drivers, we estimate a wage equation designed to explain the 
nominal mileage rate received by each respondent in terms of a set of appropriate - - 
independent variables. In this equation the coefficients estimated for the two policy-relevant 
factors (1) and (2) show negative values; that is, other things equal, being irregular or driving 
at night is associated with lower nominal mileage: pay received. Under some assumptions 
stated below, we interpret this reduction in the wage rate as an estimate of the marginal per- 
mile benefit realized by society under the current level of these two operational 
- 
characteristics. 
The basic intuition behind this interpretation is as follows. Road drivers can be treated, to a 
first approximation, as if they only switch jobs based on how much they make in a week, 
once they are away from home. They work in a competitive labor market, if adjustments are 
made for union membership, and so their individual human capital characteristics essentially 
determine their next best job option, and hence the level of weekly wage they command. This 
is because, in competitive equilibrium, they can expect to make neither more nor less than the 
value to them of the hometime/weekly wage bundle that their fallback option would give 
them. So, a firm whose freight gives mileage-paid drivers more miles per week, either due to 
schedules that require a high proportion of night time driving, or due to schedule irregularity 
from "tour-of-duty acceleration," or due simply to excessive or intensified work (the 
sweating of labor), can on average pay a bit less per mile and still offer the weekly earnings 
level needed to just keep the marginal driver indifferent between working and quitting. But in 
a competitive freight market, this decrease will be reflected in freight rates, which an: passed 
on ultimately to consumers. Hence, this decrease represents the marginal (i.e. per mile) social 
gain of such night driving or irregularity: the marginal cost contribution of truck 
transportation in the supply chain leading to consumer products is less by this amount. 
This estimate is only for dnvers in this subset of the commercial vehicle operator population, 
a limitation imposed by the problem of measuring nominal mileage rates for drivers paid by 
other methods (e.g. percentage of revenue). However, for a first approximation we assume 
that the estimate obtained for mileage-paid road drivers is representative of that for all road 
drivers, and use this to approximate the total social cost involved in the policy change of 
setting "irregularity" to zero and limiting night driving. Here are the assumptions under 
which the nominal wage equation may be properly interpreted to give estimates of the 
marginal social benefit of present policies. 
(1) It is assumed that motor freight is an effectively competitive industry. Hence, the rates 
it charges approximately represent the marginal cost of providing trucking services. 
(2) Road drivers don't care a lot about leisure consumed away from home, and so they don't 
have a standard labor-leisure tradeoff. While away from home they tend to work as 
many hours as will continue to increase their earnings by any positive amount, up to the 
limits defined by freight schedules andlor regulations. This is the most nonstandard of 
our assumptions, but we argue, based on our industry background, that it is plausible 
for road drivers. (We suggest in Section VI that this assumption might be tested in 
future work.) 
(3) The labor market for commercial truck drivers is approximately in long term 
competitive equilibrium. That is, once we have accounted for differences in human 
capital and any other factors that explain differences in next best opportunities to the 
present job, drivers receive their reservation earnings and amenities bundle. So, once 
they go on the road, drivers bring home a weekly earnings package that makes them 
approximately indifferent between worhng on the schedule required on the road, and 
taking their next best job elsewhere. 
(4) The level of night driving, and of irregularity in schedule caused by accelerating one's 
tour of duty cycle to a more rapid pace than one driving shift every twenty-four hours 
are, to a first approximation, due to the demands of the market for freight services. 
That is, shipper loading schedules and delays, consignee delivery windows and queues, 
and the like, are primarily responsible for driver schedule irregularity and night driving 
(and hence the levels of these that we observe are predominantly exogenous, as opposed 
to being significantly due to endogenous driver choices). 
None of these assumptions is literally completely true, but all four are defensible as 
approximate descriptions of the market for regional and long haul truckload (TL) motor 
freight services, and the associated labor markets for dnvers. The less-then-truckload (LTL) 
segment, and probably local trucking services, differ primarily in that employees tend to 
receive significant employment rents (especially in LTL); the other three assumptions are 
relatively reasonable even in these parts of trucking. When these four assumptions are 
satisfied, then the following story is sensible. 
Freight that requires accelerated tour of duty schedules and night driving is associated with 
drivers running more miles (or having hours of paid non-driving work, if applicable) per 
week, which increases weekly earnings. Thus, firms on average are able to pay drivers 
working this type of schedule less per mile, other things equal, without lowering their weekly 
earnings. (Think of irregularity as producing a kind of an "employment rent", which firms tax 
away from drivers because the labor market is competitive.) This in turn makes the firm's 
marginal cost of such movements lower. Since the market for freight services is competitive, 
this lower marginal cost results in lower rates on average to those who pay freight bills 
(shippers or consignees). These lower rates in turn flow through to consumers to the extent 
that links in the supply chain leading to consumer goods, in which such trucking serviices are 
a cost item, themselves operate competitively. The net result of cutting irregularity or night 
driving would thus be an increase in supply chain costs that would cause a leftward shift 
(reduction) in the aggregate supply function for consumer products. 
We can tell an analogous story about the role of the reduction in hours supplied by currently 
irregular dnvers, in the event irregularity is prohibited, as a measure of the productive: output 
that would be lost. We have less confidence in applicability of this story, as we are not 
completely confident the hours equation is correctly specified (see Section V below). 
Estimating Total Social Costs. Unlike the case of a shift in a supply function due the 
imposition of a unit tax, the implied leftward shift (reduction) in supply is caused by a real 
increase in the utilization of social resources. So the resulting loss of consumer surplus, most 
of which is transferred to producers, represents, in equilibrium, a real social opportunity cost 
to consumers. Hence the correct measure of the social cost in this case is not a deadweight 
loss (the difference between the consumer surplus lost and the producer surplus gained), but 
the total reduction in consumer surplus. For the present, we treat the loss in consumer 
surplus as equal to the gain in producer surplus, as this is in turn estimated by calculating the 
increased costs of production caused by regulatory changes (1) and (2). This amounts to 
assuming that the demand for trucking services is perfectly inelastic, and the supply is 
perfectly elastic, even after all adjustments involved in having the economy return to general 
equilibrium take place. Thus, for instance, we arc ignoring any intermodal shifts in response 
to higher trucking costs (any such shifts would probably modestly decrease the present 
estimate). However, since the total loss in consumer surplus is the relevant measure, these 
simplifications will cause a much smaller proportional impact on the results of the calculation 
than similar ones would in a case in which only a deadweight loss is at issue. 
Let's consider the total social cost of policy change (1) (requiring "regularity"), using the 
results from the wage equation. The coefficient on the proxy we constructed for irregularity 
(a binary variable) -.0196. It is statistically significant at the 14.5% level, which means it is 
estimated relatively imprecisely, limiting our confidence in the estimate's numerical value 
(see below, Section IV for a full discussion of this equation). Under the assumptions in 
Section U, in equilibrium we expect that the typical irregular driver gets on average more 
miles (or more paid hours, where applicable), and so makes about the same annual income as 
a regular driver, other things equal. If we prohibit irregularity, then these drivers will have to 
be paid slightly less than 2 cents per mile more on the smaller number of miles they will then 
run. 
Using the average annual miles from the Driver Sur~ey  of 112,000 as an estimate of the total 
annual miles run (hence not trying to explicitly capture any implied change in miles), this 
increase amounts to $2,195 per year in higher per mile wages over fewer miles under a no 
irregularity policy for the average irregular driver, in order to restore his or her wages to their 
approximate pre-regulatory change level. Hence society will pay that much more in higher 
freight rates for the freight each irregular driver now hauls, under our simplifying 
assumptions, if irregularity were prohibited, and all drivers perfectly complied with the 
prohibition. 
If we treat all drivers (including owner-operators) like the average driver in our mileage-paid 
subset, and using figure (estimated elsewhere in this study) of 955,500 road drivers operating 
commercial vehicles, and we assume that 23.4% of this entire population was "irregular" (the 
same percentage as was irregular in our subset), this means that 223,500 drivers in the whole 
population would have to be paid about $2,200 in higher per-mile rates, while making fewer 
miles. So, this method of summing up the marginal costs over drivers produces an estimated 
total social cost to end consumers of $492,000,000 (a bit under $500 million) per year. 
Let's consider the total social cost of policy change (2), limiting night driving to eighteen 
hours per week, using the results from the wage equation. First we need to translate this limit 
into a number that is meaningful in terms of our variable measuring night driving as a 
percentage of all driving on the last trip. We utilize the mileage-paid regression sub-sample, 
since we will use a regression coefficient estimate in the calculation. The hours reported for 
the last full week are 66.3 at the mean of the sub-sample, and at the mean of percent driving 
in the sub-sample, 75.3% of these were driving hours. So we estimate the weekly driving 
hours as 75% x 66.3 = 49.9 hours. A limit of 18 hours per week would thus represent 
18149.9 = 36% of weekly driving time. Next we need to adjust for the fact that the variable 
we have to measure the percent of night driving is the percent of driving time on the last 
completed trip that took place between the hours of 11:OO p.m. and 7:00 am., and the hours 
relevant to the potential policy change are 12:OO midnight and 6:00 a.m. If we assume a 
uniform distribution of this driving over the eight hour interval in question, the percentage of 
driving time our respondents have that occurs between 12:OO midnight and 6:00 a.m. should 
be 75% of the value we record for the longer period. Hence, the percentage of night driving 
measure by our variable that represents the limit proposed is 11-75 = 1.333 times 36%, or 
about 48%. This is approximately equal to the percentage of night driving we record at the 
seventy fifth percentile of our distribution of the percent of night driving variable. So, this 
suggests that about one quarter of our sample will be affected by an eighteen hour limitation. 
To calculate the marginal effect of this limitation, we will compute the increase in wages 
estimated to be required to shift someone at the ninetieth percentile of the percent night 
driving distribution down to the seventy fifth percentile. Then to estimate the total social 
cost we will scale this up for the whole over-the-road driver population by applying this 
change to one quarter of that population. The ninetieth percentile night driver has 66.7% of 
his or her driving at night, and to cut this level to the 46.7% of the seventy fifth percentile 
night driver is a drop of 30%. The point estimate of the effect of the percent of night driving 
on the wage is -.0415. This estimate is statistically significant at the 6.25% level, and so is a 
bit more precise than that associated with irregularity. This estimated value has the 
consequence that the elasticity of the wage with respect to the percent of night driving at the 
mean of the wage, but the ninetieth percentile of the night driving distribution, is -.0415 x 
(.6671.303) = .091%. Hence, a 30% drop in the percent night driving should be associated 
with approximately a 30 x -091% = 2.74% increase in the wage, or .027 x $.303 = $.0083 per 
mile. On an average annual mileage of 112,000, this is about $930 per year. Applied to one 
quarter of the estimated 955,500 regional and long haul road drivers, this gives a total social 
cost estimate of $222,150,000. 
Last, for comparison, let's consider the total social cost of policy change (I), using the results 
of the hours equation. The estimated coefficient on the proxy variable for irregularity is 
approximately twelve hours. Although this estimate is statistically significant by standard 
conventions, for theoretical reasons we are much less confident that this is a correct estimate 
(see below, Section V, for a complete discussion of the hours equation). Assuming that 
subtracting 12 hours per week (or 624 hours per 52 week year) from the approximately 
223,500 irregular drivers in the population captures the number of productive hours that 
would need to be replaced due to a prohibition of irregularity, the industry would need to 
purchase 139,500,000 more hours of work than before. If we assume that all these hours can 
be supplied at the margin by incumbent drivers, at the marginal rate of $7.01 per hour 
calculated elsewhere in this report from a regression on CPS driver data, the total annual 
social cost would be about $978,000,000, or arourid twice as high as the estimate arrived at 
from the wage equation. (It would be possible to calculate this estimate using other 
assumptions, such as assuming that some new drivers have to be attracted and that this would 
require higher wages, but we neglect this until such time as this second equation is placed on 
a more sound theoretical footing.) 
The Wage Equation in Detail. The wage equation is based on the idea that firms pay 
approximately their marginal revenue product to drivers. The left hand side variable is the 
nominal wage rate; the model is restricted to a sub-sample consisting of those employee 
drivers who reported a mileage rate of within a reasonable range, which excludes owner- 
operators (who get high mileage rates that include truck payments or who get percentage of 
revenue) and local drivers (who generally get hourly pay, or in rare cases, percentage of 
revenue). The N is approximately 170, and all regressions are weighted to reflect the 
different sampling rates at high traffic and low traffic interview sites. The weights ensure 
that the results reflect the population sampled, which is intended to be drivers passing 
through truck stops in the upper Midwest during the summer and fall of 1997, and hence, an 
approximation to the population of drivers passing through the upper Midwest during that 
time. We are thus implicitly assuming that this slice of the driver population is representative 
of all the truck drivers who will be significantly affected by the proposed changes to the 
Hours of Service for regional and long haul drivers. 
The right hand side variables are (1) human capital variables that affect the revenue 
productivity of the driver's work input, (2) operational features that reflect the level of 
revenue likely to be generated by that work, and (3) operational or institutional factors that 
may affect reported mileage pay directly. After some experimentation as to which proxies 
work appropriately and which don't, in the first group are: occupational experience and its 
square (occexp and occexp2, in years; the squared term to permit an expected non-linearity- 
that the marginal effect should decrease), firm tenure (tenure--in months), education level 
(hsplus--binary for high school or higher versus less than high school), minority status 
(rninority--binary), and whether the driver has a clean driving record (unclean--binary, with 
value one if reported an accident or moving violation in a commercial vehicle in the 
preceding 12 months). In the second group are type of equipment (dry box--binary for 
standard dry van-thought to be a more competitive segment--versus other), a length of haul 
proxy (regional--binary for regional or not, broken at 500 miles of reported typical run 
length), and the size of the firm (fsize--measured as number of total drivers). In the third 
category go union status (union-binary), whether the driver is paid for any non-driving time 
(paid--binary; to permit either a trade-off between mileage pay rate and receiving pay for 
other duties, or a "good jobs-bad jobs" effect which would cause them to march together), an 
interaction between union and pay for non-driving time (unionpd--to pull out from "paid the 
effect of union drivers who normally get paid for nearly all non-driving time), and the two 
policy relevant variables based on the information on the last full trip cycle--irregularity 
(irregl-binary) and percent of night driving (nightper--continuous). 
In the currently standard version of this model we have the results shown in the table below. 
The adjusted R' (a measure of the proportion of variance in the dependent variable predicted 
by the independent variables) is slightly more than .298, which is quite decent for a cross 
section model. To interpret this table, note that "actmrate" is the left hand, or dependent 
variable, and the variables below it in a column are the right hand side, or independent 
variables. 
actmrate I Coef. Std. Err. t ~>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------.-- 
union 1 -.0366932 .0170644 -2.150 0.033 -.0703718 -.0030146 
paid 1 .0157242 .0124254 1.265 0.207 -.0087987 .0402471 
unionpd 1 .I643136 .0527365 3.116 0.002 .0602321 ,268395 
hsplus 1 .0169313 .0145652 1.162 0.247 -.0118148 .0456774 
occexp ( .0055928 .0023794 2.351 0.020 .0008968 .0102888 
occexp2 1 -. 0001591 .0000777 -2.046 0.042 -.0003125 -5.66e-06 
tenure 1 .000287 .0002486 1.154 0.250 -. 0002036 .0007776 
minority 1 .0101269 .0193478 0.523 0.601 -. 0280581 .0483118 
irregl 1 -.0195682 .0181354 -1.079 0.282 -.0553605 .0162241 
nightper 1 -.0415537 .a269278 -1.543 0.125 -.0946988 .0115913 
drybox 1 -.02911 .0164022 -1.775 0.078 -.0614814 ,0032615 
regional 1 .0060165 .0194155 0.310 0.757 -. 0323021 .0442352 
fsize 1 2.21e-06 1.26e-06 1.760 0.080 -2.69e-07 4.70e-06 
unclean ( ,0050014 .0136551 0.366 0.715 -.0219484 .0319512 
,cons 1 ,2396454 .0210524 11.383 0.000 .I980961 .2811948 
Let's interpret the coefficients on our two policy variables. 
1) Since irregularity (irregl) is a binary variable, we can read the results from the point 
estimate: being irregular lowers the reported nominal mileage rate by approximately 
two cents per mile. Since for theoretical reasons we expect a negative sign om this 
coefficient, the significance level is determined by a one-tailed test, and so is half the 
level reported above for the standard two-tailed test, or ,141. Thus, our confidence in 
this estimate is relatively low. 
2) For the percentage of night driving (nightper), we need a little more interpretation. 
The coefficient is approximately negative .041. At the mean values of both .variables, 
this gives an elasticity of the predicted wage with respect to the percentage of night 
driving of .041 x (.278/.303) = ,038. This implies that at the means, a 1% increase in 
the percentage of night hours will be associated with a .038% drop in the mileage 
rate. Thus, a 10% increase in night driving percentage (from 27.8% to 30.6%) would 
be associated with a -38% cut in the mileage rate (or about $.001). To give an 
example different from the one used in the calculation of marginal social cost in 
Section 111, this suggests that cutting out all night driving (i.e. cutting it by 100%) for 
those at the mean levels of pay and night driving would raise their mileage rates by 
about 3.8%, or around $.0115 per mile (slightly more than a penny per mile). Since 
for theoretical reasons we also expect a negative sign on this coefficient, the 
significance level is also determined by a one-tailed test, and so is half the level 
reported above for the standard two-tailed test, or .0625. Therefore we are reasonably 
confident of this estimate. 
The other coefficients in the equation tell a reasonable story. I briefly discuss their 
interpretations to fill in the context for the policy results. 
3) The coefficient on the union indicator variable added to that on the union-paid 
interaction tell us that union drivers (all of whom receive some kind of pay for non- 
driving work) have a mileage rate that is approximately 13 cents per mile higher than 
nonunion drivers; this is consistent with our background understanding of the large 
union premium observed (especially in LTL and specialized TL union operation, 
which we find describes all or nearly all of the union drivers in our sample). 
4) We expect schooling at the level that is useful in alternative jobs to improve the 
reservation wage of drivers, and the coefficient on the indicator hsplus estimates the 
value of this at about 1.6 cents per mile. Even applying a one-tailed test (which cuts 
the significance level from ,247 to .124) this estimate is imprecise. 
5) Occupational experience and its square are both estimated precisely; at the mean of 
experience (15 years) and of the predicted wage ($.303) the point estimates imply that 
a 1% change in occupational experience is associated with a .27% increase in mileage 
rate. This says that at the means, 15 months of experience is worth a little less (.8) 
than a penny a mile in pay rate. 
6) The coefficient on firm tenure is imprecisely estimated (applying a one-tailed test puts 
the level at .125), but has the expected sign. The point estimate says that at the means 
(4.5 years and $.303 per mile wage) 12 months of firm tenure is worth about a third of 
a cent per mile, so three years would be worth about a penny per mile. 
7) The coefficient on minority is opposite to that which other empirical work would 
suggest, but it is also so imprecisely estimated that it could have the expected sign. 
We interpret this to be due to the small number of minorities in the sample, combined 
with the fact that blacks, the largest minority group in the sample, are more often 
union members (with high pay) than is true on average, while Hispanics, the next 
largest group, are less often union members. 
8) We expect the coefficient on the indicator for equipment type to be negative, since 
drybox captures whether the trailer hauled is of general purpose or specialized 
purpose, and competition and potential competition are both expected to be higher 
with general purpose equipment. The point estimate is relatively precise, and says 
that general purpose equipment is associated with about 3 cents per mile less pay. 
9) The coefficient on indicator for regional work is of the expected sign. Rates to 
shippers are slightly lower on a per mile basis on longer runs (due to spreading fixed 
costs), and this is reflected an estimate of slightly higher mileage pay for runs under 
500 miles. However this estimate is so imprecise that it doesn't tell us much. 
10) The coefficient on firm size (measured as the total number of drivers) is small, but 
f 
precisely estimated. It implies that at the mean predicted wage ($.303) and firm size 
(1,130 drivers), an increase to the size of the largest TL firm (about 12,000, or a 
1,000% increase) would be associated with a 2 cents per mile increase in the wage 
rate. 
11) Last, the coefficient on the bad driving record measure (unclean) is opposite the 
expected negative sign, but it is so imprecisely estimated that it could be zero or have 
the right sign. We interpret this imprecision to be due to either errors in self 
reporting, or possibly due to mismeasurement for present purposes because the only 
drivers whose job prospects are determined by their recent driving record are the 
subset who have recently changed jobs. Another alternative is that given turnover 
levels in some parts of the industry, firms are not trying to filter out drivers with bad 
records. 
All in all, when interpreted these coefficients tell a reasonable story, and one that is generally 
consistent with our background understanding of industry practices and institutions. We are 
therefore reasonably confident that this specification gives a theoretically acceptable first cut 
at capturing the relationship it is designed to measure, and therefore also gives an 
theoretically acceptable, albeit empirically somewhat imprecise, first cut at providing the 
basis for measuring social cost. 
The Hours Equation. The labor supply equation is based on the idea that given the decision 
to work as a truck driver at a given a wage rate, plus the level of need the driver has for 
income and various operational constraints that limit or enable the completion of runs (such 
as the policy-relevant variables of the level of irregularity or night driving), the driver will 
choose the optimal number of hours to work. We assume a recursive two-stage structure to 
this estimation problem: the driver's wage is first predicted from the wage equation, and then 
this predicted wage is inserted in the labor supply equation as an independent variable 
(instead of using the reported wage). We are assuming thus that we can capture the effect in 
each equation separately of variables which we think affect both (including our policy 
variables), without simultaneity or identification issues. In a more extensive project we 
would construct a formal utility maximization model to make explicit the structure of the 
assumptions implicit in this equation, and identify whether there are any cross-equation 
restrictions needed between the wage equation and the hours supply equation, and whether 
more sophisticated estimation techniques might be required. In the absence of this step we 
are less confident of the results from this equation than we are of those from the wage 
equation. However, we have produced a reasonable ad hoc specification, which we think 
provides a rough first cut at the estimation of labor supply decisions for incumbent drivers, 
although it is potentially subject to revision. 
Our left hand side variable is the total work hours reported by the respondent for the 
preceding seven days. This is undoubtedly measured with some error, and although the 
survey asks for the hours actually worked, as opposed to the hours logged, we expect the 
main error to be an under reporting of total hours. We believe this would either be because 
the driver might be unwilling to report hours which actually exceeded the regulatory limits, 
even anonymously to an interviewer, or because the driver's recall over a seven day period 
might be influenced by what he actually logged during that period, which is likely to 
especially involve the under reporting of non-driving work time. We attempt to control for 
this to the extent possible. 
On the right hand side we have four groups of variables. The first measure direct incentives 
to provide hours: the predicted wage from the wage equation, and its square (wage and 
pwage2-the latter to permit backward bending labor supply at high wages), whether the 
driver receives any pay for non-driving work, (paid--binary), and an interaction between this 
and the driver's union status (unionpd), to separate out the effect of union drivers who get 
paid for most non-driving time. In the second group are variables that are proxies for other 
motivational or control factors that affect labor supply choices. These include the number of 
economically dependent children who reside with the driver (numchild), how much other 
income the household has (othinc), and a measure of the last time the driver had 24 hours off 
duty at home (lasthome, in days), and the driver's union status (union--with the expectation 
that this directly gives the driver somewhat more control over hours worked, along with the 
higher wage it brings). In the third group are operational factors that limit or enable miles to 
be made and/or runs to be completed. In this group are the percent of non-driving work 
hours (pernodrv), whether the driver has short runs or not (regional--which here means 500 
miles or less as an average reported run), and the two policy relevant variables: whether the 
driver has an irregular schedule (irregl), and percent of night driving (nightper). The last 
group is a single measure of the likelihood of under reporting weekly hours. It is an 
interaction between the percent of non-driving time reported (recall this is from the last trip), 
and a measure of the number of hours less than sixty which the driver reported for the last 
week's total (devper). This is to capture that portion of under reporting that is due to the 
practice of saving log time for driving hours by reporting non-driving work time as off duty, 
thus causing weekly hours to be less than 60 when market conditions (e.g. delays at shippers 
or consignees) prevent the full exhaustion of driving hours. 
In the current version of the labor supply equation, we have coefficient estimates presented in 
the table below. The adjusted R' (a measure of the proportion of the variation in the 
dependent variable which is predicted by the independent variables) is .354, which is very 
decent for a cross section estimation. To interpret this table, note that "hrsweek" is the left 
hand side, or dependent variable, and the variables below it in a column are the right hand 
side, or independent variables. 
hrsweek I Coef. Std.Err. t ~>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
pwage 1 248.4684 229.9141 1.081 0.281 -205.4052 702.3419 
irregl 1 11.98129 5.257417 2.279 0.024 1.602616 22.35995 
nightper 1 -.4083473 7.311694 -0.056 0.956 -14.84237 14.02567 
pernodrv 1 26.86129 9.704851 2.768 0.006 7.702945 46.01964 
union 1 61.72147 16.37457 3.769 0.000 29.39643 94.04651 
regional 1 -7.902634 3.009758 -2.626 0.009 -13.8442 -1.96107 
paid 1 1.111417 4.9635 0.224 0.823 -8.68703 10.90986 
unionpd 1 -81.2913 23.102 -3.519 0.001 -126.897 -35.68562 
devper 1 4.65155 .6484444 7.173 0.000 3.371455 5.931644 
age 1 1.519493 1.369906 1.109 0.269 -1.18484 4.223826 
numchild 1 -.4580857 1.002579 -0.457 0.648 -2.437278 1.521106 
othinc 1 -.000048 .0001116 -0.430 0.668 -.0002683 ,0001724 
lasthome 1 .I558112 .I238967 1.258 0.210 -.0887734 .4003957 
Let's interpret the coefficients on our two policy variables. 
1) The coefficient of regularity (irregl) is precisely measured, and says that an 
irregular schedule is associated with almost 12 hours additional hours reported per 
week. Under our maintained assumptions that irregularity primarily reflects the 
demands of the flow of freight, this would suggest that cutting out all irregularity 
(permitting only one tour of duty per 24 hour period) would be associated with a drop 
in 12 hours worked for the typical driver. Note that our measure is based on total 
hours reported to us, not the (possibly smaller) number of hours logged under the 
current regulations. 
2) The coefficient on percentage of night driving is measured so imprecisely as to be 
meaningless, so this specification does not tell us much about this question. 
The rest of the coefficients on variables in the equation tell a reasonable story. We briefly 
discuss their interpretations to provide the context for understanding the equation as a whole. 
The coefficients on the predicted wage and its square have the expected sign 
(positive for pwage, and negative for pwage2). At the means of the variables, 
together they imply that a 1% increase in the predicted wage would be associated with 
a .49% increase in hours supplied. To give an example, this would mean that a $.03 
per mile increase in the wage (10%) would be associated with about 3.25 more hours 
per week (4.9%). However, even using one-tailed tests (since we have a definite 
expectation as to sign), these coefficients are imprecisely estimated (14% and 18% 
significance levels), so although the magnitude of these coefficients is reasonable, our 
confidence in these results is not very great. 
4) The percent of non-driving work time enters in two ways. Its simple coefficient is 
estimated very precisely (1% significance level), and implies at the means of both 
variables that a 1% increase in percent non-driving work time is associated with a . l% 
increase in total hours worked in the last week, as reported by survey respondents to 
interviewers. At the means this translates into an increase from 24.7% non-driving 
work time to 27.2% (10%) being associated with .6 more hours of reported weekly 
work time (1%). In addition, the coefficient on the interaction of percent non-driving 
time with the number of hour less than 60 reported is very precisely estimated 
(significance level as high as can be measured). This coefficient has the interpretation 
that at the means of both variables, a 1% increase in this interaction term is associated 
with a 1.5% decrease in reported weekly hours. So, at the means, and starting from a 
mean reporting deviation of 5.2 hours, the same 10% increase in the percent non- 
driving work time that is associated with .6 more hours of reported work time is also 
associated with an increased reporting deviation that drops reported weekly hours by 
approximately 1. Thus, the net effect of a 10% increase in the percent of non-driving 
work time is a .4 hour decrease in reported time, and the pattern of the coefficients is 
strongly consistent with the hypothesis that under reporting of non-driving time is 
reflected in the hours reported to the interviewer for the last week. 
5) The coefficients on the union indicator and the interaction indicator of union with 
paid are both estimated very precisely (significance levels of less than 1%). Together 
they tell us that union drivers (all of whom are paid for some non-driving time) report 
approximately 20 hours less of work per week. 
6) The coefficient on regional is very precisely estimated (significance level of better 
than 1%). It tells us that regional drivers (500 miles or shorter average reported run) 
report approximately 8 hours less per week than those with longer runs. From the 
descriptive statistics we expect that regional drivers work similar but slightly fewer 
hours than longer haul drivers, but that their non-driving time is likely to be a larger 
proportion of their total time (as we'd expect time spent at shippers and consignees to 
be a proportionally larger). Since we have controlled for this effect with the variable 
for percent non-driving time, this result is sensible. 
7) The coefficients on age and its square are opposite in sign to our casual 
expectation (that older drivers tend to slow down a little, and not work as many hours, 
controlling for number of children and the like). The results are not precise enough to 
be very clear, however. And we note that in our sample age and its square are 
correlated quite highly with experience and its square (about +.55 in each case), so we 
may be unable to distinguish the effect of experience (which met expectations in the 
wage equation) from an age effect for this reason. 
8) We have no particular expectation about the coefficient on the number of children, 
since children cause both an interest in working more hours to get more income, and 
also in getting home, and these may conflict. It is estimated too imprecisely to tell us 
much, although the current point estimate would imply at the means that having one 
more economically dependent child at home is associated with about .5 less reported 
hours per week. 
9) Our expectation for other income is negative, but even with a one-tailed test it is 
estimated imprecisely (significance level of .33). The current point estimate implies 
that at the means, a doubling of other household income from $1 1,000 to $22,000 
would be associated with about .6 fewer reported hours per week, but this doesn't tell 
us much, due to the lack of precision in the estimate. 
10) Our expectation for the coefficient of days since last home for 24 hours is 
positive, on the assumption that getting home requires working more hours on 
average, rather than cutting a week short. On this assumption a one-tailed test makes 
this coefficient moderately precise (significance level of just over 10%). The point 
estimate implies that at the means (being gone 7.7 days and working 66 hours per 
week), in increase of an extra week since last at home is associated with reporting 
1.25 more hours per week. 
All in all, when interpreted these coefficients tell a reasonable story, and one that is generally 
consistent with our background understanding of industry practices and institutions. 
However, the results are not as clean as those in the wage equation, and for this reason as 
well as the theoretical questions about proper specification that are potentially relevant here, 
we are quite a bit less confident in these results. 
Future Directions. In this first attack on the problem we have attempted to construct a 
prototype methodology for generating estimates of the marginal and total social costs 
involved in simplified versions of two of the policy changes being considered with respect to 
the Hours of Service of commercial motor vehicle operators. The actual numerical estimates 
are reported in Section 1.1. The prototype we have developed makes use of the unique 
survey data on truck drivers collected by the University of Michigan Trucking Industry 
Program, and while it is relatively primitive and ad hoc in its present form, it is potentially 
capable of validation, extension, and refinement in several ways 
If future work were to be undertaken on this topic, there are a number of ways we could 
proceed. The following list is not exhaustive. First, we would hope to make use of 
extensions to the UMTIP Driver Survey data set, if the results of the Wave 2 administration 
of this survey were to be available in time. This would potentially increase the precision of 
our estimates by increasing N. Second, we would attempt to put the entire enterprise on 
stronger theoretical foundations. We would construct a formal utility maximization model 
for the choice behavior of drivers on whom we have data, and we would use this model to 
provide a specific theoretical justification for the specification of one or more regression 
equation systems. Then we would attempt to devise more formal tests of key assumptions, to 
the extent permitted by the data, such as the assumption made in Section I1 about the labor- 
leisure tradeoff of road drivers. (It might also be possible to test this assumption empirically 
by properly specifying an annual andlor a weekly earnings equation, and testing for the effect 
of our policy variables in it--with the expectation that they should have small effects if we 
have properly accounted for other influences, if the assumptions in Section II are correct.) 
Third, we would attempt to more precisely model the particular changes being considered, by 
constructing proxy variables that more closely track the potential changes being considered, 
including the different options as to how many working and off-duty hours will be permitted. 
We could also potentially construct variations consequent upon assuming different levels of 
compliance. Fourth, we would explore several ways in which it might be possible to refine 
the estimates of totaI social cost, given the point estimates from the equation system. We 
could attempt to account for a demand function for trucking services that is not perfectly 
inelastic (e.g. by estimating intermodal shifts). We could use more sophisticated assumptions 
about the relationships between irregularity in the sub-sample and in the entire population, 
and utilize more information about relevant distributions than just the mean. Fifth, we could 
construct more formal confidence intervals for the total social cost estimates. 
1.3.3: Industry Impact. 
Hours of service changes will likely have a great impact on the economic conditions of the 
industry. The proposed regulations attempt to create a broadly customized set of rules 
designed to make trucking safer and healthier. These new rules will change the way the 
industry works, assuming the FHWA finds a way to obtain broad industry compliance. Some 
of the most current suggestions include limitations requiring carriers to schedule drivers for a 
regular period of rest each day, in effect limiting their flexibility in assigning driver duty 
time; creating a definite weekly off-duty period during which drivers could get two actual 
nights sleep; allowing some flexibility for long-haul drivers who could take a shorter break at 
the end of one week of work and a longer break at the end of two weeks of work; and 
limiting night time driving (12:OO AM to 6:00 PM) to 18 hours per week. Researchers will 
study these regulations and develop frameworks within which they can analyze the impact of 
the change. Using institutional and operational knowledge developed from previous 
research, experience, and UMTIP industry case studies, researchers will estimate the 
operational effect of changes on various industry segments and types of operations, 
quantifying these effects to a first approximation. In this task researchers will not try to 
estimate the impact of regulatory changes on intermodal shifts, nor will they attempt to 
estimate the impact on the economy as shippers and consignees adapt to the change. 
In studying the proposed options we do not find any explicit restrictions requiring a 
significant amount of regularity. While we refer below to some regulatory impact 011 
operations that might occur as the result of a regulatory change, we have avoided drawing 
conclusions or inferences based on imprecise definitions. For this reason we excerpt 
proposed changes in the analytic text. Note that we attempted to model the impact of 
irregularity on wages and hours of service above, as we originally understood that proposed 
regulations would require regularity, but have restricted analysis here to the proposed 
regulatory options forwarded to us by the Office {of Motor Carriers. 
We have found nothing in the proposed HOS regulations that would suggest drivers would 
behave in any different way than they do now without a dramatic change in enforcement 
strategy. Currently the average driver is not in compliance with the present HOS regulations 
and nothing in the proposed regulations suggests this will change. Although the proposed 
rules might encourage regularity (or at least discourage backwards rotation of schedule), we 
find nothing in these rules that requires regular schedules. We also find nothing to prevent 
extensive forward rotation that would shift the driver's daily cycle so extremely as to disrupt 
sleep patterns entirely. Finally, we find nothing in the proposed rules to govern the operation 
of sleeper teams, perhaps the fastest-growing operations in trucking. 
Industry impact can be separated into three different components. We can expect different 
effects from different aspects of the proposed changes. We will evaluate each of the 
proposed changes for likely impact on the industry. 
Option A: Status quo hours of service limitations. 
Text: 
Status quo. All definitions, requirements, exemptions, 
exceptions, and interpretations remain the same. 
In the first section of this report we showed that a majority of intercity truck drivers do not 
adhere to the current HOS rules, even in the broadest sense of weekly hours of service limits. 
The lack of adherence is not a minor issue. To a significant extent, drivers are not merely 
adjusting their work time to fit their personal circadian schedules. On the contrary, they are 
using loopholes in the current regulations to extend their work hours and playing the odds 
that they will not be caught. Indeed, with more than 400,000 motor carriers registered in 
interstate commerce - most of them quite small - government enforcement agencies 
require far more resources to enforce the law than they have available. Compliance must be 
voluntary or self-enforcing. 
It appears, from the analysis presented in this report, that under the current legal regime 
(current FLSA, current limitations on union organizing, etc.) the cost of compliance would 
primarily be borne by the current violators. Without addressing how compliance can be 
secured, it appears that the unionized sector, including LTL and package carriers, comes 
relatively close to compliance. It also appears that owner operators (for whatever reasons) 
also come close to compliance. The number of new drivers needed in those sectors therefore 
would be minimal. Most new drivers would be needed by the TL industry, which has the 
greatest unfulfilled demand for drivers. 
Weekly maximum hours. The most extensive violators appear to be in the non-union 
truckload sector, with somewhat more violations among those pulling dry boxes, suggesting 
the TL general freight sector may be most out of compliance. We have not had time to 
analyze the data for firm size effects, but we suspect the biggest violators are relatively small 
TL general freight carriers; these carriers tend to be extremely competitive. We expect 
therefore that the greatest proportion of the cost associated with returning to compliance 
would be borne by this segment of the trucking industry. 
In the analysis we presented above, the cost of this compliance primarily comes from the 
demand for more drivers. According to the calculations above, the trucking industry would 
need to hire between 56,330 and 130,443 new hvers ,  depending on the extent to which 
drivers currently working less than 60 hours can work more hours. In our estimation, it 
would be unrealistically optimistic to expect to hire the minimum drivers as estimated above 
because their particular work schedules are defined by their operations; most likely the 
industry would need to hire closer to 130,000 drivers than the converse. Most of these 
additional drivers would work for lower-paid TL carriers facing a typical turnover rate of 
100% today, suggesting the burden of the estimated driver wage increase mostly will fall on 
the TL carriers, since their wages are markedly lower than the wages in LTL and wages will 
have to rise to attract enough labor to satisfy the demand. 
Finally, although we have not had the time to analyze differential effects by industry sub- 
sector, from the Form M (filed with the BTS) we find that the average carrier employs 
approximately 1.1 drivers per power unit. Assuming this average usage fits the TL industry 
(and particularly thinking about smaller carriers, the assumption makes sense), the industry 
will need between 51,209 and 118,585 additional power units ((56,330 + 1.1) and (130,443 t 
1.1)). While reduced usage by individual drivers (due to compliance with the 60 hour limit) 
might allow additional slip-seating of units (multiple drivers assigned to a single truck) it is 
impossible to estimate the impact without analyzing use patters very closely. Since the truck 
manufacturing industry built and sold 209,483 Class 8 tractors to set a new record in 1998, 
we can expect the price of trucks also to rise as the demand increases. With new truck prices 
running approximately $100,000, the cost of increasing the truck fleet could range between 
$5.121 billion and $1 1.859 billion, though much of the demand for additional trucks initially 
would be absorbed by used truck purchases that would reduce the cost. We have not 
calculated these economic effects beyond the trucking industry's need for drivers due to the 
lack of time, but it appears that the needed supply of trucks will produce a boom in the truck 
manufacturing industry, offsetting some of the negative economic effects. Additional human 
resource needs would include additional mechanics and other service personnel, and 
additional support personnel to administer the industry growth. Potential offsetting 
reductioi~s might include modest disintermediation from truck to intermodal or rail, but 
continuing intense service demands for trucking service will limit that shift. 
All of these costs might be minimized or eliminated were drivers' time to be used efficiently. 
Recall from earlier analysis that if we saved 25 percent of drivers' wasted, unpaid time we 
would eliminate the need for additional drivers. 'The same efficiency gain would be realized 
from the cost of equipment discussed in the previous paragraph. This suggests the current 
system wastes billions of dollars of driver time, reflecting the opportunity cost of drivers' 
labor time (unpaid labor time offset by excessive weekly hours) as well as billions of dollars 
in wasted opportunity cost of equipment, as a $100,000 truck spends about 25% of its time 
collecting dust. Again, time and resource constraints make it impossible for us to evaluate 
this complex ripple effect at this time. 
Daily maximum hours. The driver survey suggests the current daily maximum hours limits 
are violated relatively frequently. The data collected in our survey may not exactly show 
what drivers are doing (though with more time arid funding for analysis we may be able to 
learn more from the data) but it does suggest a pattern worth noting. Reflecting back on the 
data in Table 43 we can see that at the 75" percentile, drivers worked 14 hours - nearly the 
absolute maximum for a single shift and two hours less than the absolute theoretical legal 
maximum for a 24 hour period. At the 90" percentile for the full sample drivers work 18 
hours, clearly beyond the legal limit. The total for local and regional drivers is 16 hours at 
the 90' percentile and 19 hours for long-haul drivers. Without looking very closely at the 
pattern of hours reported we cannot tell exactly what drivers may be doing but we can infer 
that at least a significant number of them are working more hours than they are supposed to 
work. Figuring that the typical driver takes a couple of hours off during a day to eat and take 
care of personal sanitation we can infer that at the 75" percentile drivers probably are not 
getting an eight hour break; certainly this must be true for long-haul drivers at the same 
percentile. The distribution of this variable may be affected by the location at which the 
surveys were administered, as it may not be close to the average long-haul driver's pick up or 
delivery point (where we would find most wasted hours). 
The cost of compliance with current daily maximum hours limits is less clear. To the extent 
that drivers are exceeding their daily limits, work time would have to be reduced to reach 
compliance. This might cause some portion of the freight to arrive or be picked up later than 
promised or currently experienced, at some undetermined cost to truckers, shippers, and 
receivers. Clearly, however, as with weekly hours, wasted driver time accounts for enough 
of the difference to suggest that efficient use of drivers' time might save enough time to bring 
them into compliance. 
The data suggest here also that the long-haul TL industry would absorb most of the cost of 
compliance. The TL industry has the biggest problem currently and would have the biggest 
adjustment coping with current weekly maximum hours rules. The chronic driver shortage 
reported by carriers induces them to get the absolute maximum out of each driver, and 
maximum effort by each driver is consistent with the colltinuous use of capital. The TL 
industry would find it most difficult to comply with daily limits because of demands shippers 
put on the carriers in a competitive environment. 
The LTL industry, both regionally and nationally, tends to operate in a rhythm, that 
adequately protects most drivers from over work, and the high degree of unionization 
contributes to that outcome. From our research we think the regional LTL business is 
structured around pickups and deliveries that must be made in successive days, and hours of 
work beyond about 12 per day are not practical. There are only about 12 hours between the 
time the drivers bring the freight to outbound terminals and the time the freight must be 
delivered to inbound terminals in preparation for making the next day's deliveries. The long- 
haul LTL business might find it more difficult to comply except evidence suggests they 
already comply due to extensive conditioning and due to their concern with liability. While a 
TL company (particularly a small one) might close down and re-form under a new name after 
losing a lawsuit, an LTL company has too much capital investment, network investment, and 
marketing exposure to take such an action. 
Option B: One-Size-Fits-All(l2-12). 
Text: 
All drivers must have a minimum of 12 consecutive hours off 
duty, and may work up to 12 consecutive hours (with no 
distinction between driving and non-driving). The 12 
consecutive hours for work will include all rest and meal 
breaks. 
All drivers must have at least a 58 hour weekly (7-consecutive 
day) off duty period of time. This would allow 60 hours of 
work in a 5 day period. 
Daily scheduling. While neither this nor any other proposed reform institutionalizes 
consistency of schedule, this proposed reform at least infers consistent scheduling in an 
indirect way. As discussed above, the regional LTL industry would seem to have the least 
difficulty conforming with this schedule, as most freight follows the overnight rhythm. The 
ability to use the driver for 12 hours regardless of activity (driving or labor) would give the 
carriers more flexibility. We are not sure how much of this additional capability the carriers 
might use but it allows them to adjust according to the demands on their business. The 
national LTL industry might also seem to be able to live with this as they now use their 
drivers for less than 10 hours of driving at a time (and at least the union carriers do not 
require drivers to do other work) and would have the additional flexibility to use drivers 
beyond 10 hours if necessary. Both industry segments probably would have difficulty with 
this rule because it would reduce overall labor time somewhat; the rule specifies that the 12 
hours includes all breaks, so the net effect might be to reduce total daily labor by as much as 
10 percent or as little as zero. Assuming drivers work 11 hours per day for five days per 
week, that gives them a 55 hour work week, which is about what we would expect in the 
industry. 
The long-haul TL industry, at the other extreme, would have to make major changes to adjust 
to this schedule. Our information suggests that drivers currently work far more hours than 
this rule would allow. In fact, data in Table 43 show half of the drivers in the TL industry 
would have to reduce their hours of work to achieve compliance. If other reforms caused the 
reduction in driver wasted time, as discussed above, the effect might be minimized. That is, 
since the median long-haul driver drives only 9 hours daily, this might not affect the driving 
labor experience of drivers at the median. However, note that at the 75" percentile long-haul 
drivers drive 12 hours, suggesting that the only way they could comply would be by 
eliminating non-driving hours entirely. This may be possible under the current compliance 
procedure (drivers log their non-driving labor time as off duty), this probably was not what 
the regulators would have expected. In sum, the long-haul TL industry probably would have 
to hire about 50 percent more drivers than they currently have, assuming they actually 
complied with the regulation and assuming no change in the current framework that does not 
discourage shippers and consignees (and even carriers) from wasting drivers' time. 
Regional trucking generally looks closer to LTL than to the long haul trucking industry. 
While data are sketchy, the tables in this report suggest they fall approximately in the middle 
between local and long haul, depending on the measure. They are more likely on average to 
perform labor other than driving than the long-haul TL people, though the latter waste their 
time in larger blocks. It is difficult to generalize among such a wide set of possibilities, in 
terms of industry segments and markets, so conclusions are difficult to make based on the 
proposed regulation and the current work schedule. Work schedules vary quite widely due to 
industry segment. 
Weekly scheduling. Proposed regulations would allow two days of rest, or at least two nights 
of sleep, at the end of a work week. The regional LTL industry already is structured in this 
way, or at least as closely as any other group. The typical regional LTL driver begins his 
work week Monday evening or night and works 5 "shifts" of driving and labor and ends up 
back at his home domicile by Saturday morning (some might add an additional shift to reach 
maximum hours and earnings or make service requirements for the carrier). While the new 
regulations would further limit flexibility of these firms with respect to extra driving (because 
of the requirement of 58 consecutive hours off once per week) they would have the least 
effect on these drivers. 
The long-haul LTL industry is not scheduled in this way. While we believe they could adapt 
to this schedule they would have to do so with some effort and dislocation. Their operations 
currently depend on a mix of regular bid runs, on-call drivers, and casual drivers. City drivers 
(pickup and delivery) have reasonably regular shifts, ordinarily are paid by the hour, and 
probably stick pretty closely to the recommended HOS limits and schedule. Regular bid road 
drivers run steady operations between cities and haul the most predictable freight. As a 
result, their schedules are predictable and can most likely conform to the daily and weekly 
HOS rules. Lower-seniority irregular road drivers who maintain a position on a seniority list 
("road board") are called in to work as the carrier is able to "close out" a trailer and send it to 
another destination. Such destinations vary, but sharp cutoff times needed for regional LTL 
aren't needed in national LTL and hence the daily discipline is not as critical. Bigger 
terminals have a higher number of bid drivers, normally, and may be able to create relatively 
restricted time windows during which daily dispatch can occur (though this does not seem to 
be an issue according to proposed HOS rules we have received from FMCSAHS). Weekly 
regularity is a bigger problem, since that is not a current requirement. We have no way to 
estimate the cost of compliance for this industry, though it probably is something they could 
do with some loss of efficiency. 
Both the regional and national LTL industry may find it difficult to adapt structurally to 
different options regarding hours of service. Currently these carriers take both business and 
regulatory constraints into consideration when planning terminal networks. That is, they 
consider the metropolitan area in which they may pick up and deliver freight (or where they 
have appropriate freight density) along with the distances between terminals between which 
they transfer freight throughout their network. Any changes in daily hours of service 
regulations could cause them to move terminals closer together or farther apart. We cannot 
readily estimate the cost of such readjustment but we thought it important to mention that 
some readjustment undoubtedly will take place. 
The regional trucking industry (particularly TL and other-than-general-freight) probably 
could adapt to this change relatively easily also, since they are better able to get drivers home 
on weekends or on a weekly basis. Currently these carriers advertise "home weekends" as a 
recruiting tool, so undoubtedly their workers and potential workers view this as a benefit. 
While they scarcely comply with the current 60 hour weekly limit (Table 39 shows them 
working 60 hours per week at the median), their biggest problem probably will come more in 
adapting to the 60 hour limit than in adapting to the schedule providing for 58 hours of 
continuous off duty time weekly. 
The long-haul TL industry would find it the most difficult to adapt. Currently drivers are 
working through this period and view lengthy delays on the road as tiring time wasters. 
Since these drivers typically sleep in their trucks and would have to spend this time in truck 
stops when their weekly break occurs on the road, they may not achieve the level of rest 
anticipated by the rule even if they obey the regulation. For analytic purposes, however, it 
might make sense to divide the long-haul TL industry into two broad conceptual segments. 
Smaller TL carriers run their drivers long distances and likely will have their drivers 
spending weeks on the road. While we have not analyzed this phenomenon in detail, 
research suggests the smaller carriers have fewer alternatives to this form of operation. That 
is, if they dispatch a driver on a long cross-country run they alone are responsible for locating 
freight for the return trip. We suspect their inability to locate freight on a timely basis 
contributes to the "wasted time" phenomenon observed from the survey. 1,arger carriers may 
be more likely to locate freight for the return at this distance, though every carrier has some 
trouble maintaining freight balance over long routes and between far-flung city pairs. 
Perhaps the biggest advantage larger carriers (or perhaps more precisely, carriers with denser 
regional concentrations and freight lanes) have over smaller carriers is some ability to relay 
freight from one region to another. The ability to relay freight from one driver to another 
would allow the carrier to keep drivers within a reasonable proximity of home and allow 
them greater opportunities to return them home for the 58 hour breaks. Without this option, 
long-haul carriers and their drivers would find it rather difficult to adapt to this regulation. 
We suspect that the unintended consequences might include a continuation of the current 
situation: drivers extend their overall hours of service by logging wasted time off duty, and 
will continue to maximize paid time on the road at all hazards. 
Option C: General Rule (12-12) 
Text: 
1. All drivers must have a minimum of 12 consecutive hours 
off duty, and may work up to 12 consecutive hours (with no 
distinction between driving and non-driving). The 12 
consecutive hours for work will include all rest and meal 
breaks. 
2. Weekly. Drivers must have at least a 58 hour weekly (7- 
consecutive day) off duty period of time. This would allow 
60 hours of work in a 5 day period. 
Long-haul, Motorcoach Tour, Regional Less-than- 
Truckload, Scheduled Route Bus (10-2-12) 
Long-haul, regional less-than-truckload, scheduled route bus, 
and motorcoach tour have the common meanings known in the 
motor carrier industry. 
3. Daily. The regulations would require long-haul (e.g., 
truckload), regional less-than-truckload, scheduled route 
bus, and motorcoach tour drrvers to have a minimum of 
10 consecutive hours off-duty, and drive up to 12 hours. 
The regulation would allow these drivers to break the 12 
hour work period with off-duty periods totaling at least two 
additional hours. 
4. Weekly. The regulations would allow a two-week option for truckload, 
regional less-than-truckload, schedulsd route bus, and motorcoach tour 
drivers. These drivers must have at least a 36 hour end-of-workweek off- 
duty period, including 2 consecutive midnight to 6 AM periods. This 
would allow up to 72 hours of work in the first 6 days of the 14 day period 
of time. After the 36-hour off-duty period, the driver may work up to 48 
hours over workdays 8,9, 10, and 11 of the 14-day work period, and then 
the driver must be off duty for at least 82 hours prior to returning to work. 
Option C appears to be almost the same as Option B except that long haul drivers may have 
the ability to concentrate their work during the first week of work, allowing them the ability 
to minimize the cost inherent in the 58 hour extended rest period specified in Option B. The 
specifications are ambiguous in that they include only truckload or regional LTL (in this 
paper we do not analyze motorcoach drivers). The analysis that follows generally describes 
potential impact on any sector that could take advantage of this option. 
This option might make it easier for TL carriers to comply with the regulations, but we are 
not certain how much impact the difference represents. The 36 hour break after the first 72 
hours of work, since it includes two night-time sleep periods, may well encourage safer 
operations. Drivers probably could squeeze this period (essentially two nights and a day) 
into one weekend day without seriously affecting their ability to make long runs. It is not 
clear, however, how far a long-haul driver could go before running out of hours on the return 
trip. The consequences of running out of hours before returning home on the return trip are 
severe, as the driver must take 82 hours off (3.4 days); such an extended enforced break 
might induce extremely dangerous practices on the part of the drivers to avoid such a penalty. 
The alternative might be to encourage appropriate practices by ensuring that drivers' time is 
not wasted; that is the most powerful predictor in our analysis above. 
According to our research, approximately 25% of a long-haul driver's time is wasted loading, 
unloading, and waiting around. If this remains the case, it is not at all clear that a driver can 
cross the country, deliver a load, and pick up a load within the required time frame for two- 
week operations. Indeed, we know that the average driver can get in only 45 hours of driving 
per week in a two-week period according to this rule, forcing him to continue to log wasted 
time off duty in order to make his pickups and deliveries (he can make the long-distance run 
within the allowed time if he logs labor time as off duty, as he does now). For this reason it 
is quite unclear whether the rule will be effective or enforceable. On the other hand, if 
shippers and consignees were forced to pay for drivers' time on either end of a load (thereby 
enabling the carrier to pay for the driver's time), we probably would see less wasted time and 
less incentive for overwork. This phenomenon, called "moral hazard" (in this case on the 
part of shippers, consignees, and carriers) may be responsible for most of the abuses we see 
on a regular basis. If so, the proposed change in regulatory structure will be doomed at the 
outset. 
The impact on regional LTL is unclear. We do not quite see how this might affect regional 
LTL one way or the other. This business sector is the most consistent and most likely to be 
able to stay with prescribed limits as suggested in Option B. The same is true for national 
LTL, though in either case this option might allow for uneven work scheduling and greater 
flexibility. On the other hand, carriers that take advantage of it one week would need to find 
replacement workers to complete the week's schedule during a second week. While this is 
possible (individual schedules can be set up on a two-week basis so that replacement workers 
can substitute for one regular employee for two days, another regular employee for the next 
two days, and so on), the advantages of such an operation (over Option B) are entirely 
unclear. 
Option D: Night-time Differential 
(All Drivers, No Exemptions or Exceptions) 
Text: 
This option would limit driving between the hours of Midnight 
and 6:00 A.M. for all drivers to a maximum of 18 hours in a 
workweek. 
General Rule (12-12) 
1. Daily. All drivers must have a minimum of 12 consecutive 
hours off duty, and may work up to 12 consecutive hours 
(with no distinction between driving and non-driving). The 
12 consecutive hours for work will include all rest and meal 
breaks. 
2. Weekly. Drivers must have at least a 58 hour weekly (7- 
consecutive day) off duty period of time. This would allow 
60 hours of work in a 5 day period. 
Long-haul, Motorcoach Tour, Regional Less-than- 
Truckload, Scheduled Route Bus (10-2-12) 
3. Daily. The regulations would require long-haul (e.g., 
truckload), regional less-than-truckload, scheduled route 
bus, and motorcoach tour drivers to have a minimum of 
10 consecutive hour off-duty, and drive up to 12 hours. 
The regulation would allow these drivers to break the 12 
hour work period with off-duty periods totaling at least two 
additional hours. 
4. Weekly. The regulations would allow a two-week option 
for truckload, regional less-than-truckload, scheduled route 
bus, and motorcoach tour drivers. These drivers must have 
at least a 36 hour end-of-workweek off-duty period, 
including 2 consecutive midnight to 6 AM periods. This 
would allow up to 72 hours of work in the first 6 days of 
the 14 day period of time. After the 34-hour off-duty 
period, the driver may work up to 48 hours over workdays 
8,9, 10, and 11 of the 14-day work period, and then the 
driver must be off duty for at least 82 hours prior to 
returning to work 
This option has two primary dimensions. The hours-of-service dimension seems consistent 
with Options B and C. The impact of these aspects of the regulation on the industry has been 
analyzed above and will not be repeated here. The second dimension is the limitation on 
night-time driving. The following analysis assesses this impact. 
The limitation on night-time driving would cause major restructuring in the LTL industry. 
Our research shows that most LTL carriers, especially in the regional industry, run 
throughout the night. The regional LTL industry, in particular, relies on night-time driving. 
Its primary niche is the overnight service lane, and the structure of operations requires night 
time driving. To summarize and simplify their operations, they pick up freight during the 
afternoon and bring it to a terminal where it is stripped off local trailers and reloaded on road 
trailers for delivery. The dock operation may take anywhere from 3 to 5 hours, after which 
the loaded trailers are dispatched over-the-road to a terminal or terminals in another city. The 
freight may be handled once or twice enroute during the night. In any case, the freight 
arrives at its destination terminal the following morning, is stripped off the road trailer and 
loaded onto a city trailer. A city driver ("pickup and delivery driver") takes the freight to the 
customer, and repeats the pickup process. This pattern ordinarily continues Monday through 
Friday, with most freight picked up and delivered on those days. 
Variations on this theme apply to the inter-regional LTL carriers as well as to national 
package delivery carriers, much of whose revenue actually consists of regional and local 
freight. This description applies to package delivery operations, such as United Parcel 
Service and Federal Express, for example. National LTL carriers (along with inter-regional 
LTL carriers and package carriers) have wider variation in operation. The pickup and 
delivery processes are the same, but longer lanes mean that the intermediate dispatch can take 
place around the clock. Some carriers are structured such that inter-regional movement of 
freight will tend to happen on the same night-time lanes on which their over-night shipments 
travel, and some carriers are structured so that second- and third-day freight will travel during 
the day for at least some of its intermediate movement. In any case, the entire industry 
depends on night-time freight movement and any attempt to restrict it to 18 hours per week 
per driver would cause major restructuring. Indeed, since this restriction likely would restrict 
drivers to three days of work per week (less than full time), we suggest carriers might adapt 
by switching their drivers between night-time and day-time shifts throughout the week. 
While this would comply with the regulations, it would cause major damage to their 
biological cycles and making operations extremely dangerous. Alternatively, regulators 
could ban all night time driving, but resulting congestion and risk exposure probably would 
overwhelm the positive safety effects. 
Our driver survey evidence suggests the problem of night-time driving is somewhat less 
severe than previously thought. The above section on night driving, including Table 64 
through 
Table 71, suggest that on average drivers already are well in compliance with such a 
proposed rule. The discrepancy comes at the extremes. People who are on the night shift 
perform all of their work during these hours, so as individuals they are far from compliance 
with a proposed 18 hour limit. This group includes those who drive for most regional LTL 
carriers, for package carriers, and probably for much of the inter-regional and national LTL 
industry. Those who drive for TL firms (particularly long-haul) may well drive a small 
enough percentage of their hours during this period that they would be in compliance. The 
problem is that these drivers work 80 hours at the 75" percentile and 96 hours at the 90" 
percentile, making the 18 hour limitation a minor issue in their work schedule but one that 
likely makes a minor contribution to their safety risk. Ironically, the drivers most likely to be 
compliant with the 60 hour limit probably are the very drivers whose industry would be 
altered dramatically or shut down as a result of such a regulation. Finally, while data are 
sketchy we think the LTL and package industry has a much lower than average accident rate, 
so we would be interfering with the operations of those carriers that contribute least to the 
nation's highway safety problem. 
With greater funding and more time a more definitive analysis can be made. At this point, 
however, it seems to us this regulation would not achieve anywhere near enough benefit to 
justify the cost. We have not performed an economic analysis of this effect, but we could do 
so given more time for analysis. 

